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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 4 actorsExploits 2 CVEs

CHOPSTICK

Also known asBackdoor.SofacyXSPLMwebhpXagent

X-Agent, also referred to in the provided content as CHOPSTICK, Chopstick, SPLM, XAgent, X-Agent, WebHP, and Backdoor.SofacyX, is a modular backdoor/RAT closely associated with APT28 (also tracked as Fancy Bear, Sofacy, and Sednit) and attributed in the content to Russia’s GRU. The malware has been used in long-running cyber-espionage operations against political, governmental, military, diplomatic, and security-related targets, including Democratic Party networks in 2016, NATO-related entities, and broader campaigns against Eastern European governments and other strategic organizations. Reported infection vectors include spear-phishing and deployment through APT28 tooling such as SOURFACE and EVILTOSS.

The content describes X-Agent/CHOPSTICK as a flexible espionage implant that supports remote command execution, file transfer and exfiltration, keylogging, screenshot capture, monitoring of network activity, access to the Windows Registry for information gathering, and access to victim file systems and network resources. It has used HTTP and HTTPS for command and control depending on module configuration, and CHOPSTICK C2 traffic is described as encrypted with TLS. The content also states that APT28 used relay infrastructure and compromised machines to proxy or obscure communications between CHOPSTICK and its servers. Anti-analysis behavior is also noted: CHOPSTICK includes runtime checks to detect analysis environments and avoid execution.

The content further indicates that X-Agent existed in multiple platform variants, including Windows, Linux, iOS, Android, and later macOS. It is described as APT28’s flagship or signature implant during the 2010s. Related tooling and lineage mentioned in the content include X-Tunnel for exfiltration and SlimAgent, which researchers assessed as having direct code lineage from or being an evolution of the X-Agent keylogger module. High-confidence capabilities explicitly mentioned include remote command execution, keylogging, screenshotting, file transmission/exfiltration, registry access, TLS-encrypted C2, HTTP/HTTPS-based C2, and anti-analysis checks.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

2 CVES
CVE-2017-11292Type Confusion RCE in Adobe Flash Player bytecode verificationExploited in the wild

IoCs Table 2 lists a lure document (World War3.docx; SHA-1 7aada8bcc0d1ab8ffb1f0fae4757789c6f5546a3) detected as SWF/Exploit.CVE-2017-11292.A; the report notes DealersChoice generates malicious documents with embedded Adobe Flash Player exploits.

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
CVE-2016-4117Adobe Flash Player arbitrary code execution in 21.0.0.226 and earlierExploited in the wild

IoCs Table 2 lists a phishing document (f3805382ae2e23ff1147301d131a06e00e4ff75f) detected as Win32/Exploit.CVE-2016-4117.A; the report describes Sednit’s DealersChoice platform embedding Adobe Flash Player exploits in malicious Office documents.

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

4 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT28

This may indicate the OS requirements of their intended targets but it may also be an attempt to take advantage of a security telemitry blindspot in many enterprises, as is with Penquin Turla and APT28’s Linux XAgent variant.

via medium chronicle blogmedium.com
GRU

Another unit mate, Capt. Nikolay Kozachek, allegedly crafted the X-Agent malware used to hack the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee and DNC networks in April 2016.

via washington postwashingtonpost.com
unit_26165

...their involvement in the development of Unit 26165’s X-Agent malware

via security weeksecurityweek.com
APT29

...their involvement in the development of Unit 26165’s X-Agent malware

via security weeksecurityweek.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

28 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

They also send emails purportedly containing links to news items, but instead linking to malware drop sites that install toolkits onto the target's computer.

T1566PhishingEvidence2

Spear-phishing (T1566) — Targeted emails lured key staff into clicking malicious links or downloading attachments.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

Figure 2. Main attack methods and malware used by the Sednit group since 2014... Email attachments

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The hackers used a spear phishing attack, directing emails to the false URL electronicfrontierfoundation.org.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

Together with the help of above mentioned tools, the group gained access to the file system and registry; enumerate network resources; create processes... | It used a downloader tool that FireEye dubbed " SOURFACE ", a backdoor labelled " EVILTOSS " that gives hackers remote access and a flexible modular implant called " CHOPSTICK " to enhance functionality of the espionage software.

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence2

RemoteShell 0x1302 Executes supplied commands in Linux command-line interpreter /bin/sh

Persistence

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution. | Many malware families store configuration, payloads, encryption keys, C2 addresses, or other operational data in Registry keys, such as QakBot storing configuration in a randomly named subkey under HKCU\Software\Microsoft and PolyglotDuke writing encrypted JSON configuration files to the Registry.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The threat group implements counter-analysis techniques to obfuscate their code. They add junk data to encoded strings, making decoding difficult without the junk removal algorithm.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

APT28 executed CHOPSTICK by using rundll32 commands such as rundll32.exe "C:\Windows\twain_64.dll".

