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Kamikaze is a destructive wiper associated with the TeamPCP threat actor and used in 2026 supply-chain and cloud-native intrusion activity. It is designed to activate selectively against systems associated with Iran, including Kubernetes environments configured for the Iran timezone or otherwise identified as Iranian targets. In Kubernetes environments, Kamikaze is deployed via a DaemonSet to every node in the cluster, including control-plane nodes, and is intended to wipe filesystems across the cluster and crash or reboot affected systems. On non-Kubernetes Iranian systems, related TeamPCP tooling invokes destructive filesystem-erasure routines instead of deploying a persistent backdoor.
Kamikaze appeared as a second-stage destructive payload in TeamPCP operations that otherwise emphasized credential theft, propagation, and persistence. It was observed in malicious Trivy container images distributed through a software supply-chain compromise, in CanisterWorm-related propagation chains affecting npm ecosystems, and in updated TeamPCP Kubernetes-focused tooling. Outside the Iran-targeting condition, TeamPCP malware families in the same workflows typically deployed persistent backdoor functionality rather than the wiper, indicating Kamikaze is a conditional destructive branch within a broader intrusion framework.
The malware targets cloud-native infrastructure, especially Kubernetes clusters, and reflects TeamPCP’s evolution from financially motivated credential theft and infrastructure abuse toward region-specific destructive operations. High-confidence reporting links it to attacks on developer tooling, CI/CD environments, exposed container infrastructure, and poisoned open-source packages. Its primary purpose is destruction rather than espionage or persistence, although it is delivered through campaigns that also include credential harvesting, worm-like propagation, and Kubernetes-wide deployment mechanisms.
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1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
This destructive code path checked whether the victim system was configured for the Iran timezone and, if that's the case, fired a DaemonSet that wiped every node in the cluster via a wiper not-so-subtly named Kamikaze.
14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
This destructive code path checked whether the victim system was configured for the Iran timezone
new variants observed as recently as March 2026 began to incorporate wiper-like functionality
On Iranian systems it deployed a host-provisioner-iran DaemonSet, mounted the host root filesystem, and ran a container named kamikaze that deleted the host filesystem and force-rebooted the node.
Iranian nodes get wiped and force-rebooted via a container named 'kamikaze.'
1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A wiper deployed in compromised Kubernetes environments to erase every node in the cluster when the victim system is configured for the Iran timezone.
A destructive payload delivered selectively to systems geolocated to Iranian IP space, intended to wipe filesystems.
A wiper malware previously distributed via CanisterWorm and exposed Docker instances, noted here for using the same .WAV payload concealment technique.
A destructive wiper payload triggered by CanisterWorm on systems identified as being in Iran. It wipes Kubernetes clusters by deploying a DaemonSet to every node, or runs 'rm -rf / --no-preserve-root' on non-Kubernetes systems.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.