Malware

EnrollLogger

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The credentials were sent back to the attackers and were used for lateral movement and privilege escalation

Execution

1 technique

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

the attackers used the DLL search order hijacking technique in order to load Mimikatz

Persistence

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The credentials were sent back to the attackers and were used for lateral movement and privilege escalation

Privilege Escalation

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The credentials were sent back to the attackers and were used for lateral movement and privilege escalation

Stealth

3 techniques

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

PcShare was executed via a Loader DLL (NvSmartMax.dll) and a Payload (NvSmartMax.dat) attempting to masquerade as a legitimate module by NVIDIA

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The credentials were sent back to the attackers and were used for lateral movement and privilege escalation

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

the attackers used the DLL search order hijacking technique in order to load Mimikatz

Credential Access

1 technique

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

One of the tools used by the attackers was a custom-built keylogger dubbed “EnrollLogger”

Collection

2 techniques

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

One of the tools used by the attackers was a custom-built keylogger dubbed “EnrollLogger”

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

the keylogger also steals data stored on Windows’ Clipboard

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Hashes

1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

2 SOURCESView more in app

cybereason blogNews

Jan 1, 2025

DeadRinger: Exposing Chinese Threat Actors Targeting Major Telcos

A custom keylogger that monitors keystrokes via GetKeyState(), steals clipboard data, XOR-encrypts the collected data, and stores it in text files under a roaming profile directory. It was deployed via DLL hijacking using PotPlayer.

cybereason blogNews

Jan 25, 2026

DeadRinger: Exposing Chinese Threat Actors Targeting Major Telcos

Custom keylogger deployed via DLL hijacking against PotPlayer to capture keystrokes (GetKeyState) and clipboard data, XOR-encrypting and writing logs to disk for later collection.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

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IOC matching1

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping5

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

Malware

EnrollLogger

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The credentials were sent back to the attackers and were used for lateral movement and privilege escalation

Execution

1 technique

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

the attackers used the DLL search order hijacking technique in order to load Mimikatz

Persistence

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The credentials were sent back to the attackers and were used for lateral movement and privilege escalation

Privilege Escalation

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The credentials were sent back to the attackers and were used for lateral movement and privilege escalation

Stealth

3 techniques

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

PcShare was executed via a Loader DLL (NvSmartMax.dll) and a Payload (NvSmartMax.dat) attempting to masquerade as a legitimate module by NVIDIA

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The credentials were sent back to the attackers and were used for lateral movement and privilege escalation

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

the attackers used the DLL search order hijacking technique in order to load Mimikatz

Credential Access

1 technique

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

One of the tools used by the attackers was a custom-built keylogger dubbed “EnrollLogger”

Collection

2 techniques

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

One of the tools used by the attackers was a custom-built keylogger dubbed “EnrollLogger”

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

the keylogger also steals data stored on Windows’ Clipboard

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Hashes

1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

2 SOURCESView more in app

cybereason blogNews

Jan 1, 2025

DeadRinger: Exposing Chinese Threat Actors Targeting Major Telcos

cybereason blogNews

Jan 25, 2026

DeadRinger: Exposing Chinese Threat Actors Targeting Major Telcos

Custom keylogger deployed via DLL hijacking against PotPlayer to capture keystrokes (GetKeyState) and clipboard data, XOR-encrypting and writing logs to disk for later collection.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching1

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping5

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.