Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda is a banking trojan associated with credential and financial theft, including campaigns targeting online retail sites during the holiday season. The provided content states that it has been distributed via PowerShell-based download-and-execute chains and, on at least one occasion, was downloaded by Emotet. It has also been delivered through SEO poisoning campaigns in which malicious links were made more prominent in search results to target users with the Zeus Panda banking trojan.
Its observed capabilities include hooking GetClipboardData to monitor clipboard pastes and collect data, taking screenshots of the victim machine, launching remote scripts on the victim host, decrypting strings at runtime, collecting the current UTC system time and sending it to command-and-control infrastructure, and deleting files or uninstalling scripts to cover its tracks. The malware also checks for the existence and contents of Registry keys, and modifies Registry keys under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\PhishingFilter\ to disable phishing filters. The initial payload has used obfuscated macro commands, and PowerShell has been used to download and execute the payload.
Zeus Panda performs system language checks by querying keyboard mapping and terminates execution if it detects LANG_RUSSIAN, LANG_BELARUSIAN, LANG_KAZAK, or LANG_UKRAINIAN, indicating geofencing behavior. High-confidence indicators and artifacts directly mentioned in the content include use of GetClipboardData hooking, PowerShell execution, Registry interaction including HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\PhishingFilter, screenshot capture, remote script execution, runtime string decryption, and exclusion of Russian, Belarusian, Kazakh, and Ukrainian language environments.
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Groups observed using it
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
On at least one occasion during the Christmas week, Emotet also downloaded Zeus Panda. This instance of Zeus Panda primarily targeted online retail sites during the holiday season.
Techniques & procedures
20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Execution
3 techniques
Execution
APT19 downloaded and launched code within a SCT file; APT32 used COM scriptlets to download Cobalt Strike beacons; APT37 used Ruby scripts to execute payloads; ArcaneDoor included the adversary executing command line interface (CLI) commands.
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using PowerShell scripts/commands for execution, download, staging, reconnaissance, persistence, credential access, lateral movement, and defense evasion; e.g., "Sandworm Team used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses."
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.
Stealth
5 techniques
Stealth
The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.
Examples throughout the content include 'encrypted payloads decrypted and executed in memory,' 'encrypts its configuration file,' 'AES-encrypted resource,' 'RC4 encrypted embedded scripts,' and 'payload includes an encrypted main component.'
Examples throughout the content include deleting tools, logs, malware-related files, staged archives, screenshots, temporary files, and exfiltrated data 'to cover their tracks,' 'reduce their footprint,' 'remove traces of activity,' or as part of 'post-intrusion cleanup.'
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
Discovery
5 techniques
Discovery
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors querying, enumerating, searching, reading, or checking Windows Registry keys and values, e.g., "ADVSTORESHELL can enumerate registry keys," "APT41 queried registry values to determine items such as configured RDP ports and network configurations," and "Reg may be used to gather details from the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface."
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").
Avaddon checks for specific keyboard layouts and OS languages to avoid targeting Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) entities... Bazar can perform a check to ensure that the operating system's keyboard and language settings are not set to Russian... Clop has checked the keyboard language using the GetKeyboardLayout() function... Ryuk has been observed to query the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\Language and the value InstallLanguage.
Collection
1 technique
Collection
Command and Control
2 techniques
Command and Control
Other
2 techniques
Other
BlackByte performed Registry modifications to escalate privileges and disable security tools. Embargo has modified and deleted Registry keys to add services, and to disable Security Solutions such as Windows Defender. TA505 has used malware to disable Windows Defender through modification of the Registry. During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors, including Storm-2603, disabled security services via Registry modifications.
Examples include BlackByte performing Registry modifications to escalate privileges and disable security tools; LockBit 3.0 changing Registry values to disable SmartScreen and Windows Defender; TA505 using malware to disable Windows Defender through Registry modification.
IOCs tracked for this family
8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
Recent activity
37 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Software changes: ... Zeus Panda
Malware that checks keyboard mapping for language and terminates on specified CIS languages.
Banking trojan that uses PowerShell to download and execute its payload.
Malware that obfuscates macro commands in its initial payload.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.