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HELLCAT is a cybercriminal ransomware and data-extortion group that emerged in mid-2024, with principal operators associated with the BreachForums community. An operator using the alias Rey has been linked to the group. HELLCAT is associated with breaches affecting industrial and automotive organizations, including Schneider Electric and Jaguar Land Rover.
Its documented intrusion activity includes using exposed credentials to access corporate Jira systems and extracting sensitive organizational data. In the Schneider Electric breach, a HELLCAT operator accessed Jira using exposed credentials and scraped approximately 400,000 rows of user data through the MiniOrange REST API. The group also leaked internal Jaguar Land Rover documents in March 2025, including development information and employee data. HELLCAT identifies the criminal operation; a distinct malware payload, its encryption implementation, and its supported operating systems have not been established.
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1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
One of their operators ... obtained access to Schneider Electric's Jira server using exposed credentials and then scraped 400,000 rows of user data.
31 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
33 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Ransomware family referenced in the associated analytic stories.
Ransomware family referenced in an associated analytic story.
Associated Analytic Story ... Hellcat Ransomware
Ransomware family mentioned as relevant to a detection for unusually frequent process termination, a behavior linked to ransomware execution.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.