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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
In 2024, we published an article detailing how Magecart veteran ATMZOW was found using Google Tag Manager for delivering malware.
7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
After removing the first layer of obfuscation, we got the familiar ATMZOW style of code... Unlike previous variants, however, the obfuscation used in this recently discovered GTM-TVKQ79ZS container uses extra complexity to hide all the domains and activation conditions.
50 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A Magecart-associated web skimmer used to deliver malicious JavaScript via Google Tag Manager in order to steal payment card data from Magento checkout pages.
A credit card skimmer used in ecommerce website compromises, particularly via malicious Google Tag Manager containers. It injects additional external scripts, uses multilayer obfuscation, rotates among many attacker-controlled domains, and is linked to long-running Magento-focused skimming activity.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.