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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 2 actors

BADBAZAAR

BadBazaar is a mobile spyware/surveillanceware family with Android and iOS variants. Public reporting in the provided content ties it with high confidence to China-aligned activity, including attribution to APT15 (also known as VIXEN PANDA/NICKEL), and other reporting links BadBazaar operations to GREF and Volexity’s EvilBamboo tracking. It has been used primarily against Uyghur, Tibetan, and Taiwanese individuals and communities, as well as related civil society organizations; reporting also notes targeting of people connected to democracy activism, Falun Gong, and other groups viewed by the Chinese state as sensitive.

BadBazaar is commonly delivered through trojanized or legitimate-looking mobile applications, especially Android apps masquerading as messaging apps, prayer apps, utilities, PDF readers, radio apps, dictionaries, battery managers, video players, third-party app stores, and regionally themed apps. Named lures and apps in the content include Signal Plus Messenger, FlyGram, TibetOne, Muslim Pro-themed lures, Radio Afghanistan-themed lures, WhatsApp/Signal/Telegram impersonators, and Whoscall-themed samples. Distribution channels mentioned include dedicated websites such as signalplus[.]org and flygram[.]org, Telegram channels and groups including tibetanphone, Reddit/forum promotion, YouTube promotional videos, Google Play, Samsung Galaxy Store, and in one case Apple’s App Store via the TibetOne iOS app.

Capabilities described in the content include theft of device and operator information, contacts, call logs, installed apps, Wi-Fi information, Google account emails, chats or messaging-related data, location data, photos, files, and in some variants real-time SMS theft/forwarding, photo capture, microphone/camera access, and tracking in real time. Government advisories cited in the content state that BadBazaar can covertly access microphones, cameras, messages, photos, chats, and location data. ESET reported that the Signal Plus Messenger variant abused Signal’s linked-device feature to silently link a victim’s Signal account to an attacker-controlled device and steal the Signal PIN, enabling surveillance of Signal communications. FlyGram also included a malicious Cloud Sync feature that uploaded Telegram backups and metadata to attacker-controlled infrastructure.

The iOS variant, publicly analyzed by Lookout in January 2024, masqueraded as TibetOne and exfiltrated device name, device type, local IP, OS version, UDID, and location. It sent data to tryhrwserf[.]com:4432/api/iosvalues and location-related data to tryhrwserf[.]com:4432/api/ioslogin, used SSL pinning with embedded certificate WIN-I6VBN8MR92A.cer (SHA1: 55191348eb763dc853a719c0f3defdbe354127db), and abused location permissions by presenting weather information via the OpenWeatherMap API key 64ffc9b16a9884436fa2ef3bf5248075. Reporting also notes Android/iOS C2 similarities, including Windows-hosted ASP.NET infrastructure and common API ports 4432 or 4332, with some servers exposing unsecured API help pages or iOS-related endpoints such as api/IosUploadFile.

Infrastructure and indicators explicitly mentioned in the content include signalplus[.]org:4332, flygram[.]org:4432, tryhrwserf[.]com, tibetone[.]org, xle.clublogs[.]com, clublogs[.]com, actuallys[.]com, rewrwer[.]com, voiceoftibet[.]net, myloughborough[.]com, pmstwocqn[.]com, collinformations[.]com, androidupdated[.]net, mail.pmumail[.]com, and IPs including 148[.]251[.]87[.]197, 95.179.210[.]85, and 65.21.92[.]67. Additional artifacts noted include package names org.thoughtcrime.securesmsplus and org.telegram.FlyGram, and SSL/common-name artifacts such as WMSvc-WIN-50QO3EIRQVP, WIN-50QO3EIRQVP, WIN-EU0VLBL7TUJ, and WIN-70E59JVOB9G.

The content consistently characterizes BadBazaar as part of long-running mobile surveillance operations using culturally tailored social engineering against targeted ethnic and political communities, with collection of data that would support monitoring, intimidation, and harassment.

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For your environment

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Ke3chang

The malicious code found in these apps is attributed to the BadBazaar malware family, which has been used in the past by a China-aligned APT group called GREF.

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
ta413

BADBAZAAR is a mobile malware with iOS and Android variants that have targeted Uyghurs, Tibetans and Taiwanese individuals.

via australian acsccyber.gov.au
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

APT15 developed its own malware, allowing it to persist within victim networks (T1587.001).

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The PRC has been publicly linked to cyber espionage operations against the Uyghur minority group, including members living in Canada, using spear phishing emails and spyware.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The app was circulated in targeted Telegram channels and Reddit forums where members of the Tibetan community gather.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

BADBAZAAR is spread via social media platforms and official app stores.

Execution

1 technique
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

YouTube videos (promoting the use of the malicious applications) were created by the malicious cyber actors. These videos included tutorials on how to use the applications developed.

Stealth

1 technique
T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

today's battleground is in people's pockets, as malicious tools pose as everyday apps

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

These two spywares hid inside legitimate-looking Android apps, acting essentially as “Trojan” malware, with surveillance capabilities such as the ability to access the phone’s cameras, microphone, chats, photos, and location data...

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

34 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
28 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
6 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching34

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping7

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.