Zebrocy is a malware family associated with the Russian state-sponsored threat group APT28. It has been observed in Go-based variants and is used as part of espionage-oriented intrusion activity against Windows systems. Zebrocy functions as a remote access malware family with broad post-compromise collection and operator-control capabilities.
Documented behavior includes host reconnaissance such as collecting the current username, enumerating running processes through tasklist and WMI, gathering network configuration information with ipconfig, identifying mapped or newly added network drives, and collecting local date and time zone information. Zebrocy also supports screen capture, including saving screenshots in common image formats, and can exfiltrate collected data to command-and-control infrastructure over HTTP POST requests, including with URL or percent encoding applied to outbound data.
The malware supports persistence through multiple Windows mechanisms, including creation of scheduled tasks and Registry Run key autoruns. It also includes functionality to decode or decrypt secondary payloads and strings, with reported use of AES and XOR, then write additional payloads to disk for follow-on execution. Additional operator actions include deleting files and directories and uploading credential-dumping tools that extract browser-stored credentials for later theft.
Overall, Zebrocy is best characterized as an APT28-associated Windows backdoor used for reconnaissance, surveillance, credential collection support, persistence, and exfiltration during targeted intrusions.
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2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Zebrocy - Russian state-sponsored group APT28 created a Go-based version of their Zebrocy malware last year.
PETROVITE demonstrates Stage 1 of the ICS Kill Chain capabilities and targets mining and energy operations in Kazakhstan.
31 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Multiple entries describe APT28/Pawn Storm/Sofacy campaigns using lure documents, themed emails, and phishing schemes, e.g., “APT28 Hacker Group Targeting Europe, Americas, Asia in Widespread Phishing Scheme”, “New Spear Phishing Campaign Pretends to be EFF”, and “distribution of emails with 'instructions' on 'updating the operating system'”.
Examples include “PowerPoint mouse-over event abused to deliver Graphite implants”, “BREXIT-themed lure document that delivers ZEKAPAB malware”, “fake NATO training docs to breach govt networks”, and repeated references to lure documents delivering Zebrocy or Seduploader.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors creating, modifying, or invoking Windows scheduled tasks via Task Scheduler or schtasks for persistence, execution, and lateral movement.
The Golang backdoor uses cmd.exe to execute commands.
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using cmd.exe, the Windows command shell, to execute commands, launch payloads, run batch files, and automate actions on compromised hosts.
The file ... with the name “Seminar.rtf” exploited CVE-2017-0199 ... “Seminar.rtf” downloaded a second stage document ... (4de5adb865b5198b4f2593ad436fceff, exploiting CVE-2017-11882) ... we detected a spearphishing GreyEnergy document ... exploiting CVE-2017-11882
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors creating, modifying, or invoking Windows scheduled tasks via Task Scheduler or schtasks for persistence, execution, and lateral movement.
ADVSTORESHELL achieves persistence by adding itself to the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key... APT28 has deployed malware that has copied itself to the startup directory for persistence... FIN7 malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors creating, modifying, or invoking Windows scheduled tasks via Task Scheduler or schtasks for persistence, execution, and lateral movement.
One listed item explicitly names “T1055 Process Injection” and includes APT28-linked malware such as Downdelph among examples.
ADVSTORESHELL achieves persistence by adding itself to the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key... APT28 has deployed malware that has copied itself to the startup directory for persistence... FIN7 malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.
One listed item explicitly names “T1055 Process Injection” and includes APT28-linked malware such as Downdelph among examples.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors deleting files, directories, droppers, logs, scripts, temporary files, exfiltrated archives, and uninstalling themselves to cover tracks or reduce forensic artifacts.
Agent Tesla can gather credentials from a number of browsers... APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne to gather credentials... TrickBot can obtain passwords stored in files from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Microsoft Edge... SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins; CryptUnprotectData
Agent Tesla can gather credentials from a number of browsers... APT3 has used tools to dump passwords from browsers... APT41 used BrowserGhost, a tool designed to obtain credentials from browsers, to retrieve information from password stores... TrickBot can obtain passwords stored in files from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Microsoft Edge
AdFind can extract subnet information from Active Directory; actors used ipconfig /all, netsh.exe, ifconfig, arp, route, nbtstat, and related APIs/commands to gather IP, MAC, DNS, DHCP, gateway, proxy, routing, ARP, and adapter information.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting the victim username, identifying logged-in users, running whoami, query user, quser, or similar commands to determine the current user or user sessions.
Tasklist can be used to discover processes running on a system. Numerous malware families and threat groups are described as listing running processes, collecting PIDs, checking for specific process names, or enumerating loaded modules.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting OS version, computer name, architecture, CPU, memory, disk, language, and other host details; examples include use of commands such as ver, systeminfo, hostname, uname -m, sw_vers -productVersion, and fsutil.
The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing of groups and malware that can 'list files and directories,' 'search for files,' 'enumerate drives,' 'gather file metadata,' or 'browse file systems' on compromised hosts.
Numerous entries mention enumerating drives, logical disks, disk type, free space, or volume information; examples include 'Babuk can enumerate disk volumes,' 'Cuba can enumerate local drives,' and 'TAINTEDSCRIBE can use DriveList to retrieve drive information.'
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting the current date, time, or time zone from victim systems, including examples such as "The net time command can be used... to determine the local or remote system time" and commands like "net time \\hostname" and "w32tm /tz".
Both sets of activity used the same servers at the same time and targeted the same organization... different Zebrocy C2 servers, including 193.23.181[.]151 ... Another server we detected that was used both by Zebrocy and by GreyEnergy is 185.217.0[.]124 ... They retrieve additional data from the following URL...
The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing showing numerous malware families and threat groups that 'use HTTP,' 'use HTTPS,' 'HTTP POST requests,' 'HTTP GET requests,' or 'HTTP/S' for command and control communications.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors that can "download files from C2," "download additional payloads," "upload and download files," "retrieve payloads from the C2 server," and "copy files to remote machines."
41 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
109 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A long-running, multi-language APT28/Sofacy malware family used in espionage campaigns, with loader and backdoor variants.
A long-running malware family mentioned because some GigaWiper samples showed classifier overlap and technical similarities with it; the article does not establish definitive attribution or direct operational use in this event.
A multilingual first-stage downloader and backdoor family used against embassies and ministries of foreign affairs, often treated as an APT28-associated operational cluster.
Referenced as a malware family associated with APT28 whose AutoIt variants search for predefined file extensions and use similar phishing and collection tradecraft.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.