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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

SilentCryptoMiner

SilentCryptoMiner is a covert cryptocurrency miner based on the open-source XMRig miner and, in some cases, described as a modified fork of the open-source SilentCryptoMiner project. It is used to mine multiple cryptocurrencies including XMR/Monero, ETH, ETC, and RTM, abusing victim CPU and GPU resources while attempting to remain unnoticed. Reported capabilities and behaviors include direct system calls for evasion, anti-analysis checks for virtual machines and sandboxes, monitoring for security and analysis tools and pausing mining when such tools are opened, disabling Windows sleep and hibernation, adding Microsoft Defender exclusions, and using the WinRing0x64.sys/WinRing0.sys vulnerable signed driver to tune CPU settings and improve mining performance. Observed persistence mechanisms include scheduled tasks, Run registry keys, Windows services such as DrvSvc disguised as a legitimate service, and fake Google updater services such as GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC. Some campaigns used process hollowing or injection into legitimate processes including dwm.exe, explorer.exe, conhost.exe, and Windows Explorer, with watchdog components restoring the miner if removed.

Observed infection vectors include trojanized or fake software installers, often delivered as ISO files; fake VPN and DPI-bypass/restriction-bypass tools distributed via YouTube, Telegram, and sites such as gitrok[.]com; fake browser or video player/HLS plugin update prompts on pirated streaming, movie, and online library sites; compromised digital book libraries; and malicious archives containing a legitimate-looking executable plus a side-loaded malicious DLL. In one January 2025 campaign reported by Doctor Web, components were distributed via steganography in specially crafted images. In the Russian fake VPN/DPI-bypass campaign, telemetry indicated more than 2,000 victims in Russia, and the second-stage payload was only downloadable from Russian IP addresses.

SilentCryptoMiner has been associated with multiple financially motivated campaigns and malware clusters. Elastic linked its deployment to the REF1695 operation, where it was installed alongside CNB Bot, PureRAT, and other loaders/miners. Kaspersky/Securelist reporting described campaigns in 2026 in which a modified SilentCryptoMiner was delivered with a RAT and watchdog via DLL side-loading from fake update lures on high-traffic pirated content platforms. Doctor Web reported a January 2025 Monero-mining campaign using SilentCryptoMiner. The malware has also appeared in broader malware panels and IOC tracking alongside families such as Vidar Stealer and Kraken RAT.

High-confidence infrastructure and indicators mentioned in the content include: 150.241.93[.]90:443 for mining in one XMRig-based sample with remote configuration hosted on Pastebin; 193.233.203[.]138/WjEjoHCj/t and 9x9o[.]com/q.txt in the Russian loader chain; payload storage as %LocalAppData%\driverpatch9t1ohxw8\di.exe; malicious archive URL urush1bar4[.]online; SHA1 6A0FE6065D76715FEEBC1526D456DB737F624407 for a malicious DLL used in one 2026 campaign; RAT C2 domains 5d14vnfb[.]space, r7mvjl67[.]space, zgj1tam9[.]space, jeaw520i[.]space, and qdmagva5[.]space; miner configuration server 107[.]172[.]212[.]235; and UnamWebPanel addresses m4yuri[.]online and kristina[.]quest. Additional samples mentioned as using SilentCryptoMiner as an obfuscation or packaging layer include SHA-256 e3505901fd44c8f6597ca9c512375b6ecbf3dc21dbae3d373318c99929d62091, b86612a6d62a1789031248bdb732b8bff51acaeaa687c3559f0980560a8abf2f, and cf1d985a33b39d332d4bac33d971a004dcd18cea82ff1b291c6a5046e073414d.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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REF1695

However, instead of the promised software, a series of loaders installs a malicious toolkit including CNB Bot, PureRAT, and SilentCryptoMiner.

via hackreadhackread.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

31 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

By visiting pirated movie and TV show streaming sites, users are met with a fake alert claiming their video player plugin is out of date. One click on that fake update button kicks off an infection.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

the attackers threatened the content creators under the pretext of copyright infringement, demanding that they post videos with malicious links or risk shutdown of their YouTube channels.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The infection chain leveraged a fake update for a video player plugin. When the user attempted to watch a video, the player displayed a message saying the plugin version was outdated and asking to install an update to continue. Clicking the link downloaded a ZIP archive.

