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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
During the investigation, we discovered QSC: a multi-plugin malware framework that loads and runs plugins (modules) in memory.
During the investigation, we discovered QSC: a multi-plugin malware framework that loads and runs plugins (modules) in memory.
During the investigation, we discovered QSC: a multi-plugin malware framework that loads and runs plugins (modules) in memory.
16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
The Command Shell module launches % windir % \ system32 \ cmd . exe as a shell using the CreateProcess API, and data is written to and read from the shell using pipes.
dc191340 Close the connection, delete its own module file and terminate its own process.
ping 172.19.19.1 - n 1 ping 172.19.19.2 - n 1 tracert 172.19.19.2 netstat - ano ping - a 172.17.104.102 - n 1
Send target information (e.g. computer name, user name, OS version, etc.)
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.