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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 5 actors

Raccoon Stealer

Raccoon Stealer is a commodity infostealer and malware-as-a-service offering used in the cybercriminal ecosystem to steal credentials and other victim data. The provided content states that it steals login credentials, browser history, cookies, session tokens, and other information from infected systems. It gathers information about the infected system owner and user, fingerprints hosts including by querying HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\MachineGuid, and collects the locale name of the infected device via GetUserDefaultLocaleName to check for the string "ru"; in analyzed samples, no action was taken when that string was present. Raccoon Stealer also collects files and directories from victim systems based on configuration data downloaded from command-and-control servers.

For command and control and exfiltration, the content explicitly states that Raccoon Stealer uses HTTP, particularly HTTP POST requests, and existing HTTP-based C2 channels for exfiltration. One mentioned C2 indicator is 91.201.115.148. The malware is repeatedly described as part of the broader infostealer economy alongside families such as RedLine, Vidar, Lumma, and StealC, and as enabling downstream intrusion activity through theft of browser-saved passwords, cookies, and session tokens.

The content associates Raccoon Stealer with multiple threat contexts. It notes that Scattered Spider has used Raccoon Stealer, and that GOLD HARVEST is known to employ commodity infostealers such as Vidar and Raccoon to collect browser-saved passwords, cookies, and session tokens. It is also referenced in malware bundles alongside AZORult, Predator the Thief, Smoke Loader, RedLine Stealer, Amadey, and Ficker Stealer, and in one observed malvertising-related infection chain a batch script downloaded Raccoon Stealer together with the Gozi/Ursnif backdoor. Additional reporting in the content links infrastructure clusters to BumbleBee, Raccoon Stealer, RecordBreaker, and SolarMarker.

The infection vectors mentioned in the content are indirect but consistent with commodity infostealer delivery: malware bundles, malware-as-a-service operations, and malvertising or SEO-poisoning-related delivery chains. The content also highlights its relevance to cloud and identity compromise by noting that infostealers such as Raccoon Stealer can extract cookies, credentials, and session tokens from browsers, including in the context of attacks against Snowflake-related access. Overall, the high-confidence characterization from the provided material is that Raccoon Stealer is a widely used credential and data theft malware family focused on browser and host data collection, HTTP-based C2/exfiltration, and support for broader criminal intrusion and extortion workflows.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

5 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Scattered Spider

GOLD HARVEST is known to employ commodity infostealers such as Vidar and Raccoon, which collect browser-saved passwords, cookies, and session tokens.

via sophos threat researchnews.sophos.com
GOLD HARVEST

GOLD HARVEST is known to employ commodity infostealers such as Vidar and Raccoon, which collect browser-saved passwords, cookies, and session tokens.

via sophos threat researchnews.sophos.com
Void Blizzard

"Threat actors then use information-stealing malware, such as Raccoon Stealer and Redline, to acquire credentials and session tokens from the victim’s browser."

via recorded future blogrecordedfuture.com
Storm-0501

"Threat actors then use information-stealing malware, such as Raccoon Stealer and Redline, to acquire credentials and session tokens from the victim’s browser."

via recorded future blogrecordedfuture.com
Curious Serpens

"Threat actors then use information-stealing malware, such as Raccoon Stealer and Redline, to acquire credentials and session tokens from the victim’s browser."

via recorded future blogrecordedfuture.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

31 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

2 techniques
T1592Gather Victim Host InformationEvidence1

Volt Typhoon has obtained the victim's system current location.

T1598Phishing for InformationEvidence1

This attack – known as ‘malvertising’ – is often aimed at users looking to download popular software applications.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence2

[ATK-16] Malvertising

T1586Compromise AccountsEvidence1

Selon Group-IB, les cybercriminels s’appuient également sur ... la prise de contrôle de médias sociaux pour disséminer les logiciels malveillants.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

There is increasing interplay between social engineering and stolen credentials... These credentials can enable initial access directly or support more convincing social engineering attempts by allowing attackers to reference internal systems or mimic legitimate employee behavior.

T1566PhishingEvidence2

Scattered Spider’s powerful initial access tactics ... include phone calls, SMS phishing, email phishing, MFA fatigue attacks, and SIM swapping. The domains used for email and SMS phishing abuse the Okta and Zoho ServiceDesk brands combined with the target’s name to make them appear legitimate.

Execution

2 techniques
T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

When a user searches for a related term and clicks through to the malicious site, the attackers check the Referer header to confirm the user has come from a search engine, and then entice them into downloading malware disguised as a legitimate software application.

