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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The group’s arsenal includes proprietary malware such as PebbleDash, BabyShark, AppleSeed, and RandomQuery, as well as open-source RATs like xRAT, XenoRAT, and TutRAT.
8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
the group has shifted to using a new script-based attack chain that leverages multiple PowerShell and VBScript stagers to quietly infect systems.
The malware used in the DEEP#GOSU campaign likely enters the system through typical means where the user downloads a malicious email attachment containing a zip file with a single disguised file using the extension: pdf.lnk... Stage 1: Initial execution: LNK files [T1204.002]
Stage 2: Invoked code from Dropbox [T1102]... All of the C2 communication is handled through legitimate services such as Dropbox or Google Docs allowing the malware to blend undetected into regular network traffic.
we determined that the script once again reached back out to Dropbox and downloaded a compressed Base64 string.
2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.