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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 6 actorsExploits 2 CVEs

Atomic Stealer

Also known asAtomic macOS StealerSHAMOS

Atomic macOS Stealer, also known as AMOS, Atomic Stealer, Atomic MacOS Stealer, and Shamos, is a macOS-focused information stealer sold or rented via Telegram and repeatedly observed in crimeware, malvertising, phishing, fake software installer, and paste-and-run/ClickFix delivery campaigns. It is distributed in DMG-based installers and fake application bundles impersonating legitimate software such as Tor Browser, Notion, Microsoft Office, Photoshop CC, TradingView-related tools, and Homebrew, and has also been embedded in malicious OpenClaw/ClawHub skills. Earlier campaigns commonly instructed victims to bypass Gatekeeper via right-click and Open; after Apple patched that bypass in October 2024, reporting indicates a shift toward ClickFix and Terminal paste-and-run social engineering.

AMOS is designed to steal sensitive data from macOS systems, especially browser and locally stored secrets. Reported capabilities include theft of browser credentials, cookies, session tokens, autofill data, stored payment card data, browser history, browser profile data, Keychain data including login.keychain-db, SSH keys, messaging app data, Apple Notes data, Safari cookies, user documents, and cryptocurrency wallet data. Targeted browsers mentioned across reporting include Chrome, Brave, Edge, Vivaldi, Opera, Arc, CocCoc, Yandex, Firefox and Firefox-derived browsers, and Safari. Targeted wallet applications and artifacts include Electrum, Binance, Exodus, Atomic Wallet, Coinomi, Wasabi Wallet, Bitcoin Core, Litecoin Core, DashCore, Guarda, Dogecoin Wallet, TonKeeper, and numerous cryptocurrency browser extensions. Some reports also note theft from Telegram Desktop and Discord, and replacement of Ledger Live and Trezor Suite with malicious versions.

Behaviorally, AMOS commonly uses AppleScript or osascript-driven fake macOS or System Preferences authentication dialogs to capture the victim’s local password, validating it in some variants with /usr/bin/dscl -authonly. Multiple reports describe a smash-and-grab model without persistence, though newer variants and related reporting note Python-assisted collection, anti-analysis checks for VMware, and in some cases overlap in tradecraft with RustDoor and similarities with Odyssey/Poseidon AppleScript logic. One Bitdefender-described variant drops an XOR-decoded Python script to /var/tmp/olx, collects browser, wallet, Safari cookie, system_profiler, and login.keychain-db data, and exfiltrates an in-memory ZIP archive via HTTP POST to /p2p on 5.42.65.114.

AMOS has been associated in reporting with Russian threat activity and has also been used by criminal ecosystems such as Crazy Evil. It has remained one of the most prevalent and popular macOS stealers through 2024 and 2025, frequently cited alongside Poseidon/Odyssey and Cthulhu as notable macOS threats.

High-confidence infrastructure and indicators mentioned in the content include amos-malware[.]ru/sendlog, 37.220.87[.]16:5000/sendlog, 94.142.138[.]177/sendlog, 5.42.65.114/p2p, 91.92.242[.]30 and 91.92.242[.]30/lamq4, nextnovatech.com, wooofi.com, slackcomtop.aab-e-pak.com, slackforbusiness.net including /api.php and /main.php, macpaw.us, svs-verificationdate[.]beer, and 196.251.107[.]171. Sample hashes and related indicators explicitly cited include Setup.dmg SHA256 15f39e53a2b4fa01f2c39ad29c7fe4c2fef6f24eff6fa46b8e77add58e7ac709; Sophos-listed AMOS sample hashes 01082cd4733e5f3e2c3f642fa6c0afb5a9489d39ff26a35549263fc0e02ebad3, bda2503fc02b11258399cfabd0778a997654b5bd7d30e5e3f5bef54a74b914e1, c43e506c9b964dddf6fd784bf0cc78b4a2396f47257361dc22e1070e249eae16, 4dce8b3beba71b8b44b6576ff2497ed68c6fafebd046822f0d60f8758238e900, 564b21c293bc9d0885dc7a87dbf488a497c98d2103d91f5bbcfdb476eb8b6f4c, b351e3f475681ab2e8db5b2bbd2beaf26e5b4fd082ca08eba6fffbc76370113c, 8891e7562eb4db253a8582376083ca99b19457680f9d36a5ba4108790740785e, 716778bab5fb2c439a51362be5941a50d587714d58a6faa39eefa96aa79c1561, d23491dd351f43f0efad5cee2be80c4049349a7695c0e7de1de632c791356183, and 7bcfcc90d0bd6c85b5b1cc9f287e161020571a0418afb50f2dd67685e9d3a4fc.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

2 CVES
CVE-2025-55182React2Shell RCE in React Server Components Flight ProtocolExploited in the wild

"A critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability, identified as CVE-2025-55182 and dubbed React2Shell, exists within the React Server Components (RSC) architecture, allowing unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code..."

via f5 communitycommunity.f5.com
CVE-2026-25253One-Click RCE in OpenClaw via gatewayUrl WebSocket Token Exfiltration

The campaign coincides with the disclosure of a high-severity OpenClaw vulnerability (CVE-2026-25253) that enables one-click remote code execution through token exfiltration and WebSocket hijacking. Although patched in late January 2026, the flaw points to the platform’s growing attack surface.

via sentinelone blogsentinelone.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

6 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
unit_42

A separate skill called omnicogg embedded the AMOS malware dropper inside a README.md file, then padded it with 22 MB of junk characters to exceed file size limits that most scanning pipelines enforce.

