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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Distribution of infected samples ... through weaponized Microsoft Office documents containing malicious macros, or by exploiting known vulnerabilities—most recently CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-2017-11882.
Distribution of infected samples ... through weaponized Microsoft Office documents containing malicious macros, or by exploiting known vulnerabilities—most recently CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-2017-11882.
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
In most recent cases, that payload has been the NewCore RAT (Korplug/Plugx and Sisfader were seen in prior campaigns).
This Trojan downloader downloads a RAT (Remote Access Trojan), which we will call “NewCore” RAT... We named this RAT ‘NewCore’ after we found the project name used by the author...
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Malicious DLL providing remote file management, uploads and downloads, disk and directory enumeration, screen monitoring, command-shell access, and shutdown or reboot capabilities. It depends on its downloader for command-and-control configuration rather than embedding the server string in the DLL. The described delivery chain uses malicious Office documents, DLL sideloading, registry persistence, and environment checks before payload retrieval. Its code may derive from PcClient and PcCortr. The report associates analyzed campaigns with Goblin Panda but explicitly cautions that the additional listed samples were not analyzed and their attribution is unconfirmed.
A DLL-based remote access trojan delivered by an in-memory downloader. It supports system control and file-management operations including shutdown/restart, disk and directory listing, file information, rename/copy/delete/execute/search, file upload/download, screen monitoring, and command shell access. It also evades analysis by relying on the downloader to pass C2 information at runtime.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.