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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The below SNORT rule can be used to detect the MoriAgent Beacon... YARA rule to detect MoriAgent implant... description = "C++ MuddyWater implant"
1 distinct technique documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
The below SNORT rule can be used to detect the MoriAgent Beacon. alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS (msg:" MoriAgent Beacon HTTP Request"; content:"/Index.php?i="; depth:200; content:"&t="; within:64; content:"HTTP/1.1"; within:64; content:"Content-Type: application/json"; within:32; content:"Content-Length: 0"; within:90; threshold:type limit,track by_src,count 1,seconds 120; sid:1000001; rev:001;)
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A malicious program in MuddyWater's arsenal.
MoriAgent is described as a C++ MuddyWater implant/backdoor with beaconing behavior over HTTP, including requests containing '/Index.php?i=' and 'Content-Type: application/json'.
Prior MuddyWater DLL-based malware referenced because of code similarities to PowGoop and campaign lineage.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.