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Mallory
MalwareRansomwareUsed by 12 actorsExploits 4 CVEs

XWorm

Also known asXWorm RAT

XWorm is a commodity Windows remote access trojan (RAT) widely referred to as XWorm or XWorm RAT. The provided content describes it as a full-featured RAT used by financially motivated actors and delivered across numerous malware distribution ecosystems and campaigns. Reported capabilities include startup registration, autorun modification, scheduled task creation, persistence, system information collection, host reconnaissance, user activity monitoring, encrypted socket-based command-and-control communications, remote code or payload execution, download-and-execute, reflective .NET loading, shell execution, browser opening, hidden HTTP requests, screenshots, plugin management, system shutdown or restart, DDoS activity, and in some cases anti-AMSI and anti-ETW functionality in associated loaders or shellcode stages.

Observed delivery vectors in the content include phishing and tax-themed lures, malvertising, ClickFix fake CAPTCHA flows, trojanized GitHub repositories and builders, malicious npm packages, fake game sites promoted through hijacked Discord accounts, WebDAV/search-ms chains abusing TryCloudflare Tunnel infrastructure, Python-based loaders, APC injection, staged .NET loaders, steganographic payload concealment, and packed delivery via HeartCrypt. Specific examples include ChatGPT-themed ClickFix malvertising, Indian Income Tax Department impersonation via harivo[.]vip, Canada-targeted mshta delivery that bundled Lumma with XWorm, and the Astral Warfare campaign delivering XWorm from astralwarfare[.]fr and a malicious npm package.

The malware appears in multiple criminal ecosystems as either a primary payload or secondary payload, including Amadey, PhantomVAI Loader, HeartCrypt-packed campaigns, TryCloudflare-based delivery clusters, and GitHub/distribution-as-a-service style operations. The content also links XWorm distribution to actors or clusters such as TA558, NullBulge, and multiple unattributed financially motivated campaigns; attribution to a single actor is not supported because XWorm is broadly used commodity malware.

Targeting in the content spans organizations and users globally, with explicit references to campaigns affecting India, Canada, Latin America, Switzerland, Ukraine, and broad global enterprise targets. Sectors and themes mentioned include finance, law, manufacturing, technology, hospitality, government, education, utilities, healthcare, and tax-related workflows.

High-confidence indicators and configuration details directly mentioned in the content include: C2 103[.]231[.]12[.]27:4444 in the India tax-themed campaign; XWorm-related indicators 66[.]63[.]168[.]133:7000 and weidmachane[.]zapto[.]org:7000 from an analyzed obfuscated cluster; and Astral Warfare XWorm configuration values including C2 host 185.94.29.43, port 7004, separator <Xwormmm>, group "XWorm V7.4," mutex ksUtjUa9iXc5wwbk, and USB name USB.exe. Additional associated infrastructure and artifacts mentioned include harivo[.]vip, astralwarfare[.]fr, promptcraft[.]online, and delivery from 185.147.125[.]174 in a Lumma-plus-XWorm chain. The content also notes a January 2025 report of a trojanized XWorm RAT builder distributed via GitHub that infected would-be users with an infostealer.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

4 CVES
CVE-2018-0802Microsoft Office Equation Editor Memory Corruption RCEExploited in the wild

2025-12 FortiGuard [[URL_5ad24528_9]] Multi-themed phishing, Equation Editor CVE-2018-0802 abuse | → XWorm RAT (XClient variant) process-hollowed into Caspol.exe → C2: alzap.ddns.com.br on a Brazilian Telefonica residential IP

via breakglass intelintel.breakglass.tech
CVE-2017-11882Microsoft Office Equation Editor Remote Code Execution

1014578922 INV_PL SWB Specimen.xlam Invoice CVE-2017-11882 2026-03-24 | A Turkish-origin threat actor operating under the GitHub alias flexhere687-art ... is conducting an active XWorm V6.0 campaign using a multi-layered delivery chain.

via breakglass intelintel.breakglass.tech
CVE-2026-20817Windows Error Reporting Service Elevation of Privilege

