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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
基于应用使用的Firebase数据库地址,我们将此新恶意家族命名为Dcpro。该家族仅具备少量的基本信息窃取功能,包含的恶意功能如下: 窃取联系人、窃取通话记录、窃取短信、窃取指定WhatsApp目录媒体文件、窃取设备外部存储文件。
基于应用使用的Firebase数据库地址,我们将此新恶意家族命名为Dcpro。该家族仅具备少量的基本信息窃取功能,包含的恶意功能如下: 窃取联系人、窃取通话记录、窃取短信、窃取指定WhatsApp目录媒体文件、窃取设备外部存储文件。
7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.