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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 2 actors

TEARDROP

TEARDROP is a previously unknown, memory-only Windows dropper discovered during investigations into the 2020 SolarWinds supply-chain compromise. It was used as a second-stage/post-exploitation payload following SUNBURST/Solorigate activity and was observed deploying customized Cobalt Strike Beacon payloads; reporting also notes TEARDROP or RAINDROP backdoors were used for follow-on access, domain enumeration, and collection/exfiltration via hands-on-keyboard activity. TEARDROP was associated with the threat actor tracked as UNC2452 by FireEye and as NOBELIUM by Microsoft; broader reporting also links the operation to APT29/Cozy Bear/The Dukes. It has been described as running as a Windows service, including from C:\Windows\SysWOW64, and in FireEye reporting was associated with C:\Windows\SYSWOW64\netsetupsvc.dll. TEARDROP loaded executable code directly into memory without leaving an on-disk payload, read payload data from gracious_truth.jpg, checked for the existence of HKU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CTF before decoding its embedded payload, used a custom rolling XOR algorithm to decode that payload, and manually loaded it with a custom PE-like loader. High-confidence indicators and artifacts mentioned in the content include the service-based execution, the path C:\Windows\SYSWOW64\netsetupsvc.dll, the file gracious_truth.jpg, and the registry check for HKU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CTF. The malware is specifically tied to selected SolarWinds victims that received second-stage tooling over HTTP/HTTPS after initial SUNBURST compromise.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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SVR

If further actions were taken, TEARDROP or RAINDROP backdoors would be deployed, which would install a customized Cobalt Strike beacon in the environment, enumerating the domain and allowing for the collection and exfiltration of information of value using hands-on-keyboard techniques.

via ca ccscyber.gc.ca
APT29

If further actions were taken, TEARDROP or RAINDROP backdoors would be deployed, which would install a customized Cobalt Strike beacon in the environment, enumerating the domain and allowing for the collection and exfiltration of information of value using hands-on-keyboard techniques.

via ca ccscyber.gc.ca
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

For the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used numerous pieces of malware that were likely developed for or by the group, including SUNBURST, SUNSPOT, Raindrop, and TEARDROP.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence6

We assess that threat actors will almost certainly continue to develop their capability to compromise organizations through supply chains as an alternative to direct action against a target’s network defences.

T1195.003Compromise Hardware Supply ChainEvidence1

State-sponsored threat actors have demonstrated their ability to compromise service providers such as MSPs as a method of infiltrating the supply chain of organizations of strategic interest, establishing persistence, and securing access to downstream targets.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

“On May 25, 2021, the campaign escalated as NOBELIUM leveraged the legitimate mass-mailing service, Constant Contact, to masquerade as a US-based development organization and distribute malicious URLs…”

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

This week, VA officials told reporters there are currently no signs the hackers took advantage of the backdoor in their network, which was unwittingly installed by roughly 18,000 SolarWinds clients this year.

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques... System Services: Service Execution [T1569.002]

Persistence

3 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence6

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used an arbitrary system service to load at system boot for persistence for Industroyer. They also replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

If further actions were taken, TEARDROP or RAINDROP backdoors would be deployed, which would install a customized Cobalt Strike beacon in the environment.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mappings: APT29 Privilege Escalation T1055: Process Injection .002: Portable Executable Injection

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence6

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used an arbitrary system service to load at system boot for persistence for Industroyer. They also replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

If further actions were taken, TEARDROP or RAINDROP backdoors would be deployed, which would install a customized Cobalt Strike beacon in the environment.

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence1

"SHOTPUT is obscured using XOR encoding and appended to a valid GIF file." / "TEARDROP created and read from a file with a fake JPG header" / "Ramsay has base64-encoded its portable executable and hidden itself under a JPG header."

T1027.009Embedded PayloadsEvidence1

JPIN uses a encrypted and compressed payload that is disguised as a bitmap within the resource section of the installer. Ramsay has base64-encoded its portable executable and hidden itself under a JPG header. TEARDROP created and read from a file with a fake JPG header.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mappings: APT29 Privilege Escalation T1055: Process Injection .002: Portable Executable Injection

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, deobfuscating, or unpacking payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 responses prior to execution or use.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

“...lateral movement using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to run the attacker’s payload using the Rundll32.exe process.”

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence4

Leveraging memory-only droppers to deploy Cobalt Strike BEACON and potentially other backdoors.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The malware deployed into the Orion Platform, known as Teardrop, was highly sophisticated, according to experts, and in addition to harvesting users’ credentials and monitoring their keystrokes...

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

The malware deployed into the Orion Platform, known as Teardrop, was highly sophisticated, according to experts, and in addition to harvesting users’ credentials and monitoring their keystrokes...

Discovery

2 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors querying, enumerating, searching, reading, or checking Windows Registry keys and values, e.g., "ADVSTORESHELL can enumerate registry keys," "APT41 queried registry values to determine items such as configured RDP ports and network configurations," and "Reg may be used to gather details from the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface."

T1482Domain Trust DiscoveryEvidence1

TEARDROP or RAINDROP backdoors would be deployed, which would install a customized Cobalt Strike beacon in the environment, enumerating the domain and allowing for the collection and exfiltration of information of value.

Collection

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The malware deployed into the Orion Platform, known as Teardrop, was highly sophisticated, according to experts, and in addition to harvesting users’ credentials and monitoring their keystrokes...

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques... Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols [T1071.001]

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence6

This dropper then requested the download and execution of the second-stage WINELOADER.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
4 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app22 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching5

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping23

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.