Skip to main content
Meet us at Black Hat USA 2026— Las Vegas, August 1–6Book a Meeting
Mallory
MalwareUsed by 2 actors

VileLoader

Share:
For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
Evilnum

This malware is consistently seen being deployed by an accompanying loader known as VileLoader, used to run VileRAT in-memory, limiting on-disk artifacts.

via stairwellstairwell.com
Deathstalker

This malware is consistently seen being deployed by an accompanying loader known as VileLoader, used to run VileRAT in-memory, limiting on-disk artifacts.

via stairwellstairwell.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

Back in the summer of 2020, DeathStalker’s VileRAT initial infection consisted in spear-phishing emails sent to foreign exchange companies... More recently... the initial infection vector is still a malicious message: a Word document (DOCX) is sent to targets via email.

Execution

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

VileDropper... schedules a task to run VileLoader 35 to 65 seconds later, then indefinitely every three hours and 45 minutes... VileRAT functionalities include... Setting up persistence using scheduled tasks.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

Based on public reports and observed filenames, we believe that this variant is being distributed through fake software piracy sites in order to broadly infect systems.

Persistence

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

VileDropper... schedules a task to run VileLoader 35 to 65 seconds later, then indefinitely every three hours and 45 minutes... VileRAT functionalities include... Setting up persistence using scheduled tasks.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

VileDropper... schedules a task to run VileLoader 35 to 65 seconds later, then indefinitely every three hours and 45 minutes... VileRAT functionalities include... Setting up persistence using scheduled tasks.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

VileLoader then opens its encoded companion shellcode file... maps the deobfuscated data in a region with read, write and execute (RWX) permissions, and runs the next stage (stage 2) by starting a new thread.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

This payload and its filename are both obfuscated using XOR-based encoding methods... VileRAT’s core component is stored in a compressed, Xored, and base64 encoded buffer...

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

When executed, it validates the passed command line argument ... before dynamically resolving imports related to file loading and process execution.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

Stairwell has observed new activity and has identified new variants of VileRAT being deployed by modified versions of legitimate installers that contain VileLoader.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

VileLoader then opens its encoded companion shellcode file... maps the deobfuscated data in a region with read, write and execute (RWX) permissions, and runs the next stage (stage 2) by starting a new thread.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

This NSIS Installer was signed on 13 August 2023 13:21:00 UTC from GLOSUB LLC.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

This malware is consistently seen being deployed by an accompanying loader known as VileLoader, used to run VileRAT in-memory, limiting on-disk artifacts.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

the DOTM-embedded macro silently gathers information about security products that are installed on the target computer... VileDropper: gathers additional data on the targeted environment... The JSON that is passed to the C2 server can be broken down as follows... host, uname, Windows version.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

If the C2 server answers with an implant package... contains one or several “files” with the following additional metadata: A CSIDL value... A subdirectory name; A file name...

Collection

1 technique
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

If the C2 server requests a screenshot, then VileLoader stage 2 sends an HTTP POST request... The associated HTTP POST body data is an encoded JPEG screenshot.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

The useful information is stored as a JSON document... and set as a cookie value in the HTTP request... VileLoader stage 2 sends an HTTP POST request with a cookie whose value is a XORed JSON dictionary.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

VileDropper sends data to a C2 server using an HTTP GET request... VileLoader’s second stage builds an HTTP GET request... VileRAT tries to send an HTTP POST request to each of the C2 servers that exist in its configuration.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

VileLoader’s main goal is to download and execute an additional payload from a C2 server... If the C2 server answers with an implant package, it sends a Type D XORed blob... contains one or several “files”... Finally, the last dropped file is also immediately executed.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence1

The useful information is stored as a JSON document, which is then XOR-encoded, base64-encoded, URL-encoded... The encrypted blob (cookie value) is initially a JSON dictionary, encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, XORed, base64-encoded and URL-encoded.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

249 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
147 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
102 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 months ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 months ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 months ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 months ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching249

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping16

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.