HookBot, also known as Hook, is an Android banking trojan offered through a malware-as-a-service model. It appeared in January 2023 and belongs to the Cerberus-derived ERMAC lineage; ERMAC 3.0 subsequently incorporated substantial HookBot code. DukeEugene advertised and developed Hook, with RedDragon identified as a coder. Operators rent management infrastructure, build malicious APKs, and arrange distribution through sideloaded applications, fake updates, download links, file-hosting services, and messaging channels.
HookBot abuses Android accessibility permissions to monitor and manipulate applications, display credential-stealing overlays, and intercept SMS messages and authentication codes. It extends ERMAC's functionality with VNC-based remote screen control, file management, WhatsApp manipulation, and a WhatsApp propagation command. Its infrastructure supports forwarding stolen data and operator commands through Telegram. Selectable launcher identities impersonate popular applications, while APK obfuscation and IP-whitelisted management services impede analysis and infrastructure discovery.
Its overlay targeting encompasses banking, payment, cryptocurrency exchange, and wallet applications across numerous countries. These target inventories indicate intended targeting rather than confirmed infections. Leaked builder, panel, and Android source components have enabled independent operators to deploy and modify the malware.
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Hook added roughly 38 commands, most notably remote screen control via VNC.
Hook added roughly 38 commands, most notably remote screen control via VNC.
5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
792 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Android banking trojan and ERMAC fork that adds remote screen control, file management, WhatsApp manipulation, and link propagation from infected phones. Its infrastructure closely matches ERMAC 3.0 but additionally includes an IP-whitelist security gate and a Telegram operator interface for stolen credentials, SMS, authentication codes, and commands. The gate leaves the default builder port exposed, providing a more durable detection surface than panel titles.
Named malware family listed as detectable via favicon hash hunting of exposed infrastructure.
Listed as a malware/tool name in a collection of SHA-256 hashes intended to help identify C2 infrastructure, open directories, and phishing assets.
Malware family observed as command-and-control infrastructure hosted on the abusive networks discussed in the report.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.