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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

DoiLoader

DOILoader, also referred to in the provided content as IDAT Loader or HijackLoader, is a malware loader used to execute encrypted follow-on payloads via DLL side-loading. In the observed activity, threat actors bundled trojanized DLLs with legitimate signed applications so that execution of the benign program side-loaded DOILoader, which then decrypted and launched the next-stage malware from an included encrypted file. Reported examples include a trojanized PYTHON27.DLL side-loaded by a renamed legitimate Ace Stream executable to execute an encrypted payload in Vos.xwtx and run zgRAT, and a trojanized DLL bundled with the signed application Rene.E Facebook Widget to load Lumma Stealer encoded in an m4a file. Proofpoint also described ClearFake activity in which a trojanized DLL using DOILoader loaded Lumma Stealer from an encrypted file extracted from a ZIP archive.

The malware is associated in the content with multiple financially motivated delivery clusters and campaigns. It was observed in malware chains tied to TA2727, where Windows users were typically served DOILoader and Lumma Stealer through fake browser update lures on compromised websites, with traffic routed by TA2726. It also appeared in broader activity sets that delivered XWorm, Amadey, zgRAT, NetSupport, and Lumma Stealer, including reservation-themed DanaBot-linked campaigns and Lovable-hosted malware delivery chains. Infection vectors directly mentioned include fake secure download pages, fake browser update pages, compromised websites with malicious injects, and archives containing legitimate executables plus trojanized DLL dependencies.

High-confidence indicators and artifacts directly mentioned in the content include the encrypted payload file Vos.xwtx, the trojanized PYTHON27.DLL, bundled m4a-encoded payload storage, and one command-and-control endpoint associated with a DOILoader-to-zgRAT chain: 84[.]32[.]41[.]163:7705.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TA2727

The MSI installed and executed the legitimate and signed application “Rene.E Facebook Widget”. However, one of the bundled DLLs was trojanized with DOILoader, which was side loaded upon execution. DOILoader then ran Lumma Stealer, which was encoded in a bundled m4a file.

via proofpointproofpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Typically, an attack chain will consist of three parts: the malicious injects served to website visitors, which are often malicious JavaScript scripts; a traffic distribution service (TDS) responsible for determining what user gets which payload based on a variety of filtering options; and the ultimate payload that is downloaded by the script.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

Messages contained URLs leading to a website instructing the recipient to sign a form and click “submit”. Then, the user would be redirected to a ClickFix landing page.

Execution

2 techniques
T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

If the target clicked the download button, a popup opened that provided the password “RE2025” and another download button that led to the download of a RAR-file...

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

The RAR file contained the executable “Rechnung DE009100019000.exe”... When the .exe was executed, it sideloaded the included PYTHON27.DLL...

Stealth

1 technique
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

The MSI installed and executed the legitimate and signed application “Rene.E Facebook Widget”. However, one of the bundled DLLs was trojanized with DOILoader, which was side loaded upon execution.

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence2

downloaded a file named “data.zip” and extracted the contents to find and execute any .exe files

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

another download button that led to the download of a RAR-file “DE0019902001000RE.rar” hosted on Dropbox.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
2 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
2 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
2 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app11 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app11 months ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app11 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app11 months ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching6

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping7

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.