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Hook is an Android banking trojan derived from the ERMAC malware family and widely regarded as one of the more capable mobile banking malware strains in active circulation. It has been associated with the threat actor DukeEugene and has been marketed in underground communities as a botnet or malware service. Hook extends traditional Android banking-trojan tradecraft with broader remote-access and device-takeover functionality, blurring the line between banking malware, spyware, and RAT-style mobile malware.
Hook targets Android devices and is designed to support the full fraud chain from initial compromise through credential theft, session abuse, and fraudulent transaction execution. Core capabilities include overlay-based credential harvesting against banking and cryptocurrency applications, keylogging, SMS theft, contact theft, call forwarding, USSD execution, screenshot capture, geolocation collection, and theft of cryptocurrency wallet data including recovery-seed material. Hook also supports remote control of infected devices through abuse of Android Accessibility Services, enabling operators to simulate user interaction such as taps, swipes, scrolling, text entry, unlocking actions, and other hands-on-device operations often described as VNC-style control.
The malware communicates with command-and-control infrastructure using encrypted traffic and supports both HTTP and WebSocket-based communications, including real-time bidirectional control. It can enumerate installed applications, receive target lists from its operators, manage files on the device, retrieve images, and interact with messaging applications such as WhatsApp. These features enable both financial fraud and broader post-compromise surveillance or operational control.
Hook has been observed targeting a large international set of banking institutions, financial services, and cryptocurrency wallets across multiple regions including South America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. It is part of the broader ecosystem of modern Android banking trojans that rely heavily on Accessibility abuse and remote device takeover to defeat multifactor authentication and conduct account fraud. Public reporting has also noted underground rental offerings for Hook infrastructure and botnets, reinforcing its role as a commercially operated mobile malware platform.
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2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Based on the malware’s panel, we named this malware variant Hook. ... Hook now joins the very dangerous ranks of malware which is able to perform a full attack chain from infection to fraudulent transaction.
The mobile threat landscape has been shaped over the years by well-established banking Trojan families such as Anatsa, Octo, Hook...
10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
the malware either sends back to the server the full list of the files available on the device, or downloads a specific file from the file system
One modification that was done with this new malware variant, was the introduction of WebSocket communication in addition to the HTTP traffic used in the previous Ermac variants.
131 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
15 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Referenced as an Android banking trojan with 107 commands and a similar playbook involving fake-app droppers, Accessibility abuse, and HTML overlays.
An Android banking trojan observed on the same multi-RAT host, used for banking fraud within the operator's diversified malware portfolio.
Android banking trojan with overlay injection, VNC-based remote control, keylogging, SMS interception, call control, screenshot capture, file management, phishing via smart injections, credential theft, and cryptocurrency/seed phrase theft.
Android banking trojan variant adding ransomware-style full-screen overlays for extortion and expanded remote command set.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.