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence1

Les cybercriminels intègrent par exemple des liens permettant de télécharger des malwares dans des critiques de jeux populaires ou dans des loteries sur les médias sociaux.

Persistence

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

There is increasing interplay between social engineering and stolen credentials... These credentials can enable initial access directly or support more convincing social engineering attempts by allowing attackers to reference internal systems or mimic legitimate employee behavior.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

There is increasing interplay between social engineering and stolen credentials... These credentials can enable initial access directly or support more convincing social engineering attempts by allowing attackers to reference internal systems or mimic legitimate employee behavior.

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

Examples throughout the content include 'encrypted payloads decrypted and executed in memory,' 'encrypts its configuration file,' 'AES-encrypted resource,' 'RC4 encrypted embedded scripts,' and 'payload includes an encrypted main component.'

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware deleting files, tools, scripts, logs, droppers, staged data, and artifacts from compromised systems to cover tracks, remove evidence, or self-delete.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

There is increasing interplay between social engineering and stolen credentials... These credentials can enable initial access directly or support more convincing social engineering attempts by allowing attackers to reference internal systems or mimic legitimate employee behavior.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, deobfuscating, or unpacking payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 responses prior to execution or use.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

DarkGate queries system locale information during execution. Later versions of DarkGate query GetSystemDefaultLCID for locale information to determine if the malware is executing in Russian-speaking countries.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

The downloaded file was a VHD container which, when mounted, revealed Installer.bat, a batch file containing simple commands intended to raise execution privileges; add scanning exclusions for Windows Defender; and download and execute a remote batch script and an executable.

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

When successfully deployed and executed, information-stealing malware can harvest credentials (usernames, passwords, and session cookies) from infected environments and export them as logs to the attackers’ server.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence7

These logs can hold credentials and tokens present on the compromised device, including corporate VPN, email, cloud, and SSO accounts... attackers authenticate with legitimate credentials, even bypassing MFA if they have a session cookie.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence3

When successfully deployed and executed, information-stealing malware can harvest credentials (usernames, passwords, and session cookies) from infected environments and export them as logs to the attackers’ server.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware stealing usernames, passwords, cookies, session tokens, and other saved credentials from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, Edge, Opera, Safari, and Yandex.

Discovery

7 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors querying, enumerating, searching, reading, or checking Windows Registry keys and values, e.g., "ADVSTORESHELL can enumerate registry keys," "APT41 queried registry values to determine items such as configured RDP ports and network configurations," and "Reg may be used to gather details from the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface."

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking whether the current user is an administrator, enumerating user sessions, and gathering account details from compromised hosts.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").

T1087.004Cloud AccountEvidence1

T1087.004: Account Discovery: Cloud To establish a foundational understanding of the target environment, a threat actor might first locate the identities operating within it... AzureHound parameters that facilitate the MITRE technique Account Discovery: Cloud Account include the following: list users list devices list device-owners list service-principals list service-principal-owners

T1217Browser Information DiscoveryEvidence1

APT38 has collected browser bookmark information to learn more about compromised hosts, obtain personal information about users, and acquire details about internal network resources.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

DarkGate queries system locale information during execution. Later versions of DarkGate query GetSystemDefaultLCID for locale information to determine if the malware is executing in Russian-speaking countries.

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

Confucius has used a file stealer to steal documents and images... Patchwork developed a file stealer to search C:\ and collect files with certain extensions... Winter Vivern delivered a PowerShell script capable of recursively scanning victim machines looking for various file types before exfiltrating identified files via HTTP.

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

Agrius used a custom tool, sql.net4.exe, to query SQL databases and then identify and extract personally identifiable information... AppleSeed has automatically collected data from USB drives, keystrokes, and screen images before exfiltration... Ember Bear engages in mass collection from compromised systems during intrusions.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

These are packaged into logs and sold, validated by intermediaries, and eventually monetized as enterprise access

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using HTTP and HTTPS for command and control, such as: "Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests."

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The batch script downloaded Raccoon Stealer, a prominent commodity infostealer, and Gozi/Ursnif, a backdoor.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence4

Examples include: "FIN4 has used HTTP POST requests to transmit data," "SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used HTTP for C2 and data exfiltration," and "PinchDuke transfers files from the compromised host via HTTP or HTTPS to a C2 server."

Impact

1 technique
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

- 08.20.2019 16:56:51 Release date Panel is ready Cryptolocker is ready ... - 10.02.2019 15:28:23 1.6 ransomware update changed encryption algorithm added our own key generator (not pseudo keys)

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

20 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
16 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
3 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app22 days ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 months ago
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uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 months ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching20

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution5

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping31

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.