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AnimateClipper is a cryptocurrency clipper malware family that monitors the Windows clipboard and replaces copied wallet addresses with attacker-controlled alternatives, enabling silent redirection of cryptocurrency transactions. It is associated with large-scale malware distribution campaigns that impersonate legitimate software download sites, including portals for developer, reverse-engineering, and freeware tools, and that use search-engine manipulation and gated traffic distribution infrastructure to selectively deliver payloads.
Observed delivery includes ClickFix-style lures in which victims are presented with a fake verification prompt and tricked into launching a remote script through native Windows utilities. Reported infection chains include script-based staging, PowerShell execution, RC4 decryption, use of a bundled Python environment, and in-memory shellcode execution before the final payload is loaded. The malware has been described as supporting more than 20 blockchain ecosystems.
AnimateClipper’s core function is crypto theft through clipboard substitution rather than credential harvesting. By silently hijacking copied wallet addresses, it can cause victims to send funds to attacker-controlled wallets without obvious signs of compromise. It has been observed alongside other payloads such as RemusStealer and SessionGate in campaigns that rely on fake software sites, SEO poisoning, and traffic filtering to evade researchers and deliver malware selectively. The malware targets Windows systems and is particularly relevant to users downloading software from impersonation sites and to cryptocurrency users whose transactions depend on clipboard-copied wallet addresses.
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23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
регистрация доменов - на T1583.001 (Domains). Атакующие инвестируют в подготовку инфраструктуры задолго до раздачи пейлоадов
This kicks off a complex chain involving PowerShell, RC4 decryption, a Python environment, and a hidden loader inside a deceptive file (node_modules.asar).
Its beginning contains an HTA page with obfuscated VBScript, which mshta.exe executes.
This kicks off a complex chain involving PowerShell, RC4 decryption, a Python environment, and a hidden loader inside a deceptive file (node_modules.asar).
These pages load a CloudFront-hosted JavaScript staging layer that converts a click on a “download” button/link into a handoff to a Traffic Distribution System (TDS). The TDS enforces strict gating: first-visit state, mandatory click confirmation, anti-bot/anti-analysis logic, VPN/datacenter filtering, and frequency capping.
SessionGate — A previously unknown multi-stage loader with heavy obfuscation and extensive anti-analysis mechanisms... Because of the obfuscation techniques in use, including injected junk code, opaque predicates, and string encryption, the resulting functions become extremely bloated.
This unknown multi-stage loader disguises itself as a 7-Zip SFX installer... AnimateClipper: Using the ClickFix technique, a fake Cloudflare verification screen tricks users into running a remote script via mshta.exe.
The obfuscated script embeds a large shellcode blob directly in its body and launches it from memory. It copies the shellcode into a buffer, changes the memory protection to executable, and transfers execution to it via ntdll!LdrCallEnclave.
This kicks off a complex chain involving PowerShell, RC4 decryption... requiring a one-time key from yourfastcrc.com to decrypt subsequent payloads.
These pages load a CloudFront-hosted JavaScript staging layer that converts a click on a “download” button/link into a handoff to a Traffic Distribution System (TDS). The TDS enforces strict gating: first-visit state, mandatory click confirmation, anti-bot/anti-analysis logic, VPN/datacenter filtering, and frequency capping.
Using the ClickFix technique, a fake Cloudflare verification screen tricks users into running a remote script via mshta.exe.
The stealer polls the C2 using HTTP POST requests ... The malware uses HTTPS to communicate with the resolved C2 server. In the analyzed build, the observed logic includes periodic refresh check-ins
Маршрутизация Multi-hop Proxy (T1090.003, C2) TDS-цепочка из 4+ промежуточных нод для обфускации
These pages load a CloudFront-hosted JavaScript staging layer that converts a click on a 'download' button/link into a handoff to a Traffic Distribution System (TDS). The TDS enforces strict gating: first-visit state, mandatory click confirmation, anti-bot/anti-analysis logic, VPN/datacenter filtering, and frequency capping.
These pages load a CloudFront-hosted JavaScript staging layer that converts a click on a “download” button/link into a handoff to a Traffic Distribution System (TDS). The TDS enforces strict gating: first-visit state, mandatory click confirmation, anti-bot/anti-analysis logic, VPN/datacenter filtering, and frequency capping.
31 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A cryptocurrency clipper used via fake software download sites that replaces copied wallet addresses with attacker-controlled addresses.
Криптоклиппер, который подменяет адреса криптокошельков в буфере обмена; поддерживает более 20 блокчейн-экосистем.
A multi-stage clipboard hijacker delivered through a fake verification lure and ClickFix-style execution chain. It uses mshta.exe, PowerShell, RC4 decryption, a Python environment, and a hidden loader to run shellcode, then replaces cryptocurrency wallet addresses in the clipboard with attacker-controlled ones.
Clipboard-monitoring malware that replaces copied cryptocurrency wallet addresses with attacker-controlled addresses to divert funds.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.