Denis is a Windows backdoor associated with APT32, also known as OceanLotus. It has been observed in both native and PowerShell-based variants and is used as part of targeted intrusion activity. The malware supports command-and-control communications with obfuscated strings that are decrypted at runtime, and it encodes data sent to its server with Base64. Denis performs host reconnaissance by collecting the current username, querying the Windows Registry, and gathering local network configuration details such as the system IP address through native utilities.
For execution and evasion, Denis has been linked to DLL side-loading or fake DLL loading through exploitation of a vulnerable application behavior, including delivery chains abusing legitimate software to load a malicious library. It also employs anti-analysis and defense-evasion techniques, including anti-debugging API usage and dynamic API resolution. Denis has been observed performing process hollowing using Windows APIs to run malicious code within another process. In addition, it supports destructive tasking such as deleting files from the victim machine.
Denis is primarily a post-compromise implant used in espionage-oriented operations, providing remote access and host survey capabilities while attempting to reduce detection through in-memory execution techniques, obfuscation, and abuse of trusted execution paths.
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Key TTPs: DLL hollowing overwriting memory within legitimate xpsservices.dll system library for silent payload execution under trusted process name, Notion cloud platform as C2 channel embedding instructions within Notion pages, registry persistence and scheduled task creation
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using PowerShell to execute payloads, run commands, download additional malware, perform lateral movement, evade defenses, and execute scripts in memory. | Examples include: 'APT28 downloads and executes PowerShell scripts and performs PowerShell commands'; 'APT3 has used PowerShell on victim systems to download and run payloads after exploitation'; 'TA505 has used PowerShell to download and execute malware and reconnaissance scripts.'
Numerous entries state malware can create a remote shell or reverse shell, for example 4H RAT, BLACKCOFFEE, DarkComet, PlugX, QuasarRAT, and others. | The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using cmd.exe, the Windows command shell, to execute commands, launch payloads, run batch files, and automate actions on compromised hosts.
The content is a MITRE ATT&CK-style listing of many malware families and threat groups using Windows/native OS APIs for execution, injection, discovery, anti-debugging, and other actions, ending with 'NtCreateProcess' and 'fork()'.
Denis exploits a security vulnerability to load a fake DLL and execute its code. Empire contains modules that can discover and exploit various DLL hijacking opportunities. PowerSploit contains a collection of Privesc-PowerUp modules that can discover and exploit DLL hijacking opportunities in services and processes.
Key TTPs: DLL hollowing overwriting memory within legitimate xpsservices.dll system library for silent payload execution under trusted process name, Notion cloud platform as C2 channel embedding instructions within Notion pages, registry persistence and scheduled task creation
Key TTPs: DLL hollowing overwriting memory within legitimate xpsservices.dll system library for silent payload execution under trusted process name, Notion cloud platform as C2 channel embedding instructions within Notion pages, registry persistence and scheduled task creation
APT37 leverages the Windows API calls: VirtualAlloc(), WriteProcessMemory(), and CreateRemoteThread() for process injection.
Agent Tesla has used process hollowing to create and manipulate processes through sections of unmapped memory by reallocating that space with its malicious code. APT-C-36 has used process hollowing to execute malware in the memory of legitimate processes. Astaroth can create a new process in a suspended state from a targeted legitimate process in order to unmap its memory and replace it with malicious code.
BitPaymer has used dynamic API resolution to avoid identifiable strings within the binary, including RegEnumKeyW.
APT37 leverages the Windows API calls: VirtualAlloc(), WriteProcessMemory(), and CreateRemoteThread() for process injection.
Agent Tesla has used process hollowing to create and manipulate processes through sections of unmapped memory by reallocating that space with its malicious code. APT-C-36 has used process hollowing to execute malware in the memory of legitimate processes. Astaroth can create a new process in a suspended state from a targeted legitimate process in order to unmap its memory and replace it with malicious code.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors deleting files, directories, droppers, logs, scripts, temporary files, exfiltrated archives, and uninstalling themselves to cover tracks or reduce forensic artifacts.
The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing of malware and threat groups that 'decrypt', 'decode', 'deobfuscate', 'unpack', or 'decompress' payloads, strings, configuration data, shellcode, and files prior to execution or use.
DLL hollowing overwriting memory within legitimate xpsservices.dll system library for silent payload execution under trusted process name
Denis exploits a security vulnerability to load a fake DLL and execute its code. Empire contains modules that can discover and exploit various DLL hijacking opportunities. PowerSploit contains a collection of Privesc-PowerUp modules that can discover and exploit DLL hijacking opportunities in services and processes.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors querying, enumerating, opening, and reading Windows Registry keys and values, e.g., "APT41 queried registry values to determine items such as configured RDP ports and network configurations" and "Reg may be used to gather details from the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface."
AdFind can extract subnet information from Active Directory; actors used ipconfig /all after exploiting a machine; numerous malware and groups used ipconfig, ifconfig, arp, route, netsh, nbtstat, NBTscan, and related APIs to gather IP, MAC, DNS, DHCP, gateway, proxy, domain, ARP cache, routing, and adapter details.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting the victim username, identifying logged-in users, running whoami, query user, quser, or similar commands to determine the current user or user sessions.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting OS version, computer name, architecture, CPU, memory, disk, language, and other host details; examples include use of commands such as ver, systeminfo, hostname, uname -m, sw_vers -productVersion, and fsutil.
Notion cloud platform as C2 channel embedding instructions within Notion pages
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors that can "download files from C2," "download additional payloads," "upload and download files," "retrieve payloads from the C2 server," and "copy files to remote machines."
44 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Backdoor used by OceanLotus that implements DNS tunneling for command-and-control communications.
Backdoor listed as part of the OceanLotus malware toolkit used in campaigns targeting Chinese entities.
Trojan that enumerates and collects the username from the victim machine.
Malware with a PowerShell-based variant.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.