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MalwareUsed by 2 actorsExploits 1 CVE

DonutLoader

DonutLoader is an open-source shellcode generation and in-memory execution framework used to wrap .NET assemblies, DLLs, EXEs, and other payloads into position-independent shellcode for memory-only execution. Across the provided reporting, it is consistently described as a loader/packer rather than the final payload, and is used to decrypt, unpack, inject, or launch next-stage malware entirely in memory to reduce disk artifacts and evade traditional signature- and disk-based detection.

Observed behaviors in the content include generating shellcode for in-memory execution, unpacking embedded payloads, injecting shellcode into processes such as explorer.exe, Chrome, and Microsoft Edge, and launching payloads via new threads. DonutLoader is also described as using a specialized position-independent execution stub, and one report notes shellcode generated with DonutLoader using Chaskey-LTS in CTR mode to decrypt embedded configuration and execution context.

Infection chains in the content show DonutLoader being delivered or invoked through multiple vectors and tradecraft patterns, including malicious VBScript campaigns, phishing-delivered JavaScript and batch droppers, PowerShell stages, DLL sideloading with legitimate signed binaries, abuse of LOLBins such as Scriptrunner.exe, extraction from a PNG image in a software supply-chain compromise, and malvertising campaigns impersonating software such as Node.js and Claude AI. It is also referenced in campaigns using trojanized installers, ZIP/LNK delivery, and script-based persistence.

DonutLoader is associated in the content with delivery of numerous malware families and frameworks, including ValleyRAT, CASTLESTEALER, Beagle, AgentTesla, StealC v2, XWorm, Remcos RAT, AdaptixC2 beacons, and LummaStealer-related operations. Specific examples include: a Triage-classified sample linked to ValleyRAT with C2 143.92.37.168:10086 and campaign date 2026-02-02; OXLOADER using DonutLoader to deliver CASTLESTEALER in memory; a fake Claude AI installer chain using DonutLoader to deploy the Beagle backdoor from claude-pro[.]com with C2 at license[.]claude-pro[.]com over TCP 443 or UDP 8080; JavaScript droppers abusing Scriptrunner.exe to launch DonutLoader that unpacked AgentTesla entirely in memory; hosting of DonutLoader at 62.60.226.248 where it injected StealC v2 into Chrome and Edge; and a FedEx-themed phishing chain where DonutLoader-like shellcode was injected into explorer.exe and connected to 204.10.160.190:7003 as XWorm.

The content links DonutLoader usage to multiple threat actors or clusters, though not as an exclusive tool of any one actor. It appears in reporting tied to ValleyRAT activity potentially associated with Silver Fox, GrayBravo logistics-themed campaigns, TeamPCP supply-chain activity, and LummaStealer delivery chains. Targeting described in the content spans software developers, enterprise users, shipping/logistics/maritime/procurement organizations, Windows users in the United States, and broader victims reached through malvertising, phishing, and fake software/update lures.

High-confidence indicators directly mentioned alongside DonutLoader activity include 143.92.37.168:10086 in ValleyRAT-related traffic; 62.60.226.248 hosting DonutLoader payloads; license[.]claude-pro[.]com and IP 8.217.190.58 in the Beagle campaign; and 204.10.160.190:7003 in the XWorm-related chain. Additional file and path indicators mentioned in DonutLoader-linked chains include NOVupdate.exe, avk.dll, NOVupdate.exe.dat, C:\Users\Public\Libraries<random>.exe, and %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Templates\dwm.cmd.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2026-33634Trivy supply chain compromise via malicious release and retagged GitHub ActionsExploited in the wild

On Windows systems, the hack of the Telnyx Python SDK resulted in the deployment of an executable named "msbuild.exe" that employs several obfuscation techniques to evade detection and extracts DonutLoader, a shellcode loader, from a PNG image present within the binary to load a full-featured trojan and a beacon associated with AdaptixC2, an open-source command-and-control (C2) framework.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TeamPCP

On Windows systems, the hack of the Telnyx Python SDK resulted in the deployment of an executable named "msbuild.exe" that employs several obfuscation techniques to evade detection and extracts DonutLoader, a shellcode loader, from a PNG image present within the binary to load a full-featured trojan and a beacon associated with AdaptixC2, an open-source command-and-control (C2) framework.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
Velvet Tempest

...Velvet Tempest ... used a ClickFix lure ... to drop payloads like DonutLoader and CastleRAT.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

25 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence1

The campaign appears to be spreading through malvertising, where attackers pay to place malicious links in search engine ads and sponsored results.

T1608.006SEO PoisoningEvidence1

Threat actors may have also used SEO poisoning to further boost the site’s visibility in organic search results.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Many of the Keitaro IP addresses we saw in the AS214351 network host and distribute malware.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

Stage 1: Email Delivery Victim receives spearphishing email with .JS attachment Lure themes: "Bill of Lading", "Vessel Particulars", "Urgent Inquiry For Quotation"

Execution

5 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

62[.]60[.]226[.]248 hosted the DonutLoader malware payload... a memory‑only loader that turns PE/.NET/DLL/script into shellcode and injects them into other processes.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence4

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Application Execution PowerShell T1059.001 Invoke-WebRequest + Add-Type inline C#

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence2

Stage 2: JavaScript Execution via WSH Double-click triggers WScript.exe (Windows Script Host) Script begins deobfuscation through 4-layer chain

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

"Velvet Tempest ... observed using a ClickFix lure, followed by hands-on-keyboard activity"

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence1

"...relies on affiliates, social engineering, fake cracked software, and fake CAPTCHA “ClickFix” lures." / "ClickFix pages trick users into pasting malicious PowerShell commands."

