MalwareUsed by 1 actorExploits 1 CVE

XpertRAT

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES

CVE-2017-11882Microsoft Office Equation Editor Remote Code Execution VulnerabilityExploited in the wild

It all starts with a spam email containing an XLSX attachment that exploits the Microsoft Equation Editor’s remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) to download the file vbs.exe hosted on an open directory, save it as svchost.exe under %AppData% directory and automatically execute it. | This then connects to a Command and Control server (C&C or C2) to which it sends the compromised system information, and requests for the Remote Access Trojan (RAT) component – XpertRAT.

via k7 labslabs.k7computing.com

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details

Group5

"Additionally, we believe a controller for yet another remote access trojan, XpertRAT, was also hosted on this IP in November 2015; however, we did not uncover any samples..."

via citizenlabcitizenlab.ca

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

It all starts with a spam email containing an XLSX attachment that exploits the Microsoft Equation Editor’s remote code execution vulnerability

Execution

2 techniques

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

persistence of folder.exe is handled by a VB script folder.vbs dropped in the Startup directory

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

an XLSX attachment that exploits the Microsoft Equation Editor’s remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) to download the file vbs.exe

Persistence

1 technique

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

persistence of folder.exe is handled by a VB script folder.vbs dropped in the Startup directory

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Dumping the file from memory revealed it to be a Visual Basic compiled binary which injects into a legitimate Microsoft Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe) process.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

persistence of folder.exe is handled by a VB script folder.vbs dropped in the Startup directory

Stealth

4 techniques

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

save it as svchost.exe under %AppData% directory

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Dumping the file from memory revealed it to be a Visual Basic compiled binary which injects into a legitimate Microsoft Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe) process.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

it also checks for the presence of malware analysis and debugging tools, as well as anti-malware processes... If any of the aforementioned processes are found it terminates itself.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

decrypts the code responsible for the delivery of the aforementioned scumbags into allocated heap memory, and transfers the control to it

Credential Access

1 technique

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

The password stealing module can extract saved passwords (Instagram, Twitter, Gmail, Facebook, etc.) from various browsers, mails and FTP clients.

Discovery

2 techniques

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

This then connects to a Command and Control server (C&C or C2) to which it sends the compromised system information

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

it also checks for the presence of malware analysis and debugging tools, as well as anti-malware processes... If any of the aforementioned processes are found it terminates itself.

Command and Control

3 techniques

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

This then connects to a Command and Control server (C&C or C2) to which it sends the compromised system information, and requests for the Remote Access Trojan (RAT) component – XpertRAT.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

to download the file vbs.exe hosted on an open directory, save it as svchost.exe under %AppData% directory and automatically execute it

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

The actor employs various methods to install and run a variant of either JavaScript- or VBScript-based remote access trojans (RATs).

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes

5 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 years ago

hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app8 years ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

3 SOURCESView more in app

citizenlabNews

Jan 20, 2026

Group5: Syria and the Iranian Connection - The Citizen Lab

Mentioned as a suspected RAT controller hosted on the same C2 IP (88.198.222[.]163) in Nov 2015, but no corresponding malware samples were recovered in this dataset.

talosintelligence otherNews

Apr 21, 2021

A year of Fajan evolution and Bloomberg themed campaigns

A RAT family mentioned because it shares C2 infrastructure with the Nanocore payload observed in the campaign.

k7 labsNews

Dec 18, 2018

Scumbag Combo: Agent Tesla and XpertRAT - K7 Labs

A remote access trojan fetched from C2 as a plugin/component after initial staging. It is delivered as passwords.dll and is used to retrieve usernames and passwords stored in browser caches and emails, enabling remote access and credential theft.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

Start free trial

IOC matching6

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping13

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

MalwareUsed by 1 actorExploits 1 CVE

XpertRAT

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES

CVE-2017-11882Microsoft Office Equation Editor Remote Code Execution VulnerabilityExploited in the wild

via k7 labslabs.k7computing.com

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details

Group5

"Additionally, we believe a controller for yet another remote access trojan, XpertRAT, was also hosted on this IP in November 2015; however, we did not uncover any samples..."

via citizenlabcitizenlab.ca

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

It all starts with a spam email containing an XLSX attachment that exploits the Microsoft Equation Editor’s remote code execution vulnerability

Execution

2 techniques

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

persistence of folder.exe is handled by a VB script folder.vbs dropped in the Startup directory

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

an XLSX attachment that exploits the Microsoft Equation Editor’s remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) to download the file vbs.exe

Persistence

1 technique

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

persistence of folder.exe is handled by a VB script folder.vbs dropped in the Startup directory

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Dumping the file from memory revealed it to be a Visual Basic compiled binary which injects into a legitimate Microsoft Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe) process.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

persistence of folder.exe is handled by a VB script folder.vbs dropped in the Startup directory

Stealth

4 techniques

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

save it as svchost.exe under %AppData% directory

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Dumping the file from memory revealed it to be a Visual Basic compiled binary which injects into a legitimate Microsoft Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe) process.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

it also checks for the presence of malware analysis and debugging tools, as well as anti-malware processes... If any of the aforementioned processes are found it terminates itself.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

decrypts the code responsible for the delivery of the aforementioned scumbags into allocated heap memory, and transfers the control to it

Credential Access

1 technique

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

The password stealing module can extract saved passwords (Instagram, Twitter, Gmail, Facebook, etc.) from various browsers, mails and FTP clients.

Discovery

2 techniques

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

This then connects to a Command and Control server (C&C or C2) to which it sends the compromised system information

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

it also checks for the presence of malware analysis and debugging tools, as well as anti-malware processes... If any of the aforementioned processes are found it terminates itself.

Command and Control

3 techniques

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

This then connects to a Command and Control server (C&C or C2) to which it sends the compromised system information, and requests for the Remote Access Trojan (RAT) component – XpertRAT.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

to download the file vbs.exe hosted on an open directory, save it as svchost.exe under %AppData% directory and automatically execute it

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

The actor employs various methods to install and run a variant of either JavaScript- or VBScript-based remote access trojans (RATs).

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes

5 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 years ago

hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app8 years ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

3 SOURCESView more in app

citizenlabNews

Jan 20, 2026

Group5: Syria and the Iranian Connection - The Citizen Lab

Mentioned as a suspected RAT controller hosted on the same C2 IP (88.198.222[.]163) in Nov 2015, but no corresponding malware samples were recovered in this dataset.

talosintelligence otherNews

Apr 21, 2021

A year of Fajan evolution and Bloomberg themed campaigns

A RAT family mentioned because it shares C2 infrastructure with the Nanocore payload observed in the campaign.

k7 labsNews

Dec 18, 2018

Scumbag Combo: Agent Tesla and XpertRAT - K7 Labs

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching6

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping13

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.