Execution

6 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence3

operators retain full authority to run arbitrary commands or custom shellcode remotely

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

the original start script general.bat had been modified to run this file using PowerShell.

T1059.006PythonEvidence1

The malicious executable is a simple loader written in Python and packed into an executable application using PyInstaller. In some cases, the script has been additionally obfuscated using the PyArmor library.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

a hidden function inside the file actively triggers a strategic stack overflow ... This overflow systematically builds a customized return-oriented programming chain to decrypt the primary payload

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

the developers recommend disabling security solutions, citing false positives... In one version, if the security solution on the victim’s device deleted the malicious file, the modified start script displayed the message “File not found, disable all antiviruses and re-download the file, that will help!”

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

Актуальная версия загружаемого вредоносного ПО представляет собой ZIP-архив, содержащий легитимный .exe-файл и вредоносную DLL-библиотеку. При запуске исполняемого файла библиотека подгружается в его процесс, после чего начинается выполнение вредоносной логики.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

To prevent MSRT from being automatically installed during the next update, the DontOfferThroughWUAU parameter is created with a value of 1 under the HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\MRT registry key.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence2

The loader creates a service named DrvSvc and sets its description to that of the legitimate Windows Image Acquisition (WIA) service.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

...настраивается автозагрузка копии майнера из этой папки путем добавления записи в HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence4

For stealth, SilentCryptoMiner employs process hollowing to inject the miner code into a system process (in this case, dwm.exe).

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

The encrypted data is then converted into a base64 string, which is passed as a command-line parameter to launch the miner inside the explorer.exe process through process hollowing.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence2

The loader creates a service named DrvSvc and sets its description to that of the legitimate Windows Image Acquisition (WIA) service.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

...настраивается автозагрузка копии майнера из этой папки путем добавления записи в HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

standard user runs will continuously trigger intrusive privilege prompts . This aggressive routine loops every three minutes until the victim yields control

Stealth

10 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

In some cases, the script has been additionally obfuscated using the PyArmor library.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

The miner configuration is Base64-encoded and encrypted using the AES-CBC algorithm

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

They started distributing malware under the guise of restriction bypass programs and injecting malicious code into existing programs.

T1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceEvidence1

The loader creates a service named DrvSvc and sets its description to that of the legitimate Windows Image Acquisition (WIA) service.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence4

For stealth, SilentCryptoMiner employs process hollowing to inject the miner code into a system process (in this case, dwm.exe).

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

The encrypted data is then converted into a base64 string, which is passed as a command-line parameter to launch the miner inside the explorer.exe process through process hollowing.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

For stealth, SilentCryptoMiner employs process hollowing to inject the miner code into a system process (in this case, dwm.exe).

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Scanning the current environment for artifacts of running on a virtual machine or in a sandbox. The loader compares system data... with predefined lists of values used by virtual environments.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Only after receiving a specific approval signal from the server does the malware proceed, showing that attackers carefully filter targets to avoid tripping security test environments.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

this shellcode reflectively loads the main module completely inside system memory

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

To prevent MSRT from being automatically installed during the next update, the DontOfferThroughWUAU parameter is created with a value of 1 under the HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\MRT registry key.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

the main module gathers basic processor metadata and disk serial numbers

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Scanning the current environment for artifacts of running on a virtual machine or in a sandbox. The loader compares system data... with predefined lists of values used by virtual environments.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Only after receiving a specific approval signal from the server does the malware proceed, showing that attackers carefully filter targets to avoid tripping security test environments.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071.004DNSEvidence3

It then transmits this hardware information by utilizing advanced DNS tunneling techniques

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The loader retrieves the URL of the next-stage payload from a hardcoded path on one of two domains... After the download, it saves the payload named t.py in a temporary directory and runs it.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence3

It can be controlled remotely via a web panel.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

This agent utilizes dynamically generated domains to receive administrative instructions

Impact

1 technique
T1496Resource HijackingEvidence2

The core payload is a modified version of an open-source cryptocurrency miner called SilentCryptoMiner. Once active, it silently uses the victim’s CPU and GPU to mine cryptocurrency without the user noticing.

Other

2 techniques
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence2

If running with administrator rights, the threat disables built-in operating system security utilities . It actively deletes Microsoft’s Malicious Software Removal Tool

T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Adding the AppData directory to Microsoft Defender exclusions.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

55 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
25 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
18 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
12 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching55

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping31

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.