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FakeM is a Windows remote access Trojan family first publicly documented in 2013. It disguises command-and-control communications as legitimate Windows Messenger, Yahoo! Messenger, or HTML traffic to evade network detection. The original variant encrypts communications using a custom XOR-and-bit-rotation cipher; other variants use RC4 or SSL, including modified SSL implementations that hinder conventional SSL inspection and decryption.
FakeM supports shell command execution, in-memory code execution, file and directory browsing, host-information collection, process management, registry and service access, screenshot capture, password access, keylogging, and file exfiltration. It establishes persistence through Windows registry-based automatic execution. Initial communications can transmit the compromised host’s username, computer name, and system information to its controller.
Observed delivery mechanisms include spearphishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Word or Excel attachments and directly attached executables. Document-based attacks have exploited CVE-2010-3333, CVE-2012-0158, and CVE-2009-3129, using tailored social-engineering lures to encourage recipients to open the attachments.
FakeM, including its Custom SSL variant, has been used extensively in Scarlet Mimic espionage operations targeting Tibetan and Uyghur communities, activists, journalists, nongovernmental organizations, and government agencies in Russia and India.
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
We found a family of RATs that we call “FAKEM” that make their network traffic look like various protocols. Some variants attempt to disguise network traffic to look like Windows® Messenger and Yahoo!® Messenger traffic.
We found a family of RATs that we call “FAKEM” that make their network traffic look like various protocols. Some variants attempt to disguise network traffic to look like Windows® Messenger and Yahoo!® Messenger traffic.
We found a family of RATs that we call “FAKEM” that make their network traffic look like various protocols. Some variants attempt to disguise network traffic to look like Windows® Messenger and Yahoo!® Messenger traffic.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The malware primarily used in this series of attacks was FakeM.
12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Many entries describe XOR, XOR/ADD, bitwise NOT and XOR, ROR plus XOR, hexadecimal encoding after encryption, and custom encoding/obfuscation of HTTP traffic or beacons.
The attack group primarily uses well-known vulnerabilities and the “FakeM” malware family... which attempts to disguise its malicious traffic as commonly used protocols.
Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
A cluster of Scarlet Mimic attacks used the FakeM Custom SSL variant and were deployed on C2 infrastructure that relied on free domains provided by Securepoint, a German dynamic DNS service.
The content is a catalog of malware and threat groups that encrypt command-and-control communications using algorithms such as DES, AES, RC4, XOR, Blowfish, RSA, Camellia, RC2, RC6, and custom ciphers.
"3PARA RAT command and control commands are encrypted within the HTTP C2 channel using the DES algorithm in CBC mode..."; "APT33 has used AES for encryption of command and control traffic."; "Carbanak encrypts the message body of HTTP traffic with RC2 (in CBC mode)."; "Duqu ... data stream can be encrypted with AES-CBC."; "PoisonIvy uses the Camellia cipher to encrypt communications."
11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
12 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A malware family used by Scarlet Mimic in espionage campaigns. The Custom SSL variant was delivered via malicious document attachments, connected to command-and-control infrastructure on dynamic DNS domains, and attempted to disguise malicious traffic as commonly used protocols.
Some variants use SSL for communications with command-and-control servers.
Backdoor with variants using a custom XOR-and-rotation cipher or RC4 for C2 encryption.
Malware containing a keylogger module.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.