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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

Zeus Panda

Zeus Panda is a banking trojan associated with credential and financial theft, including campaigns targeting online retail sites during the holiday season. The provided content states that it has been distributed via PowerShell-based download-and-execute chains and, on at least one occasion, was downloaded by Emotet. It has also been delivered through SEO poisoning campaigns in which malicious links were made more prominent in search results to target users with the Zeus Panda banking trojan.

Its observed capabilities include hooking GetClipboardData to monitor clipboard pastes and collect data, taking screenshots of the victim machine, launching remote scripts on the victim host, decrypting strings at runtime, collecting the current UTC system time and sending it to command-and-control infrastructure, and deleting files or uninstalling scripts to cover its tracks. The malware also checks for the existence and contents of Registry keys, and modifies Registry keys under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\PhishingFilter\ to disable phishing filters. The initial payload has used obfuscated macro commands, and PowerShell has been used to download and execute the payload.

Zeus Panda performs system language checks by querying keyboard mapping and terminates execution if it detects LANG_RUSSIAN, LANG_BELARUSIAN, LANG_KAZAK, or LANG_UKRAINIAN, indicating geofencing behavior. High-confidence indicators and artifacts directly mentioned in the content include use of GetClipboardData hooking, PowerShell execution, Registry interaction including HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\PhishingFilter, screenshot capture, remote script execution, runtime string decryption, and exclusion of Russian, Belarusian, Kazakh, and Ukrainian language environments.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TA542

On at least one occasion during the Christmas week, Emotet also downloaded Zeus Panda. This instance of Zeus Panda primarily targeted online retail sites during the holiday season.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

APT19 downloaded and launched code within a SCT file; APT32 used COM scriptlets to download Cobalt Strike beacons; APT37 used Ruby scripts to execute payloads; ArcaneDoor included the adversary executing command line interface (CLI) commands.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using PowerShell scripts/commands for execution, download, staging, reconnaissance, persistence, credential access, lateral movement, and defense evasion; e.g., "Sandworm Team used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses."

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence6

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

Examples throughout the content include 'encrypted payloads decrypted and executed in memory,' 'encrypts its configuration file,' 'AES-encrypted resource,' 'RC4 encrypted embedded scripts,' and 'payload includes an encrypted main component.'

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

Examples throughout the content include deleting tools, logs, malware-related files, staged archives, screenshots, temporary files, and exfiltrated data 'to cover their tracks,' 'reduce their footprint,' 'remove traces of activity,' or as part of 'post-intrusion cleanup.'

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence6

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware deleting files, tools, scripts, logs, droppers, staged data, and artifacts from compromised systems to cover tracks, remove evidence, or self-delete.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, deobfuscating, or unpacking payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 responses prior to execution or use.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence6

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

Discovery

5 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors querying, enumerating, searching, reading, or checking Windows Registry keys and values, e.g., "ADVSTORESHELL can enumerate registry keys," "APT41 queried registry values to determine items such as configured RDP ports and network configurations," and "Reg may be used to gather details from the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface."

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence3

Avaddon checks for specific keyboard layouts and OS languages to avoid targeting Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) entities... Bazar can perform a check to ensure that the operating system's keyboard and language settings are not set to Russian... Clop has checked the keyboard language using the GetKeyboardLayout() function... Ryuk has been observed to query the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\Language and the value InstallLanguage.

Collection

1 technique
T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

Agent Tesla can steal data from the victim’s clipboard. APT38 used a Trojan called KEYLIME to collect data from the clipboard. APT39 has used tools capable of stealing contents of the clipboard.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using HTTP and HTTPS for command and control, such as: "Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests."

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Representative examples include "APT33 has utilized PowerShell to download files from the C2 server and run various scripts," "QakBot can use PowerShell to download and execute payloads," and "TrickBot has been known to use PowerShell to download new payloads."

Other

2 techniques
T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

BlackByte performed Registry modifications to escalate privileges and disable security tools. Embargo has modified and deleted Registry keys to add services, and to disable Security Solutions such as Windows Defender. TA505 has used malware to disable Windows Defender through modification of the Registry. During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors, including Storm-2603, disabled security services via Registry modifications.

T1562Impair DefensesEvidence1

Examples include BlackByte performing Registry modifications to escalate privileges and disable security tools; LockBit 3.0 changing Registry values to disable SmartScreen and Windows Defender; TA505 using malware to disable Windows Defender through Registry modification.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
2 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
5 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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What this page doesn’t show

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IOC matching8

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping20

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Zeus Panda | Mallory