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence4

Once the MSI executes, it drops three files into the Windows Startup folder: NOVupdate.exe, NOVupdate.exe.dat, and a malicious DLL named avk.dll.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

After unpacking the core archives, the malware moves into an advanced code injection stage.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Application Execution Reflective Code Loading T1620 Donut decrypts + loads PE in-memory Defense Evasion Obfuscated Files: Embedded Payloads T1027.009 Chaskey-16 CTR encrypted Donut payloads Defense Evasion Masquerading: Legitimate Name T1036.005 Process named nsvchost.exe Defense Evasion Subvert Trust Controls T1553 Inline C# avoids pre-compiled AV detection Privilege Escalation Token Manipulation T1134.001 SeDebugPrivilege via AdjustTokenPrivileges Discovery Process Discovery T1057 CreateToolhelp32Snapshot for svchost.exe Lateral Movement Process Injection: DLL Injection T1055.001 VirtualAllocEx + WriteProcessMemory into svchost.exe

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence4

Once the MSI executes, it drops three files into the Windows Startup folder: NOVupdate.exe, NOVupdate.exe.dat, and a malicious DLL named avk.dll.

Stealth

11 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

On Windows systems, the hack of the Telnyx Python SDK resulted in the deployment of an executable named "msbuild.exe" that employs several obfuscation techniques to evade detection...

T1027.001Binary PaddingEvidence1

...extracts DonutLoader, a shellcode loader, from a PNG image present within the binary to load a full-featured trojan and a beacon associated with AdaptixC2...

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence2

The dropped PE is not AgentTesla itself but a DonutLoader shellcode packer. DonutLoader unpacks and executes the AgentTesla binary entirely in memory, leaving no additional artifacts on disk beyond the initial dropper.

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence1

extracts DonutLoader, a shellcode loader, from a PNG image present within the binary

T1027.009Embedded PayloadsEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Application Execution Reflective Code Loading T1620 Donut decrypts + loads PE in-memory Defense Evasion Obfuscated Files: Embedded Payloads T1027.009 Chaskey-16 CTR encrypted Donut payloads

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Attackers set up a convincing lookalike website to distribute a dangerous installer... The fake site, hosted at claude-pro[.]com, closely mirrors the look and feel of the real Claude website, using similar fonts and color schemes.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

After unpacking the core archives, the malware moves into an advanced code injection stage.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Application Execution Reflective Code Loading T1620 Donut decrypts + loads PE in-memory Defense Evasion Obfuscated Files: Embedded Payloads T1027.009 Chaskey-16 CTR encrypted Donut payloads Defense Evasion Masquerading: Legitimate Name T1036.005 Process named nsvchost.exe Defense Evasion Subvert Trust Controls T1553 Inline C# avoids pre-compiled AV detection Privilege Escalation Token Manipulation T1134.001 SeDebugPrivilege via AdjustTokenPrivileges Discovery Process Discovery T1057 CreateToolhelp32Snapshot for svchost.exe Lateral Movement Process Injection: DLL Injection T1055.001 VirtualAllocEx + WriteProcessMemory into svchost.exe

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence5

The program decodes these items at runtime via a simple single-byte mathematical conversion.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence2

After dropping the PE payload to C:\Users\Public\Libraries\ , the dropper does not execute it directly. Instead, it invokes Scriptrunner.exe -appvscript <payload_path> , abusing the legitimate Microsoft App-V Scriptrunner binary as a Living-off-the-Land Binary (LOLBin).

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence5

The final payload, CASTLESTEALER, is then delivered entirely in memory using an open-source shellcode generator called DonutLoader, leaving almost no trace on disk.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The hack of the Telnyx Python SDK resulted in the deployment of an executable named "msbuild.exe" ... to load a full-featured trojan and a beacon associated with AdaptixC2, an open-source command-and-control (C2) framework.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Application Execution Reflective Code Loading T1620 Donut decrypts + loads PE in-memory Defense Evasion Obfuscated Files: Embedded Payloads T1027.009 Chaskey-16 CTR encrypted Donut payloads Defense Evasion Masquerading: Legitimate Name T1036.005 Process named nsvchost.exe Defense Evasion Subvert Trust Controls T1553 Inline C# avoids pre-compiled AV detection Privilege Escalation Token Manipulation T1134.001 SeDebugPrivilege via AdjustTokenPrivileges Discovery Process Discovery T1057 CreateToolhelp32Snapshot for svchost.exe Lateral Movement Process Injection: DLL Injection T1055.001 VirtualAllocEx + WriteProcessMemory into svchost.exe Collection Screen Capture T1113 GDI BitBlt screenshot Credential Access Credentials from Web Browsers T1555.003 Chrome/Edge/Brave/Opera/Vivaldi credential theft Credential Access Steal Web Session Cookie T1539 Cookie file theft from Chromium browsers Credential Access Credentials in Files T1552.001 OpenVPN auth.txt, crypto wallet files Command and Control Web Protocols T1071.001 HTTP C2 for payload delivery and exfiltration

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

When I examined the ValleyRAT C2 traffic from the Triage sandbox execution I noticed that CapLoader as well as FlowCarp identified it as Gh0stKCP, which is a UDP-based protocol that ValleyRAT sometimes uses to transport its C2 traffic.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Command and Control Ingress Tool Transfer T1105 BitsAdmin/PowerShell downloading payloads

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

52 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
16 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
29 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
7 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 days ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 days ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
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IOC matching52

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping25

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.