GoziAT
Hunt this family in your stack
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
Groups observed using it
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Selon MICROSOFT, les opérateurs de PISTACHE TEMPEST auraient également utilisé le code malveillant TrickBot et le MaaS GoziAT [14].
Techniques & procedures
11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
3 techniques
Initial Access
Credential Access
1 technique
Credential Access
Discovery
1 technique
Discovery
Collection
3 techniques
Collection
the malware injects itself into the web browser and capture every HTTP POST request, which makes credential and stealing credit card easy.
The main feature of the module is injecting code into the web browser that will monitor which websites the victims are visiting. If a banking website is identified, ISFB injects a small snippet of JavaScript into the online banking website to steal the login credentials.
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
The RM2 branch used to have a static CnC beacon format. The bot sends its requests to a URL path like “/images/[encoded data].[avi|bmp|gif|jpeg]”
IOCs tracked for this family
2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Recent activity
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
An exclusive ISFB branch associated with Expro, used heavily against US and Canadian targets and later shifted onto CRM2.5 as GoziAt2.5/RM2.5.
Gozi/ISFB-related banking trojan variant observed in BraZZZers-related requests.
Malware-as-a-Service tooling reportedly used by PISTACHE TEMPEST according to Microsoft.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.