Grandoreiro is a Windows banking trojan associated with Latin American cybercrime activity and known for targeting online banking users. It has been distributed through malicious email attachments and uses Visual Basic or VBScript-based execution chains as part of its infection workflow. The malware employs multiple persistence mechanisms, including Registry-based configuration storage, Registry Run-style autostart, and shortcut-based startup persistence. It has also modified browser shortcuts to force the launch of malicious browser extensions, combining persistence with credential and session theft objectives.
Grandoreiro performs host profiling and reconnaissance after execution. Observed behaviors include collecting the current username, determining the victim host’s IP address, geolocation, and time information, and identifying installed security products or banking protection software by enumerating processes and installed defenses. It can decrypt internal strings at runtime, execute code through native Windows APIs, and exfiltrate stolen information to command-and-control infrastructure.
Credential access is a core function. Grandoreiro has been observed stealing Google Chrome credentials and cookie data, indicating both browser credential theft and session hijacking capability. It also uses defense-evasion and privilege-escalation techniques, including masquerading malicious browser extensions or update components as legitimate software and bypassing User Account Control by abusing file-association handling for Microsoft Management Console files. Overall, Grandoreiro is best characterized as a banking-focused credential-stealing trojan for Windows with persistence, reconnaissance, browser theft, exfiltration, and UAC-bypass functionality.
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2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
A new version of Grandoreiro malware from TA2725 targets both Mexico and Spain. Previously this malware has only targeted victims in Brazil and Mexico.
In 2025, Brazilian-origin families such as Grandoreiro (part of the Tetrade group) stood out for their constant activity and global reach. Despite a major law enforcement disruption in early 2024, Grandoreiro remained active in 2025, re-emerging with updated variants and continuing to operate.
37 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
APT-C-36 has embedded a VBScript within a malicious Word document which is executed upon the document opening.
The content is a MITRE ATT&CK-style listing of many malware families and threat groups using Windows/native OS APIs for execution, injection, discovery, anti-debugging, and other actions, ending with 'NtCreateProcess' and 'fork()'.
has attempted to get victims to launch malicious Microsoft Word attachments delivered via spearphishing emails... has required user execution of a malicious MSI installer... has been executed through user installation of an executable disguised as a flash installer.
ADVSTORESHELL is capable of setting and deleting Registry values. Agent Tesla can achieve persistence by modifying Registry key entries. APT41 used a malware variant called GOODLUCK to modify the registry in order to steal credentials.
For example, LNK browser extensions may be modified (e.g. Browser Extensions) to persistently launch malware.
C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
BitPaymer can suppress UAC prompts by setting the HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command registry key on Windows 10 or HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command on Windows 7... LockBit 2.0 can bypass UAC through creating the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\ICM\Calibration.
C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
BitPaymer can suppress UAC prompts by setting the HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command registry key on Windows 10 or HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command on Windows 7... LockBit 2.0 can bypass UAC through creating the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\ICM\Calibration.
Adversaries may create or modify shortcuts that can execute a program during system boot or user login. Adversaries may abuse shortcuts in the startup folder to execute their tools and achieve persistence.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors that 'bypass UAC,' 'perform UAC bypass,' or use specific Windows components such as fodhelper.exe, eventvwr.exe, sdclt.exe, CMSTPLUA COM interface, SilentCleanup, and registry hijacks to gain elevated privileges.
actors used the following command to rename one of their tools to a benign file name: ren "%temp%\upload" audiodg.exe ... APT1 ... used ... AcroRD32.exe ... as a name for malware ... APT28 ... changed extensions on files containing exfiltrated data to make them appear benign ... APT32 has renamed a NetCat binary to kb-10233.exe to masquerade as a Windows update.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors deleting files, directories, droppers, logs, scripts, temporary files, exfiltrated archives, and uninstalling themselves to cover tracks or reduce forensic artifacts.
The malware allows: blocking the screen of the victim, logging keystrokes, simulating mouse and keyboard activity, sharing the victim’s screen, and displaying fake pop-up windows.
Grandoreiro can steal cookie data and credentials from Google Chrome... Kimsuky has used browser extensions including Google Chrome to steal passwords and cookies from browsers... Inception used a browser plugin to steal passwords and sessions
Agent Tesla can gather credentials from a number of browsers... APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne to gather credentials... TrickBot can obtain passwords stored in files from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Microsoft Edge... SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins; CryptUnprotectData
Agent Tesla can gather credentials from a number of browsers... APT3 has used tools to dump passwords from browsers... APT41 used BrowserGhost, a tool designed to obtain credentials from browsers, to retrieve information from password stores... TrickBot can obtain passwords stored in files from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Microsoft Edge
Grandoreiro periodically monitors the foreground window to find one that belongs to a web browser process. When such a window is found and its name matches any string from a hardcoded list of bank-related strings, then and only then the malware initiates communication with its C&C server
AdFind can extract subnet information from Active Directory; actors used ipconfig /all after exploiting a machine; numerous malware and groups used ipconfig, ifconfig, arp, route, netsh, nbtstat, NBTscan, and related APIs to gather IP, MAC, DNS, DHCP, gateway, proxy, domain, ARP cache, routing, and adapter details.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting the victim username, identifying logged-in users, running whoami, query user, quser, or similar commands to determine the current user or user sessions.
Tasklist can be used to discover processes running on a system. Numerous malware families and threat groups are described as listing running processes, collecting PIDs, checking for specific process names, or enumerating loaded modules.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as hostname, OS version, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, language, and other machine characteristics; e.g., "Action RAT has the ability to collect the hostname, OS version, and OS architecture of an infected host."
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting the current date, time, or time zone from victim systems, including examples such as "The net time command can be used... to determine the local or remote system time" and commands like "net time \\hostname" and "w32tm /tz".
RTC Portal, a set of Delphi components built on top of the RealThinClient SDK which is built on top of HTTP(S).
The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing showing numerous malware families and threat groups that 'use HTTP,' 'use HTTPS,' 'HTTP POST requests,' 'HTTP GET requests,' or 'HTTP/S' for command and control communications.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors that can "download files from C2," "download additional payloads," "upload and download files," "retrieve payloads from the C2 server," and "copy files to remote machines."
Grandoreiro uses RTC, which encrypts data with a custom stream cipher.
182 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
121 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Named as another Brazilian banking trojan grouped alongside Ousaban under the 'Tetrade' label.
Named as another Brazilian banking trojan used as comparison/background for the broader trend targeting Iberian markets.
Brazilian banking trojan cited as part of the same 'Tetrade' cluster and used as comparison for similar delivery tradecraft against Iberian banking targets.
Mentioned only as related reading about another Latin American banking trojan targeting Spain.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.