Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
The starting point of the attack is a hidden Microsoft Visual Studio Code (VS Code) task named "eslint-check" that's configured with the "runOn: 'folderOpen'" option to trigger the execution of arbitrary code when the folder is opened as a workspace folder in an IDE like VS Code or Cursor.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A named malware/activity cluster with tactical overlap to PolinRider, involving JavaScript payloads disguised as font files and VS Code auto-run task execution.
A campaign-associated malware cluster/variant that abuses VS Code auto-run tasks and disguised font files to deliver multi-stage JavaScript and Python payloads, culminating in deployment of InvisibleFerret and a socket.io backdoor.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.