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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 5 actors

Phobos

Phobos is a ransomware family and ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation active since at least 2018. The content describes it as a dispersed affiliate ecosystem with multiple variants, including Eking, Eight, Elbie, Devos, and Faust, and notes additional related branding or family members such as BackMyData and 8Base. Phobos affiliates have victimized more than 1,000 public and private entities worldwide and extorted more than $39 million; a separate DOJ reference attributes at least $16 million to a four-year campaign tied to operation and distribution of the malware. Reported targets include county governments, emergency services, education, public healthcare, and other critical infrastructure, with observed activity also affecting hospitals in Romania via the BackMyData variant.

The malware is associated with numerous affiliates and clusters rather than a single actor. The content links Makop’s early operations to a Phobos variant, states that 8Base uses customized Phobos payloads, and notes that Space Bears activity has been linked by several teams to the Phobos RaaS program. Law-enforcement reporting also ties some First VPN users and investigations to Phobos cases. The ecosystem has been active on cybercrime forums, including listings for cracked PHOBOS builders and leaked/cracked ransomware tooling, which lowers the barrier to entry for affiliates.

Operationally, Phobos incidents are described as human-operated intrusions that can involve extensive pre-encryption activity; Huntress observed Phobos actors averaging more than 30 actions before ransomware deployment and longer time-to-ransom than faster families such as Play or Akira. Seqrite reports Phobos operators commonly abuse legitimate administrative tools, especially Process Hacker, as part of defense evasion and antivirus/EDR neutralization. Related reporting also links HRSword to a Phobos incident and highlights broader use of low-level tools such as YDArk, PowerRun, Mimikatz, and other signed or legitimate utilities across ransomware campaigns that include Phobos.

A detailed technical description is provided for BackMyData, explicitly identified as a Phobos-family variant. BackMyData stores encrypted configuration protected by a hard-coded AES key, contains an RSA public key to wrap per-file AES-256 keys, avoids systems with Cyrillic locale indicators, impersonates explorer.exe to duplicate a token and respawn in that security context, deletes Volume Shadow Copies, disables automatic repair and the Windows firewall, and establishes persistence via Run registry keys and the Startup folder. It enumerates logical drives and network resources, probes port 445 to reach shares, enables SeDebugPrivilege, kills processes such as sqlservr.exe, oracle.exe, mysqld.exe, outlook.exe, winword.exe, excel.exe, thunderbird.exe, and steam.exe, and uses worker threads for traversal and encryption. It partially encrypts files larger than 1.5 MB, fully encrypts smaller files, appends the .backmydata extension plus victim-specific data, and drops ransom notes named info.txt and info.hta. The analyzed BackMyData sample SHA-256 is 396a2f2dd09c936e93d250e8467ac7a9c0a923ea7f9a395e63c375b877a399a6, and encrypted files contain a 6-byte marker DD F9 CC F5 B3 44.

Observed indicators and traits tied to the broader Phobos ecosystem in the content include use of the .8base extension by 8Base-customized Phobos samples, the .backmydata extension by BackMyData, ransom notes info.txt and info.hta for BackMyData, and infrastructure overlap reported around 8Base with SmokeLoader and SystemBC, including the domain admlogs25[.]xyz. The content also notes that Japanese authorities released free decryptors for Phobos and 8Base. Overall, the provided material characterizes Phobos as a long-running, affiliate-driven ransomware ecosystem targeting a wide range of sectors, especially critical infrastructure and mid-market to larger enterprises, with variants and affiliates that share similar TTPs and frequently rely on legitimate administrative tooling for intrusion support and defense evasion.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

5 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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8Base

On February 29th 2024, CISA released an advisory on Phobos ransomware... It is assessed that Phobos is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) with a number of variants (Eking, Eight, Elbie, Devos and Faust) and a disperse set of affiliates that share very similar TTPs.

via medium intel opsmedium.com
Makop

The Makop ransomware operators started their infamous criminal business in 2020 leveraging a new variant of the notorious Phobos ransomware.

via medium lcammedium.com
Velvet Tempest

They can also manifest in even more extreme behavior where RaaS affiliates switch to older “fully owned” ransomware payloads like Phobos...

via microsoft generalmicrosoft.com
Space Bears

Several research teams link the group to the Phobos ransomware as a service program (RaaS), and the Space Bears leak site is believed to function as a shared publishing point for activity related to that infrastructure.

via hackreadhackread.com
Phobos

Polish authorities arrested a 47-year-old man suspected of involvement in cybercrime and linked him to the Phobos ransomware operation... Phobos is an organized cybercrime group operating a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model, providing its malware to affiliates who carry out attacks and share the profits.

via security affairssecurityaffairs.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

30 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.002ToolEvidence1

"...charged with producing, obtaining and sharing computer programs used to illegally obtain information stored on IT systems."

