Daserf

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using cmd.exe, the Windows command shell, to execute commands, launch payloads, run batch files, and automate actions on compromised hosts.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.

"Sandworm Team used UPX to pack a copy of Mimikatz"; "APT38 has used several code packing methods such as Themida, Enigma, VMProtect, and Obsidium"; "Lazarus Group packed malicious .db files with Themida to evade detection."

“REDBALDKNIGHT’s Daserf Backdoor Now Uses Steganography,” TrendMicro, November 7, 2017

actors used the following command to rename one of their tools to a benign file name: ren "%temp%\upload" audiodg.exe ... APT1 ... used ... AcroRD32.exe ... as a name for malware ... APT28 ... changed extensions on files containing exfiltrated data to make them appear benign ... APT32 has renamed a NetCat binary to kb-10233.exe to masquerade as a Windows update.

Akira has used legitimate names and locations for files to evade defenses.

"CARROTBALL has used a custom base64 alphabet to decode files." / "CARROTBAT has the ability to download a base64 encoded payload."

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using valid, stolen, forged, self-signed, or abused code-signing certificates to sign malware and appear legitimate, including examples such as AppleJeus using a valid digital signature from Sectigo, APT41 leveraging code-signing certificates, FIN7 signing Carbanak payloads, and SUNBURST being digitally signed by SolarWinds.

Multiple actors and tools are described as using Mimikatz/Windows Credential Editor/LaZagne/ProcDump to “dump credentials,” often by targeting LSASS memory (e.g., “used Mimikatz to capture and use legitimate credentials,” “dumped the LSASS process memory using the MiniDump function,” “injecting itself into lsass.exe”).

The content is a catalog of malware families and threat actors that 'can perform keylogging,' 'log keystrokes,' 'capture keystrokes,' or use 'keylogger' modules/tools.

The content is a catalog of malware families and threat actors that 'can perform keylogging,' 'log keystrokes,' 'capture keystrokes,' or use 'keylogger' modules/tools.

The content is a MITRE ATT&CK-style listing of malware and threat actors that "can capture screenshots," "take screenshots," "perform screen captures," or "watch the victim's screen." It ends with references to "CopyFromScreen" and "xwd."

"AppleSeed has compressed collected data before exfiltration."; "APT28 used a publicly available tool to gather and compress multiple documents..."; "Aria-body has used ZIP to compress data..."; "Cadelspy...compress stolen data into a .cab file."; "Daserf hides collected data in password-protected .rar archives."; "FIN6 has compressed log files into a ZIP archive prior to staging and exfiltration."; "Lazarus Group has compressed exfiltrated data with RAR...archive specified directories in .zip format"; "XCSSET will compress entire ~/Desktop folders..."

Cobian RAT obfuscates communications with the C2 server using Base64 encoding... Daserf uses custom base64 encoding to obfuscate HTTP traffic... Pikabot uses base64 encoding in conjunction with symmetric encryption mechanisms to obfuscate command and control communications.

The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing showing numerous malware families and threat groups that 'use HTTP,' 'use HTTPS,' 'HTTP POST requests,' 'HTTP GET requests,' or 'HTTP/S' for command and control communications.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors that can "download files from C2," "download additional payloads," "upload and download files," "retrieve payloads from the C2 server," and "copy files to remote machines."

ADVSTORESHELL C2 traffic is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding. APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server. APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.

Cobalt Strike can use Base64, URL-safe Base64, or NetBIOS encoding in its C2 traffic. More_eggs has used basE91 encoding, along with encryption, for C2 communication. Zebrocy has used URL/Percent Encoding on data exfiltrated via HTTP POST requests.

The content is a catalog of malware and threat groups that encrypt command-and-control communications using algorithms such as DES, AES, RC4, XOR, Blowfish, RSA, Camellia, RC2, RC6, and custom ciphers.

"3PARA RAT command and control commands are encrypted within the HTTP C2 channel using the DES algorithm in CBC mode..."; "APT33 has used AES for encryption of command and control traffic."; "Carbanak encrypts the message body of HTTP traffic with RC2 (in CBC mode)."; "Duqu ... data stream can be encrypted with AES-CBC."; "PoisonIvy uses the Camellia cipher to encrypt communications."