MalwareUsed by 1 actor

FFmpeg

For your environment

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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LongNosedGoblin

"...an argument runner ... was used to run a video recorder, likely FFmpeg, to capture audio and video."

via dark readingdarkreading.com

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Prior to 10.11.10, a potential FFmpeg argument injection vulnerability exists in the subtitle conversion code path. SubtitleEncoder.ConvertTextSubtitleToSrtInternal (SubtitleEncoder.cs, line 382) interpolates the subtitle file path into FFmpeg command-line arguments without calling EncodingUtils.NormalizePath(). On Linux, filenames can contain double-quote characters, which break the argument quoting and allow injection of arbitrary FFmpeg arguments.

Collection

2 techniques

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

SystemInfoManager — сбор данных о системе жертвы, в том числе снимков экранов; RemoteControlManager ... запись экранов ... Для трансляции экрана используется отдельный файл ffmpeg.exe

T1125Video CaptureEvidence1

Generated datasets for salat stealer ffmpeg in attack range... The following datasets were collected during this attack simulation: Ffmpeg_event.log Path: /datasets/attack_techniques/T1125/salat_stealer_ffmpeg/ffmpeg_event.log

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

dark readingNews

Dec 19, 2025

LongNosedGoblin Caught Snooping on Asian Governments

Legitimate multimedia tool likely repurposed by the threat actor to record audio/video from compromised systems.

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IOC matching

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Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping3

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.