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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 2 actors

Backdoor.Mistic

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Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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KongTuke

A newly discovered remote access Trojan (RAT) called Backdoor.Mistic (Mistic backdoor), tracked by Zscaler as MLTBackdoor, is helping hackers infiltrate corporate networks.

via hackreadhackread.com
Woodgnat

A newly discovered remote access Trojan (RAT) called Backdoor.Mistic (Mistic backdoor), tracked by Zscaler as MLTBackdoor, is helping hackers infiltrate corporate networks.

via hackreadhackread.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

They hijack normal WordPress websites to push fake technical alerts. In a recent tactic from early 2026 called CrashFix, they purposely froze a victim’s web browser and displayed a message telling them to copy-paste a command to fix the issue.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

From April 2026, they have also started messaging staff directly on Microsoft Teams, posing as the company’s IT helpdesk to lure workers into running malicious commands.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Mistic provides attackers with typical capabilities, including ... code execution.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3

Once an employee falls for the trick, a multi-stage PowerShell chain downloads the malware.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence3

they purposely froze a victim’s web browser and displayed a message telling them to copy-paste a command to fix the issue... started messaging staff directly on Microsoft Teams, posing as the company’s IT helpdesk to lure workers into running malicious commands.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

A loader (version.dll) hooks GetModuleFileNameW and LoadLibraryW. The GetModuleFileNameW hook makes sure that the path mpextms.exe is pointed to the legitimate location of mpextms.exe. The LoadLibraryW hook makes sure it loads the malicious EndpointDlp.dll, which is Backdoor.Mistic.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

loaded from a DLL named EndpointDlp.dll, a name associated with Microsoft endpoint-security tooling. This would help the backdoor blend in with trusted software... Persistence is established through several redundant mechanisms, including Run-key entries that masquerade as legitimate remote-access software, using names such as AnyDesk, Splashtop and Comms.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

If the scammers think they may get caught, they use a built-in kill switch to make the malware delete itself instantly.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

A loader (version.dll) hooks GetModuleFileNameW and LoadLibraryW. The GetModuleFileNameW hook makes sure that the path mpextms.exe is pointed to the legitimate location of mpextms.exe. The LoadLibraryW hook makes sure it loads the malicious EndpointDlp.dll, which is Backdoor.Mistic.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

The backdoor runs payloads in memory with no file written to disk... Execute code from C2 in memory (no file saved on the disk).

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

A .NET DLL is also loaded on the victim network. This is a credential stealer that displays a fake login screen.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

Afterward, they use built-in Windows tools like Net.exe and Reg.exe to map out the network

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

The hackers install Backdoor.Mistic, which lets them manage files

Collection

1 technique
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

A .NET DLL is also loaded on the victim network. This is a credential stealer that displays a fake login screen.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

The backdoor can run remote payloads directly in memory... Upload/download a file... Once a command is executed, a multi-stage PowerShell chain downloads and unpacks a portable WinPython environment... Finger.exe... retrieve obfuscated payloads.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Afterward, they use built-in Windows tools like Net.exe and Reg.exe to map out the network, and Curl to transfer data out.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

39 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
29 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
9 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 days ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching39

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping14

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.