Malware

Zardoor

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

3 techniques

T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

Once a connection was established, the threat actor used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to move laterally and spread the attacker's tools — including Zardoor — by spawning processes on the target system and executing commands received from the C2

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Execution T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Execution T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

“Zar32.dll” is an HTTP/SSL remote access tool (RAT) that is capable of sending encrypted data to the attacker’s C2, executing PE payloads in fileless mode, searching for Session IDs, remote shellcode execution, and updating the C2 IP/hostname or port in memory.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Defense Evasion T1055.001 Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection

Stealth

3 techniques

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Defense Evasion T1055.001 Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Finally, a cleanup batch script is created and saved to the location %TEMP%\xz330ksdfg.bat . The batch script deletes the dropper and then deletes itself.

Discovery

5 techniques

T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques DiscoveryT1018 Remote System Discovery

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques DiscoveryT1033 System Owner/User Discovery

T1049System Network Connections DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Discovery T1049 System Network Connections Discovery

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Discovery T1057 Process Discovery

T1087.002Domain AccountEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Discovery T1087.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account

Command and Control

2 techniques

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Command and Control T1090.003 Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Command and Control T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

Exfiltration

1 technique

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

Talos discovered an ongoing espionage campaign in May 2023 targeting an Islamic charitable non-profit organization in Saudi Arabia that exfiltrates data approximately twice a month.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

TypeValueLatest sighting

ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 years ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

2 SOURCESView more in app

the hacker newsNews

Feb 24, 2026

UnsolicitedBooker Targets Central Asian Telecoms With LuciDoor and MarsSnake Backdoors

"...an as-yet-unattributed campaign targeting Saudi Arabia with another backdoor referred to as Zardoor."

talosintelligence otherNews

Feb 8, 2024

New Zardoor backdoor used in long-term cyber espionage operation targeting an Islamic organization

Previously unreported backdoor family used in a long-running espionage campaign. Its main component, zar32.dll, is an HTTP/SSL RAT that communicates with C2, sends encrypted data, executes PE payloads filelessly, performs remote shellcode execution, searches for session IDs, updates C2 settings in memory, and maintains persistence with support from zor32.dll and a malicious oci.dll loader via MSDTC side-loading.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

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IOC matching1

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping14

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

Malware

Zardoor

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

3 techniques

T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Execution T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Execution T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Defense Evasion T1055.001 Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection

Stealth

3 techniques

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Defense Evasion T1055.001 Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Finally, a cleanup batch script is created and saved to the location %TEMP%\xz330ksdfg.bat . The batch script deletes the dropper and then deletes itself.

Discovery

5 techniques

T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques DiscoveryT1018 Remote System Discovery

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques DiscoveryT1033 System Owner/User Discovery

T1049System Network Connections DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Discovery T1049 System Network Connections Discovery

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Discovery T1057 Process Discovery

T1087.002Domain AccountEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Discovery T1087.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account

Command and Control

2 techniques

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Command and Control T1090.003 Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Command and Control T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

Exfiltration

1 technique

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

Talos discovered an ongoing espionage campaign in May 2023 targeting an Islamic charitable non-profit organization in Saudi Arabia that exfiltrates data approximately twice a month.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

TypeValueLatest sighting

ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 years ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

2 SOURCESView more in app

the hacker newsNews

Feb 24, 2026

UnsolicitedBooker Targets Central Asian Telecoms With LuciDoor and MarsSnake Backdoors

"...an as-yet-unattributed campaign targeting Saudi Arabia with another backdoor referred to as Zardoor."

talosintelligence otherNews

Feb 8, 2024

New Zardoor backdoor used in long-term cyber espionage operation targeting an Islamic organization

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching1

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping14

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.