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

“Alternatively, threat actors send spoofed email attachments [T1566.001]…”

Execution

4 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

“They use vssadmin.exe and Windows Management Instrumentation command-line utility (WMIC)… [T1047]…”

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

The ransomware creates a “cmd.exe” process that will execute multiple commands.

T1106Native APIEvidence2

Looking at ransomware brands in our dataset from 2020 to 2025, three brands (LockBit, Medusa, Phobos) and one technique (abuse of native BitLocker encryption) have persisted for the duration.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

“…spoofed email attachments [T1566.001] that are embedded with hidden payloads [T1204.002] such as SmokeLoader…”

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

Persistence is achieved by creating an entry under the Run registry key and copying the malware to the Startup folder.

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

The DuplicateTokenEx API is utilized to create a new access token... The ransomware spawns itself running in the security context of the newly created token.

T1134.001Token Impersonation/TheftEvidence2

The DuplicateTokenEx API is utilized to create a new access token that duplicates the token mentioned above... The ransomware spawns itself running in the security context of the newly created token.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

Persistence is achieved by creating an entry under the Run registry key and copying the malware to the Startup folder.

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

The malicious process enables the above privilege via a call to AdjustTokenPrivileges... 'SeDebugPrivilege' privilege

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

“…prepares a portable executable for deployment… [T1027.002]…”

T1027.009Embedded PayloadsEvidence1

“Embedded Payloads… Phobos actors embedded the ransomware as a hidden payload by using Smokeloader.”

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

The unencrypted file is overwritten with zeros and deleted afterwards.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

The DuplicateTokenEx API is utilized to create a new access token... The ransomware spawns itself running in the security context of the newly created token.

T1134.001Token Impersonation/TheftEvidence2

The DuplicateTokenEx API is utilized to create a new access token that duplicates the token mentioned above... The ransomware spawns itself running in the security context of the newly created token.

T1218.005MshtaEvidence1

“…Phobos ransom note is displayed… using mshta.exe [T1218.005].”

T1480.002Mutual ExclusionEvidence1

The ransomware tries to open two mutexes called “Global\\<<BID>><Volume serial number>00000001” and “Global\\<<BID>><Volume serial number>00000000”, and then creates them.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1003.001LSASS MemoryEvidence1

“Mimikatz… to export… credentials [T1003.001]…”

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

“Credentials from Password Stores [T1555]…”

T1555.005Password ManagersEvidence1

“They target… databases for… password management software [T1555.005].”

Discovery

5 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

The malware takes a snapshot of all processes in the system... The processes are enumerated using the Process32FirstW and Process32NextW APIs.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

The malware extracts the major and minor version numbers of the operating system using the GetVersion method.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

The files are enumerated using the FindFirstFileW and FindNextFileW methods.

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence1

WNetOpenEnumW is used to start an enumeration of all currently connected resources... The enumeration continues by calling the WNetEnumResourceW function.

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence1

The GetLocaleInfoW function is used to obtain the default locale... The binary verifies whether the 9th bit, which represents Cyrillic alphabets, is cleared.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

It tries to connect to every host on the network on port 445 in order to encrypt every available network share.

T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence1

It tries to connect to every host on the network on port 445 in order to encrypt every available network share.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

8base sample had been downloaded from the domain admlogs25[.]xyz ... 8base uses SystemBC to encrypt command and control traffic and Smokeloader, which provided initial obfuscation of the ransomware on ingress, unpacking, and loading of the Phobos ransomware.

Impact

3 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence11

8Base add their own branding customisation by appending “.8base” to their encrypted files and slightly modify the ransom note from the Phobos template.

T1489Service StopEvidence1

Any target process is stopped using the TerminateProcess method.

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence2

vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet – delete all Volume Shadow Copies; wmic shadowcopy delete – delete all Volume Shadow Copies | bcdedit /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures; bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no; wbadmin delete catalog -quiet

Other

1 technique
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence1

It deletes all Volume Shadow Copies and runs commands to disable the firewall.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
5 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app27 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app27 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app27 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
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IOC matching6

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution5

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping30

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.