TajMahal is a complex Windows espionage malware framework associated with highly targeted intrusions. It is notable for broad surveillance and collection functionality, including screenshot capture, webcam capture, keystroke logging, clipboard theft, document theft, collection from print spooler data, and exfiltration of gathered files over command-and-control channels. The framework can identify running processes and associated plugins, enumerate MAC address information, determine local system time, identify installed antivirus, firewall, and antispyware products, and detect connected Apple devices. It also supports DLL injection into running processes to load malicious plugins and can index and compress files into a send queue for exfiltration.
TajMahal includes specialized collection features uncommon in many malware families, such as enabling retention of printed jobs to facilitate theft of printed documents, stealing documents from local systems and print queues, and collecting written CD images and files from previously connected removable media when those devices become available again. These behaviors indicate a strong focus on long-term intelligence collection from victim endpoints.
A documented TajMahal sample was a .NET assembly focused on managing Windows service persistence. That sample used obfuscated strings, stored encrypted configuration data in the Windows Registry, and leveraged scheduled-task and service-related mechanisms to maintain access. Decrypted configuration fields indicated support for persistence service naming, description, entry-point configuration, and a self-destruction timestamp. Overall, TajMahal is best characterized as a modular espionage platform for Windows with extensive reconnaissance, surveillance, persistence, process injection, and data theft capabilities.
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24 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Aria-body has the ability to inject itself into another process such as rundll32.exe and dllhost.exe... BlackEnergy injects its DLL component into svchost.exe... ComRAT has injected its orchestrator DLL into explorer.exe... Stuxnet injects an entire DLL into an existing, newly created, or preselected trusted process.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.
Aria-body has the ability to inject itself into another process such as rundll32.exe and dllhost.exe... BlackEnergy injects its DLL component into svchost.exe... ComRAT has injected its orchestrator DLL into explorer.exe... Stuxnet injects an entire DLL into an existing, newly created, or preselected trusted process.
AdFind can extract subnet information from Active Directory; actors used ipconfig /all, netsh.exe, ifconfig, arp, route, nbtstat, and related APIs/commands to gather IP, MAC, DNS, DHCP, gateway, proxy, routing, ARP, and adapter information.
Tasklist can be used to discover processes running on a system. Numerous malware families and threat groups are described as listing running processes, collecting PIDs, checking for specific process names, or enumerating loaded modules.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as hostname, OS version, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, language, and other machine characteristics; e.g., "Action RAT has the ability to collect the hostname, OS version, and OS architecture of an infected host."
The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing of groups and malware that can 'list files and directories,' 'search for files,' 'enumerate drives,' 'gather file metadata,' or 'browse file systems' on compromised hosts.
ADVSTORESHELL can list connected devices. APT28 uses a module to receive a notification every time a USB mass storage device is inserted into a victim. APT37 has a Bluetooth device harvester, which uses Windows Bluetooth APIs to find information on connected Bluetooth devices.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting the current date, time, or time zone from victim systems, including examples such as "The net time command can be used... to determine the local or remote system time" and commands like "net time \\hostname" and "w32tm /tz".
"Bundlore has the ability to enumerate what browser is being used as well as version information"; "Orz can gather the victim's Internet Explorer version"; "SUGARDUMP can identify ... browsers, including version number"; "SideCopy has collected browser information"
"Bazar can query the Registry for installed applications." / "BRONZE BUTLER has used tools to enumerate software installed on an infected host." / "LightSpy ... enumerate the Applications folder to collect the bundle name, bundle identifier, and version information..." / "Volt Typhoon has queried the Registry on compromised systems for information on installed software."
Andariel has collected large numbers of files from compromised network systems for later extraction... APT28 has retrieved internal documents from machines inside victim environments... BADNEWS crawls the victim's local drives and collects documents... many listed groups and malware collect files, documents, credentials, payment card data, or other information from compromised hosts.
AppleSeed can find and collect data from removable media devices. APT28 backdoor may collect the entire contents of an inserted USB device. Aria-body has the ability to collect data from USB devices. BADNEWS copies files with certain extensions from USB devices to a predefined directory.
The content is a catalog of malware families and threat actors that 'can perform keylogging,' 'log keystrokes,' 'capture keystrokes,' or use 'keylogger' modules/tools.
The content is a MITRE ATT&CK-style listing of malware and threat actors that "can capture screenshots," "take screenshots," "perform screen captures," or "watch the victim's screen." It ends with references to "CopyFromScreen" and "xwd."
Agent Tesla can steal data from the victim’s clipboard. APT38 used a Trojan called KEYLIME to collect data from the clipboard. APT39 has used tools capable of stealing contents of the clipboard.
Agrius used a custom tool, sql.net4.exe, to query SQL databases and then identify and extract personally identifiable information... AppleSeed has automatically collected data from USB drives, keystrokes, and screen images before exfiltration... Ember Bear engages in mass collection from compromised systems during intrusions.
1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
56 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Identifies MAC addresses on infected hosts.
Malware framework capable of injecting plugin DLLs into running processes.
Malware capable of sending collected files over its C2 channel.
Spyware framework capable of determining local time on compromised hosts.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.