Skip to main content
Meet us at Black Hat USA 2026— Las Vegas, August 1–6Book a Meeting
Mallory
MalwareUsed by 3 actorsExploits 5 CVEs

FormBook

Also known asXLoader

FormBook is a long-running Windows infostealer family, active since at least early 2016 and commonly discussed together with its newer version, XLoader. It is sold or operated in a malware-as-a-service style and has been widely distributed through phishing and malspam campaigns, malicious archives and script attachments, macro-enabled Office documents, PDFs with download links, ISO/ZIP/RAR/ACE archives, HTA/JScript/VBS/PowerShell loader chains, malvertising, and exploitation of Office vulnerabilities such as CVE-2017-11882. Observed lures include business themes such as invoices, orders, requests, payments, bank transfers, RFQs, and shipping brands, and campaigns have targeted sectors including aerospace, defense contractors, manufacturing, financial organizations in Türkiye, logistics in Asia, and organizations in Italy, India, the United States, South Korea, and elsewhere.

High-confidence capabilities described in the content include keylogging, screenshot capture, clipboard theft, theft of browser, email, FTP, and other credentials, and form grabbing or interception of HTTP/HTTPS/SPDY/HTTP2 web data. FormBook can also receive remote commands to update itself, download and execute additional files, remove itself, launch commands, clear browser cookies, reboot or shut down the system, collect passwords, create screenshots, and download and unpack ZIP archives. The family has been observed staging or being delivered alongside other malware, and reporting explicitly notes delivery relationships involving NanoCore, Agent Tesla, NetWire, Remcos, AsyncRAT, XWorm, DCRat, and other stealers or RATs.

The malware uses substantial anti-analysis and evasion tradecraft. Reported techniques include encrypted internal buffers and strings, CRC32-based API hashing, runtime API resolution, anti-debugging, RDTSC timing checks, sandbox and VM checks, direct use of ntdll exports from disk to evade user-mode hooks (described by the author as the "Lagos Island method"), and process injection or hollowing. Observed injection targets and execution chains include explorer.exe and other browser or email processes, RegAsm.exe, RegSvcs, CasPol.exe, and addinprocess32.exe-related tradecraft. Persistence mechanisms mentioned in the content include copying itself under randomized names and paths and creating Run key entries; related loader chains also used Startup-folder artifacts and scheduled tasks.

FormBook communications use HTTP GET and POST, with encrypted and encoded traffic. Multiple reports state that FormBook/XLoader may contact numerous domains where only one is the real command-and-control server and the others are decoys, complicating sandbox analysis. One report tied FormBook traffic to the identifier "gwmr" in HTTP requests. Specific infrastructure and indicators directly mentioned in the content include tradedsglobal.com used in a June 2026 FormBook/XLoader chain, the historical C2 URL www[.]clicks-track[.]info/list/hx28/, and decoy/C2 domains such as www.togsfortoads[.]com, www.popimart[.]xyz, www.kajainterior[.]com, www.heji88.hj-88[.]com, www.headzees[.]com, www.in-snoqualmievalley[.]com, www.365heji[.]com, www.h3lpr3[.]store, www.graciesvoice[.]info, www.femfirst.co[.]uk, www.cistonewhobeliev[.]xyz, www.allspaceinfo[.]com, www.baldur-power[.]com, www.ohotechnologies[.]com, www.carlosaranguiz[.]dev, www.iidethakur[.]xyz, and www.huifeng-tech[.]com. Sample hashes directly associated with FormBook/XLoader in the content include the RFQ 11062026.js chain artifacts d6d6f9c0160cf7bfa97097f58f6acf8cafc8bd657b7aebbd326fea05e9bc3165, f56b46fa7cb1c081f461af9fdb56eca4d861a30ed12e744996036ddf4aaea729, 9da3fba7b57421476f3e6e44d0d9c800f6678c845d1b8e83864e219b6c6ae178, f84e5683e0638514a3e76be3e6d63099395b7c9ea781f321ce46129727c38fad, and db9f068ae7592e971eebf7a210ead7fd5a1c324f385dfed1872a773b56bfd5d8, as well as the historical MD5 CE84640C3228925CC4815116DDE968CB.

