GoldMax, also known as SUNSHUTTLE, is a Go-based second-stage post-exploitation backdoor associated with APT29, also tracked as NOBELIUM, Cozy Bear, and the Dukes. It was used in follow-on activity linked to the SolarWinds intrusion and has been described as part of the SVR-linked toolset used for long-duration cyberespionage operations. GoldMax has Windows and Linux variants and is intended to provide command-and-control access on already compromised systems.
On infected hosts, GoldMax has been observed maintaining persistence through scheduled tasks, including masquerading as legitimate systems management software. It stores and decrypts configuration data during execution, uses encrypted communications with command-and-control infrastructure including RSA-protected traffic, and can generate decoy network traffic to blend malicious communications with benign-looking activity. The malware can execute commands received from its operators, collect host timing information, retrieve network interface details for local system discovery, and exfiltrate files over its existing command-and-control channel.
GoldMax is associated with espionage-focused targeting by APT29 against government, public-sector, and private-sector organizations, including victims in North America and Europe. Its role in layered persistence and stealthy post-compromise operations reflects the broader tradecraft of SVR cyber operations, which emphasize covert access, resilient persistence, and low-noise data theft in high-value environments.
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Smith, L., Leathery, J., Read, B. (2021, March 4). New SUNSHUTTLE Second-Stage Backdoor Uncovered Targeting U.S.-Based Entity; Possible Connection to UNC2452. | Nafisi, R., Lelli, A. (2021, March 4). GoldMax, GoldFinder, and Sibot: Analyzing NOBELIUM’s layered persistence.
The malware presented in the workshop (Sunshuttle, from the DarkHalo APT, MD5 5DB340A70CB5D90601516DB89E629E43) is straightforward to the extent that it can be understood without paying too much attention to these objects.
25 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
GoldMax backdoor executable... Hides in hidden directories. Persistence via cron job on Linux.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors creating, modifying, or invoking Windows scheduled tasks via Task Scheduler or schtasks for persistence, execution, and lateral movement.
GoldMax backdoor executable... Hides in hidden directories. Persistence via cron job on Linux.
GoldMax backdoor executable... Hides in hidden directories. Persistence via cron job on Linux.
The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.
Examples throughout the content include 'encrypted payloads decrypted and executed in memory,' 'encrypts its configuration file,' 'AES-encrypted resource,' 'RC4 encrypted embedded scripts,' and 'payload includes an encrypted main component.'
actors used the following command to rename one of their tools to a benign file name: ren "%temp%\upload" audiodg.exe ... APT1 ... used ... AcroRD32.exe ... as a name for malware ... APT28 ... changed extensions on files containing exfiltrated data to make them appear benign ... APT32 has renamed a NetCat binary to kb-10233.exe to masquerade as a Windows update.
AdFind can extract subnet information from Active Directory; actors used ipconfig /all, netsh.exe, ifconfig, arp, route, nbtstat, and related APIs/commands to gather IP, MAC, DNS, DHCP, gateway, proxy, routing, ARP, and adapter information.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting the current date, time, or time zone from victim systems, including examples such as "The net time command can be used... to determine the local or remote system time" and commands like "net time \\hostname" and "w32tm /tz".
Examples include: "ChChes communicates to its C2 server over HTTP and embeds data within the Cookie HTTP header," "UPPERCUT has used HTTP for C2, including sending error codes in Cookie headers," and "GoldMax has used HTTPS and HTTP GET requests with custom HTTP cookies for C2."
MITRE ATT&CK Mappings: APT29 Command and Control T1071: Application Layer Protocol .001: Web Protocols .004: DNS
The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing showing numerous malware families and threat groups that 'use HTTP,' 'use HTTPS,' 'HTTP POST requests,' 'HTTP GET requests,' or 'HTTP/S' for command and control communications. | Specific implementations mentioned include 'HTTP POST requests,' 'HTTP GET requests,' 'custom HTTP cookies,' 'Cookie HTTP header,' 'HTTP Upgrade request' for WebSocket initiation, and use of APIs such as 'Microsoft Graph API' or 'Dropbox HTTP API' for C2.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors that can "download files from C2," "download additional payloads," "upload and download files," "retrieve payloads from the C2 server," and "copy files to remote machines."
4H RAT has the capability to create a remote shell. AuditCred can open a reverse shell on the system to execute commands. PlugX allows actors to spawn a reverse shell on a victim. QuasarRAT can launch a remote shell to execute commands on the victim’s machine.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using SSL, TLS, HTTPS, RSA, AES, Blowfish, RC4, ECIES, Diffie-Hellman, OpenSSL, WolfSSL, and mutual TLS to protect command and control traffic.
Multiple malware families and intrusion sets are described as encrypting C2 traffic using SSL/TLS/HTTPS (e.g., "used HTTPS for command and control", "encrypts C2 communications with TLS", "uses SSL for encrypting C2 communications", "TLS-encrypted WebSocket Protocol (WSS) for C2"). | Examples include: "encrypts some C2 with RSA", "RSA encryption for C2 communications", "hard-coded RSA public key", "RSA-2048", "RSA-4096", and "REvil has encrypted C2 communications with the ECIES algorithm".
12 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
40 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Their toolkit includes 7-Zip, AdFind, ATI-Agent, AtNow, BEATDROP, BloodHound, CEELOADER, CloudDuke, Cobalt Strike, CosmicDuke, CozyDuke, Danfuan, EnvyScout, FatDuke, FoggyWeb, GeminiDuke, Geppei, GoldFinder, GoldMax...
Backdoor referenced as similar to the Tomiris Golang backdoor; no further technical detail provided in this content.
Retrieves a list of system network interfaces after execution.
Malware implant identified in the content as one of the families used in the SolarWinds-related activity by NOBELIUM.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.