SilentCryptoMiner
SilentCryptoMiner is a covert cryptocurrency miner based on the open-source XMRig miner and, in some cases, described as a modified fork of the open-source SilentCryptoMiner project. It is used to mine multiple cryptocurrencies including XMR/Monero, ETH, ETC, and RTM, abusing victim CPU and GPU resources while attempting to remain unnoticed. Reported capabilities and behaviors include direct system calls for evasion, anti-analysis checks for virtual machines and sandboxes, monitoring for security and analysis tools and pausing mining when such tools are opened, disabling Windows sleep and hibernation, adding Microsoft Defender exclusions, and using the WinRing0x64.sys/WinRing0.sys vulnerable signed driver to tune CPU settings and improve mining performance. Observed persistence mechanisms include scheduled tasks, Run registry keys, Windows services such as DrvSvc disguised as a legitimate service, and fake Google updater services such as GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC. Some campaigns used process hollowing or injection into legitimate processes including dwm.exe, explorer.exe, conhost.exe, and Windows Explorer, with watchdog components restoring the miner if removed.
Observed infection vectors include trojanized or fake software installers, often delivered as ISO files; fake VPN and DPI-bypass/restriction-bypass tools distributed via YouTube, Telegram, and sites such as gitrok[.]com; fake browser or video player/HLS plugin update prompts on pirated streaming, movie, and online library sites; compromised digital book libraries; and malicious archives containing a legitimate-looking executable plus a side-loaded malicious DLL. In one January 2025 campaign reported by Doctor Web, components were distributed via steganography in specially crafted images. In the Russian fake VPN/DPI-bypass campaign, telemetry indicated more than 2,000 victims in Russia, and the second-stage payload was only downloadable from Russian IP addresses.
SilentCryptoMiner has been associated with multiple financially motivated campaigns and malware clusters. Elastic linked its deployment to the REF1695 operation, where it was installed alongside CNB Bot, PureRAT, and other loaders/miners. Kaspersky/Securelist reporting described campaigns in 2026 in which a modified SilentCryptoMiner was delivered with a RAT and watchdog via DLL side-loading from fake update lures on high-traffic pirated content platforms. Doctor Web reported a January 2025 Monero-mining campaign using SilentCryptoMiner. The malware has also appeared in broader malware panels and IOC tracking alongside families such as Vidar Stealer and Kraken RAT.
High-confidence infrastructure and indicators mentioned in the content include: 150.241.93[.]90:443 for mining in one XMRig-based sample with remote configuration hosted on Pastebin; 193.233.203[.]138/WjEjoHCj/t and 9x9o[.]com/q.txt in the Russian loader chain; payload storage as %LocalAppData%\driverpatch9t1ohxw8\di.exe; malicious archive URL urush1bar4[.]online; SHA1 6A0FE6065D76715FEEBC1526D456DB737F624407 for a malicious DLL used in one 2026 campaign; RAT C2 domains 5d14vnfb[.]space, r7mvjl67[.]space, zgj1tam9[.]space, jeaw520i[.]space, and qdmagva5[.]space; miner configuration server 107[.]172[.]212[.]235; and UnamWebPanel addresses m4yuri[.]online and kristina[.]quest. Additional samples mentioned as using SilentCryptoMiner as an obfuscation or packaging layer include SHA-256 e3505901fd44c8f6597ca9c512375b6ecbf3dc21dbae3d373318c99929d62091, b86612a6d62a1789031248bdb732b8bff51acaeaa687c3559f0980560a8abf2f, and cf1d985a33b39d332d4bac33d971a004dcd18cea82ff1b291c6a5046e073414d.
Hunt this family in your stack
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
Groups observed using it
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
However, instead of the promised software, a series of loaders installs a malicious toolkit including CNB Bot, PureRAT, and SilentCryptoMiner.
Techniques & procedures
31 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
3 techniques
Initial Access
By visiting pirated movie and TV show streaming sites, users are met with a fake alert claiming their video player plugin is out of date. One click on that fake update button kicks off an infection.
the attackers threatened the content creators under the pretext of copyright infringement, demanding that they post videos with malicious links or risk shutdown of their YouTube channels.
The infection chain leveraged a fake update for a video player plugin. When the user attempted to watch a video, the player displayed a message saying the plugin version was outdated and asking to install an update to continue. Clicking the link downloaded a ZIP archive.
Execution
6 techniques
Execution
operators retain full authority to run arbitrary commands or custom shellcode remotely
the original start script general.bat had been modified to run this file using PowerShell.
The malicious executable is a simple loader written in Python and packed into an executable application using PyInstaller. In some cases, the script has been additionally obfuscated using the PyArmor library.
a hidden function inside the file actively triggers a strategic stack overflow ... This overflow systematically builds a customized return-oriented programming chain to decrypt the primary payload
the developers recommend disabling security solutions, citing false positives... In one version, if the security solution on the victim’s device deleted the malicious file, the modified start script displayed the message “File not found, disable all antiviruses and re-download the file, that will help!”
Persistence
3 techniques
Persistence
To prevent MSRT from being automatically installed during the next update, the DontOfferThroughWUAU parameter is created with a value of 1 under the HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\MRT registry key.
Privilege Escalation
5 techniques
Privilege Escalation
For stealth, SilentCryptoMiner employs process hollowing to inject the miner code into a system process (in this case, dwm.exe).
The encrypted data is then converted into a base64 string, which is passed as a command-line parameter to launch the miner inside the explorer.exe process through process hollowing.
The loader creates a service named DrvSvc and sets its description to that of the legitimate Windows Image Acquisition (WIA) service.
Stealth
10 techniques
Stealth
In some cases, the script has been additionally obfuscated using the PyArmor library.
The miner configuration is Base64-encoded and encrypted using the AES-CBC algorithm
They started distributing malware under the guise of restriction bypass programs and injecting malicious code into existing programs.
The loader creates a service named DrvSvc and sets its description to that of the legitimate Windows Image Acquisition (WIA) service.
For stealth, SilentCryptoMiner employs process hollowing to inject the miner code into a system process (in this case, dwm.exe).
The encrypted data is then converted into a base64 string, which is passed as a command-line parameter to launch the miner inside the explorer.exe process through process hollowing.
For stealth, SilentCryptoMiner employs process hollowing to inject the miner code into a system process (in this case, dwm.exe).
Scanning the current environment for artifacts of running on a virtual machine or in a sandbox. The loader compares system data... with predefined lists of values used by virtual environments.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
Discovery
3 techniques
Discovery
the main module gathers basic processor metadata and disk serial numbers
Command and Control
4 techniques
Command and Control
It then transmits this hardware information by utilizing advanced DNS tunneling techniques
Impact
1 technique
Impact
IOCs tracked for this family
55 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
Recent activity
11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A customized cryptomining malware variant delivered via fake update/installers on pirated streaming and ebook sites. It uses DLL side-loading, junk code padding, a stack overflow and ROP chain to decrypt and reflectively load its main module in memory, exfiltrates host metadata over DNS tunneling, disables security tools when elevated, persists with a watchdog, and includes remote command execution capability via a RAT component.
A modified open-source cryptocurrency miner used to silently mine cryptocurrency on victim systems using CPU and GPU resources.
Cryptomining malware used to hijack victim hardware for Monero mining while evading detection by stopping mining when security tools are opened and restarting afterward.
A miner that uses direct system calls to evade detection, disables Windows Sleep and Hibernate modes, establishes persistence via a scheduled task, uses the Winring0.sys driver to tune CPU settings for mining, and is protected by a watchdog process that restores deleted artifacts and persistence.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.