Share:
For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

5 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

5 CVES
CVE-2017-11882Microsoft Office Equation Editor Remote Code ExecutionExploited in the wild

CVE-2017-11882 ... Products Associated Malware: Loki, FormBook, Pony/FAREIT | CVE-2017-11882 Vulnerable Products: Microsoft Office 2007 SP3/2010 SP2/2013 SP1/2016 Products Associated Malware: Loki, FormBook, Pony/FAREIT Mitigation: Update affected Microsoft products with the latest security patches | CVE-2017-11882 ... Associated Malware: Loki, FormBook, Pony/FAREIT | CVE-2017-11882 Vulnerable Products: Microsoft Office 2007 SP3/2010 SP2/2013 SP1/2016 Products Associated Malware: Loki, FormBook, Pony/FAREIT

via cisa advisoriescisa.gov
CVE-2018-0798Microsoft Office Equation Editor Memory Corruption RCEExploited in the wild

BITTER has exploited Microsoft Office vulnerabilities... CVE-2018-0798...

via mitre attackattack.mitre.org
CVE-2017-0199Microsoft Office/WordPad Remote Code Execution VulnerabilityExploited in the wild

Cisco Talos has been tracking a new campaign involving the FormBook malware since May 2018... FormBook is an inexpensive stealer available as "malware as a service." ... It is able to record keystrokes, steal passwords (stored locally and in web forms) and can take screenshots.

via talos intelligence blogblog.talosintelligence.com
CVE-2022-30190Follina

The analytic detects a Microsoft Office product spawning the Windows msdt.exe process... may indicate an attempt to exploit protocol handlers to bypass security controls... Associated Analytic Story: Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190.

via splunk researchresearch.splunk.com
CVE-2021-40444Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution VulnerabilityExploited in the wild

The following analytic detects Office products writing .cab or .inf files, indicative of CVE-2021-40444 exploitation. This activity is significant as it may signal an attempt to load malicious ActiveX controls and download remote payloads, a known attack vector. | https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/trojanized-onenote-document-leads-to-formbook-malware/

via splunk researchresearch.splunk.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
RATicate

"...families of RATs and infostealers. These included Lokibot, Betabot, Formbook, and AgentTesla."

via sophos threat researchnews.sophos.com
ComicForm

...Deploy Formbook Malware in Eurasian Cyberattacks

via cloudatg insightscloudatg.com
SectorJ149

...Deploy Formbook Malware in Eurasian Cyberattacks

via cloudatg insightscloudatg.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

32 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1598Phishing for InformationEvidence1

This attack – known as ‘malvertising’ – is often aimed at users looking to download popular software applications.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence2

SentinelLABS observed a cluster of virtualized .NET malware loaders distributed through malvertising attacks.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence5

The campaigns in Italian analyzed by the TG Soft C.R.A.M. were grouped according to macro categories, obtained from the subject of the email message used for malware distribution (malspam).

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence6

15/06/2026 AgentTesla - spread through five campaigns themed around: ‘Documents’, ‘Invoices’, 'Orders' (two) and ‘Requests’. ... FormBook - spread through two campaigns themed around ‘Payments’ and ‘Requests’.

Execution

8 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

It establishes persistence, executes a hidden PowerShell stager via WMI...

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

persistence: drop Q78BmqBbKP.js + scheduled task "EmGqzwd3kD"

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

These archives contain script-based malware that ultimately infects a host with the final malware.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

This script acts as a downloader, retrieving and executing a PowerShell script.

T1127.001MSBuildEvidence1

In most of the cases observed at the time of writing this article, PhantomVAI Loader injected the payload into the Microsoft Build Engine executable, MSBuild.exe.

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

Upon execution, these files kick off a multi-stage chain of extracting, deobfuscating, loading and executing secondary payloads (dynamic-link libraries), eventually detonating the final payload (executable).