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Agent Tesla has the ability to perform anti-sandboxing and anti-virtualization checks. Bisonal can check to determine if the compromised system is running on VMware. Bumblebee has the ability to perform anti-virtualization checks. CozyCar will check to ensure it is not being executed inside a virtual machine or a known malware analysis sandbox environment. Metamorfo has embedded a "vmdetect.exe" executable to identify virtual machines at the beginning of execution. RTM can detect if it is running within a sandbox or other virtualized analysis environment. Saint Bear contains several anti-analysis and anti-virtualization checks.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

CHOPSTICK includes runtime checks to identify an analysis environment and prevent execution on it. Hancitor has used a macro to check that an ActiveDocument shape object in the lure message is present. If this object is not found, the macro will exit without downloading additional payloads. Operation Spalax threat actors used droppers that would run anti-analysis checks before executing malware on a compromised host.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution. | Many malware families store configuration, payloads, encryption keys, C2 addresses, or other operational data in Registry keys, such as QakBot storing configuration in a randomly named subkey under HKCU\Software\Microsoft and PolyglotDuke writing encrypted JSON configuration files to the Registry.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

Consistent with GRU techniques and 'methods of persistence' identified by computer forensic investigators in other intrusions, the hackers again used X-Agent to log keystrokes, take screenshots, and gather system data; used a lateral-movement tool called RemCom; and used Mimikatz, a credential-harvesting tool.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence8

在同一操作基础设施上发现的名为Slimagent的键盘记录器,与APT28十多年前的标志性植入程序X-Agent有直接代码渊源。

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Together with the help of above mentioned tools... access stored credentials...

Discovery

6 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors querying, enumerating, searching, reading, or checking Windows Registry keys and values, e.g., "ADVSTORESHELL can enumerate registry keys," "APT41 queried registry values to determine items such as configured RDP ports and network configurations," and "Reg may be used to gather details from the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface."

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

Together with the help of above mentioned tools, the group gained access to the file system and registry; enumerate network resources...

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence1

20 Map network resources

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Agent Tesla has the ability to perform anti-sandboxing and anti-virtualization checks. Bisonal can check to determine if the compromised system is running on VMware. Bumblebee has the ability to perform anti-virtualization checks. CozyCar will check to ensure it is not being executed inside a virtual machine or a known malware analysis sandbox environment. Metamorfo has embedded a "vmdetect.exe" executable to identify virtual machines at the beginning of execution. RTM can detect if it is running within a sandbox or other virtualized analysis environment. Saint Bear contains several anti-analysis and anti-virtualization checks.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

CHOPSTICK includes runtime checks to identify an analysis environment and prevent execution on it. Hancitor has used a macro to check that an ActiveDocument shape object in the lure message is present. If this object is not found, the macro will exit without downloading additional payloads. Operation Spalax threat actors used droppers that would run anti-analysis checks before executing malware on a compromised host.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

An arrow representing the malicious fils moving laterally through the network. | The graphic indicates three methods of APT 29 tradecraft, including remote execution, file transmission, and keylogging

Collection

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence8

在同一操作基础设施上发现的名为Slimagent的键盘记录器,与APT28十多年前的标志性植入程序X-Agent有直接代码渊源。

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

The toolkit was unchanged: X-Agent for keylogging and screenshotting

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

These actors set up operational infrastructure to obfuscate their source infrastructure, host domains and malware for targeting organizations, establish command and control nodes, and harvest credentials and other valuable information from their targets.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using HTTP and HTTPS for command and control, such as: "Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests."

T1071.003Mail ProtocolsEvidence1

The Xagent backdoor can communicate with its C&C server over email with a custom protocol... MailChannel... SMTP to send emails and POP3 to receive emails (over TLS)

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence1

APT28 used other victims as proxies to relay command traffic, for instance using a compromised Georgian military email server as a hop point to NATO victims.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

APT28 used other victims as proxies to relay command traffic, for instance using a compromised Georgian military email server as a hop point to NATO victims.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

The attackers then upgraded valuable targets to the X-Agent backdoor, often pairing it with the Sedreco loader and the X-Tunnel network pivot.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using SSL, TLS, HTTPS, RSA, AES, Blowfish, RC4, ECIES, Diffie-Hellman, OpenSSL, WolfSSL, and mutual TLS to protect command and control traffic.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The Xagent backdoor can communicate with its C&C server over email with a custom protocol... messages are sent and received as attachments to emails... Sedreco core threads store the output generated by a command execution in the outbound file... periodically transmitted in bulk to the server.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

36 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
13 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
23 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app10 years ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app
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What this page doesn’t show

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching36

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution4

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities2

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping28

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.