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
Palo Alto Networks Unit 42

The campaign is infecting Mac devices with the Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS) infostealer, which steals browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallet data, Keychain data, messaging app information, and user documents.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
Crazy Evil

Diversified Malware Toolkit: Crazy Evil uses advanced tools like Stealc and AMOS for Windows and macOS, ensuring widespread compromise.

via recorded future blogrecordedfuture.com
ping3r

Odyssey isn’t original work. It’s a direct rebrand of Poseidon Stealer, which itself was forked from Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS).

via censys blogcensys.com
Rodrigo4

Odyssey isn’t original work. It’s a direct rebrand of Poseidon Stealer, which itself was forked from Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS).

via censys blogcensys.com
Cookie Spider

Two new AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) samples uploaded to MalwareBazaar reveal a significant evolution of the macOS stealer family.

via breakglass intelintel.breakglass.tech
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

27 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1598Phishing for InformationEvidence1

ClickFix is a social engineering technique that displays fake CAPTCHAs, browser errors, or system alerts to trick visitors into copying and executing attacker-supplied "fix instructions."

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence2

domain slackcomtop.aab-e-pak.com Malvertising domain ... domain slackforbusiness.net Malvertising domain ... url_path slackforbusiness.net/api.php Malvertising domain ... domain macpaw.us Malvertising domain

T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

Malvertising via Google Ads has also been noted privately among researchers as a distribution vector for Atomic Stealer.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence2

Attackers are using the ClawHub skill marketplace to push harmful code into AI agent environments, stealing data and running financial fraud schemes that traditional security tools failed to catch.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence3

These skills deployed infostealers, reverse shells and the Atomic macOS Stealer malware, exfiltrating browser credentials, keychains, SSH keys and crypto wallets.

T1059.002AppleScriptEvidence4

...both being Go-based infostealers that also use osascript to display error messages to the user on execution...

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

After running the Terminal command, the attack downloads a malicious DMG from svs-verificationdate[.]beer using curl with the quiet " -fsSL " flags and saves it to the /tmp folder under a random filename.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

the campaign begins with a fake CAPTCHA page that tells users to open Terminal and paste a malicious command to verify themselves.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

OpenClaw is an AI agent that runs third-party skills sourced from ClawHub, a dedicated marketplace. These skills are markdown-driven packages with deep access to local systems. When a malicious skill is installed, it can seize full control of the agent’s identity and execute unauthorized actions through the agent’s own authenticated sessions.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027.001Binary PaddingEvidence1

A separate skill called omnicogg embedded the AMOS malware dropper inside a README.md file, then padded it with 22 MB of junk characters to exceed file size limits that most scanning pipelines enforce.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence5

Each of these skills mimicked a legitimate tool. The TradingView skills appeared to be trader productivity aids, and omnicogg passed for a general utility.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Variant C... has some rudimentary attempt at anti-analysis... queries the built-in system_profiler tool’s output for SPHardwareDataType, converts the output to lowercase, then searches it for the substring “vmware”. If the substring is found, the malware then exits.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

A separate skill called omnicogg embedded the AMOS malware dropper inside a README.md file...

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1553.001Gatekeeper BypassEvidence1

Defense Evasion - обход Gatekeeper (T1553.001, Gatekeeper Bypass).

Credential Access

7 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

Atomic does not attempt to gain persistence... Atomic Stealer uses a crude but effective means of extracting the user’s login password via AppleScript spoofing.

T1110Brute ForceEvidence1

The TA also provides additional services such as a web panel for managing victims, meta mask brute-forcing for stealing seed and private keys...

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence2

It steals cookies, login databases, autofill information, stored payment cards, and browser profile data.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence4

The campaign is infecting Mac devices with the Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS) infostealer, which steals browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallet data, Keychain data, messaging app information, and user documents.

T1555.001KeychainEvidence1

In addition to obtaining the system password, the malware also targets the password management tool by utilizing the main_keychain() function to extract sensitive information from the victim’s machine.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

After collecting wallet details, the malware queries the installed browsers’ directories on the victim’s device and searches for particular browser-related files to extract confidential data, such as: Autofills Passwords Cookies Credit Cards.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence2

Once decoded, it harvests... A raw copy of login.keychain-db

Discovery

2 techniques
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

The stealer now steals the victim’s files from directories such as Desktop and Documents using the main_FileGrabber() function.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Variant C... has some rudimentary attempt at anti-analysis... queries the built-in system_profiler tool’s output for SPHardwareDataType, converts the output to lowercase, then searches it for the substring “vmware”. If the substring is found, the malware then exits.

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

The malware also steals Telegram Desktop and Discord data, Apple Notes databases, Safari cookies, Apple Keychain database files, and user documents with the PDF, TXT, or RTF extensions.

T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

Atomic does not attempt to gain persistence... Atomic Stealer uses a crude but effective means of extracting the user’s login password via AppleScript spoofing.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

All harvested data is then stored in a ZIP archive and uploaded to the attacker's server, where the attacker can retrieve it.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

That command then pulled a macOS infostealer named cluw from a remote server at 2.26.75[.]16.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence1

Finally, the Atomic macOS stealer processes the stolen information by compressing into ZIP and encoding it using Base64 format for exfiltration.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

All harvested data is then stored in a ZIP archive and uploaded to the attacker's server, where the attacker can retrieve it.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

436 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
172 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
214 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
50 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 days ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 days ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 days ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching436

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution6

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities2

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping27

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.