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

When a user searches for a related term and clicks through to the malicious site, the attackers check the Referer header to confirm the user has come from a search engine, and then entice them into downloading malware disguised as a legitimate software application.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

The top-ranking samples this week are Script files accounting for 65,22%. MSIL files follow in second place with 20,65%. As for third place, we find Office documents (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) with 14,13%.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

persistence: drop Q78BmqBbKP.js + scheduled task "EmGqzwd3kD"

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Persistence: copies self to Startup folder

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

persistence: drop Q78BmqBbKP.js + scheduled task "EmGqzwd3kD"

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

"addinprocess32.exe... can be used for injection and launching malicious payloads"; "These events are typical for injecting code into a process. Virtual protect can be abused by malware authors to modify memory protection and writing bytes to an area in memory is typical in process injection techniques."

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

It then injects this payload into a target process that is also defined by a command-line parameter, using the process hollowing technique.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Persistence: copies self to Startup folder

Stealth

9 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

Formbook, for example, has been in operation since 2021. But most recently, it has added sophisticated obfuscation techniques, designed to make sampling and analysis by security researchers more difficult.

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence1

This article highlights a new obfuscation technique threat actors are using to hide malware through steganography within bitmap resources embedded in otherwise benign 32-bit .NET applications.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Other campaigns have impersonated brands like Adobe, Gimp, Slack, Tor, and Thunderbird, in order to infect users with AuroraStealer, RedLine, Vidar, FormBook, and more.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

"addinprocess32.exe... can be used for injection and launching malicious payloads"; "These events are typical for injecting code into a process. Virtual protect can be abused by malware authors to modify memory protection and writing bytes to an area in memory is typical in process injection techniques."

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

It then injects this payload into a target process that is also defined by a command-line parameter, using the process hollowing technique.

T1127.001MSBuildEvidence1

In most of the cases observed at the time of writing this article, PhantomVAI Loader injected the payload into the Microsoft Build Engine executable, MSBuild.exe.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

carve bytes between markers INICIO ... FIM ; transform '#'→'A' , reverse, Base64-decode

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence2

"The actor in this case has utilized a commonly abused LOLBIN (Living Off The Land Binary) here to execute the encoded script through ‘DeviceCredentialDeployment.exe’ in an attempt to avoid detection"; "another Living Off the Land technique for injection/execution... pass in arguments for the process ‘addinprocess32.exe’"

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

the malware detects the presence of user- and kernel-land debuggers using the NtQueryInformationProcess and NtQuerySystemInformation functions

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Other techniques include: “Form grabbing,” which involves searching for logins that you may have entered into an online form, before it is send to a secure server Keylogging, which requires the malware to record every keystroke you make

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Family = Formbook/XLoader ... capabilities: credential theft (browser/email/FTP)

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

Beyond that, it steals stored credentials and cookies from Chrome and Firefox

Discovery

1 technique
T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

the malware detects the presence of user- and kernel-land debuggers using the NtQueryInformationProcess and NtQuerySystemInformation functions

Collection

3 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Other techniques include: “Form grabbing,” which involves searching for logins that you may have entered into an online form, before it is send to a secure server Keylogging, which requires the malware to record every keystroke you make

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

Agent Tesla can steal data from the victim’s clipboard. APT38 used a Trojan called KEYLIME to collect data from the clipboard. APT39 has used tools capable of stealing contents of the clipboard.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

The campaign arrives to victims as emails with attached archives.

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

Formbook and XLoader disguise real C2 traffic among smokescreen HTTP requests with encoded and encrypted content to multiple domains, randomly selected from an embedded list.

T1001.002SteganographyEvidence1

pulls a steganographic .NET injector ("Fiber") hidden inside a JPEG.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

XLoader Activity ... C2 for data exfiltration ... hxxp[://]www.sixfiguredigital[.]group/aoc3/

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

A campaign is marked by an identifier that is present in HTTP POST and GET requests issued by the malware.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

First, we see a call to a location in the stack ... that will execute the function InternetOpenUrlA, we also see the C2 it will use... the second shellcode downloads further malware.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

Only one of the domains is the real C2 server and the rest are decoys.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

330 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
167 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
116 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
47 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 days ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 days ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 days ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching330

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution3

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities5

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping32

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.