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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 3 actorsExploits 1 CVE

EDRKillShifter

EDRKillShifter is an EDR-killing utility developed and maintained by the RansomHub ransomware-as-a-service operation and offered to affiliates through its affiliate panel. It was first introduced to affiliates on May 8, 2024, and was observed deployed by RansomHub in 2024, including August 2024. The tool is widely described as a bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver (BYOVD) loader used to disable endpoint protection before ransomware deployment, and later reporting states updated or repurposed versions were used by other ransomware groups including Medusa, BianLian, Play, BlackSuit, Qilin, DragonForce, Crytox, Lynx, and INC.

Sophos described EDRKillShifter as a loader executable that requires a unique 64-character command-line password to run. With the correct password, it decrypts an embedded resource named BIN, writes the encrypted BIN data to Config.ini in the execution directory, deletes that file during execution, and uses the SHA-256 hash of the supplied password as the decryption key for later stages. The second stage uses self-modifying code, and the final payload is Go-based and obfuscated, possibly with gobfuscate. The payload embeds a vulnerable driver in its .data section, drops a .sys file with a random filename into \AppData\Local\Temp, creates and starts a Windows service to load the driver, and then enters an endless loop enumerating and terminating processes from a hardcoded target list. One observed variant also accepted an additional "--list" argument to add process names.

Observed driver abuse includes vulnerable drivers identified as RentDrv2 and ThreatFireMonitor. Other reporting on related or evolved builds describes the tool searching for a driver with a hardcoded random five-character name, loading a malicious driver signed with compromised or expired certificates, and using drivers masquerading as legitimate components such as the CrowdStrike Falcon Sensor Driver. Certificates mentioned in reporting on these builds include Changsha Hengxiang Information Technology Co., Ltd. and Fuzhou Dingxin Trade Co., Ltd. A recurring driver filename mraml.sys and service name mraml.exe were also reported in HeartCrypt-packed samples associated with this tooling.

Its purpose is to terminate AV/EDR processes and stop security-related services on Windows systems. Reported targets across samples include products from Sophos, Microsoft Defender, SentinelOne, Symantec, Trend Micro, Bitdefender, Cylance, ESET, F-Secure, Fortinet, HitmanPro, Kaspersky, McAfee, and Webroot. Specific process names mentioned include MsMpEng.exe, SophosHealth.exe, SAVService.exe, and sophosui.exe.

EDRKillShifter has been linked to ransomware intrusion chains in which the EDR killer is executed before the ransomware payload. Reporting ties it to RansomHub intrusions and to broader ransomware activity involving Play, Medusa, BianLian, BlackSuit, Qilin, DragonForce, Crytox, Lynx, and INC. In one failed RansomHub attack analyzed by Sophos, EDRKillShifter was used in an attempt to disable Sophos protections before ransomware execution, but Sophos blocked both the defense-evasion attempt and the subsequent ransomware activity. Sophos detects the tool as Troj/KillAV-KG.

Known sample hashes mentioned in the content include SHA256 451f5aa55eb207e73c5ca53d249b95911d3fad6fe32eee78c58947761336cc60 and d0f9eae1776a98c77a6c6d66a3fd32cee7ee6148a7276bc899c1a1376865d9b0, as well as SHA-1 BF84712C5314DF2AA851B8D4356EA51A9AD50257, 77DAF77D9D2A08CC22981C004689B870F74544B5, 2bc75023f6a4c50b21eb54d1394a7b8417608728, and 21a9ca6028992828c9c360d752cb033603a2fd93. Associated infrastructure mentioned includes 45.32.206[.]169 and 45.32.210[.]151.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2023-44976Local EDR Process Termination via Hangzhou Shunwang Rentdrv2 IOCTLExploited in the wild

BadRentdrv2 ... rentdrv2ドライバの脆弱性(CVE-2023-44976)を悪用するBYOVD PoC。x32/x64両対応で、EDR/AVプロセスをPID指定で終了可能。RansomHub等のEDRKillShifterでも悪用が確認されている

via sdsgsdsg.moe
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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RansomHub

For comparison, ESET notes that RansomHub , another prominent RaaS operation, built a single in-house EDR killer ( EDRKillShifter ) for affiliate use via its affiliate panel.

via thecybersecguruthecybersecguru.com
CosmicBeetle

RansomHub’s EDR killer, named EDRKillShifter by Sophos, is a custom tool developed and maintained by the operator.

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
Water Bakunawa

Water Bakunawa uses EDRKillShifter to evade detection and disrupt security monitoring processes.

via zerosalariumzerosalarium.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence1

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure QuadSwitcher acquired infrastructure to host their tooling.

T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware The RansomHub, Play, Medusa, and BianLian gangs develop their own encryptors and related tooling.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

"execute EDRKillShifter with a command line that includes a password string"; "can also receive an additional command line argument '--list'"

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

All samples require a unique 64-character password passed to the command line. If the password is wrong (or not provided), it won’t execute.

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

After the malware creates a new service for the driver, starts the service, and loads the driver, it enters an endless loop

Persistence

2 techniques
T1505Server Software ComponentEvidence1

The attackers can further abuse this kernel-level access to move laterally within the network, deploy ransomware, steal data, backdoor compromised systems, and perform other nefarious actions without being detected.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

"After the malware creates a new service for the driver, starts the service, and loads the driver"

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence6

BYOVD-based EDR killers exploit vulnerable drivers to escalate kernel-level privileges.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

"After the malware creates a new service for the driver, starts the service, and loads the driver"

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

Commercial EDR killers especially use obfuscation and encryption (e.g., CardSpaceKiller).

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

The original filename is Loader.exe and its product name is ARK-Game. (Some members of the research team speculated that the threat actor tries to masquerade the final payload as a popular computer game named ARK: Survival Evolved.)

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

It also copies that data into a new file named Config.ini and writes that file to the same filesystem location where the binary was executed... The malware then deletes the config.ini file

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

When run with the correct password, the executable decrypts an embedded resource named BIN and executes it in memory.

T1480Execution GuardrailsEvidence1

RansomHub’s builder adds an additional layer of protection to its encryptors, a 64-character password, without which the encryptor does not work.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

The sole purpose of the final, decoded layer is to load the final payload dynamically into memory and execute it.

Discovery

1 technique
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

it enters an endless loop that continuously enumerates the running processes, terminating processes if their name appears in a hardcoded list of targets.

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

...ultimately steal and encrypt data before extorting victims into paying a ransom... The attackers can further abuse this kernel-level access to move laterally within the network, deploy ransomware, steal data, backdoor compromised systems...

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

T1071 Application Layer Protocol In Play intrusions, payloads are retrieved via HTTP.

Impact

1 technique
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

"steal and encrypt data before extorting victims"; "deploy ransomware, steal data, backdoor compromised systems"

Other

2 techniques
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence6

ESET's analysis also documents the emerging threat of EDR killers, unmasking EDRKillShifter, one such tool developed and maintained by RansomHub.

T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence5

EDR killers terminate or suspend EDR/AV processes and services to bypass detection.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Hashes
2 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 months ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 months ago
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IOC matching2

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution3

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping20

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.