Tearing apart a .NET crypter to extract dual XWorm RAT payloads, then decompiling the RAT to find a UEFI bootkit with BlackLotus DBX bypass, an r77 rootkit, driver infection, CVE-2026-20817 zero-day UAC bypass, and D/Invoke API evasion.

via blueteamsecinfosec.pub
CVE-2025-8088WinRAR Windows Path Traversal via NTFS Alternate Data StreamsExploited in the wild

Google also observed financially motivated actors exploiting the WinRAR path-traversal flaw to distribute commodity remote access tools and information stealers such as XWorm and AsyncRAT...

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

12 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
TA558

While the actor favors VenomRAT, TA558 also distributes other commodity malware including njRAT, Remcos RAT, and recently XWorm and PDQ Connect.

via proofpointproofpoint.com
Nullbulge

The group’s other campaigns resulted in the distribution of more malware, including Async RAT and Xworm.

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
UAC-0184

XClient3.exe (XWorm; 178.33.57.148:443)

via cert uacert.gov.ua
TA584

Like similar Storm-0900 activity, this campaign led to XWorm, a popular modular malware used by many threat actors for remote access, deployment of other malware, and data theft. XWorm uses plugins that threat actors can use to perform various tasks on compromised devices. These plugins have evolved over the years. While we have not observed it being used in attacks, the latest XWorm version includes a plugin for encrypting files, giving the malware ransomware capability.

via linkedin posts weblinkedin.com
KongTuke

The terminal payload is typically XWorm or AsyncRAT, both commodity RATs sold through underground forums as Malware-as-a-Service.

via breakglass intelintel.breakglass.tech
UNC6032

XWORM RAT/Backdoor Windows UNC6032 Full remote access, C2 via Telegram.

via pillarpillar.security
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

35 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK FRAMEWORK ... Initial Access T1189 Drive-by Compromise ZIP archive with malware delivered via fake portal

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

Once downloaded, the ZIP archive unpacks a disk image file named Tax_Assessment.img, which contains two core malicious components working together in a staged execution chain.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence3

MITRE ATT&CK FRAMEWORK ... Initial Access T1566.002 Phishing: Spear phishing Link Fraudulent Income Tax website → malicious archive download

Execution

7 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

The DLL carries full RAT capabilities, including startup registration, scheduled task creation, system information collection, user activity monitoring, and encrypted communication back to the attacker.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK FRAMEWORK ... Persistence T1053.005 Scheduled Task Scheduled-task persistence functionality

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK FRAMEWORK ... Execution T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Reflection-based .NET dynamic execution

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The Lua files contain base64-encoded PowerShell that, when decoded, downloads and executes the Async RAT sample (via Invoke-WebRequest).

T1059.006PythonEvidence1

Confense documented a Python-based loader deploying XWorm RAT using APC injection from obfuscated Python code. The attack chain used Python’s ctypes library to call native Windows APIs directly

T1106Native APIEvidence1

Bumblebee’s injection module ( dij command for DLL Injection) dynamically resolves NtQueueApcThread at runtime and uses it to inject a payload DLL... While the static import of NtQueueApcThread is flagged by multiple scanners, a runtime GetProcAddress lookup on ntdll.dll is invisible to import-table analysis.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK FRAMEWORK ... Execution T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File User downloads/executes Tax_Assessment.exe

Persistence

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

The DLL carries full RAT capabilities, including startup registration, scheduled task creation, system information collection, user activity monitoring, and encrypted communication back to the attacker.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK FRAMEWORK ... Persistence T1053.005 Scheduled Task Scheduled-task persistence functionality

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

After deobfuscation, Tax_Assessment.exe was observed hiding its console window and modifying user registry settings.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

The DLL carries full RAT capabilities, including startup registration, scheduled task creation, system information collection, user activity monitoring, and encrypted communication back to the attacker.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Functions such as AddToStartupAdmin, AddToStartupNonAdmin, and SetAutoRun indicate startup persistence mechanisms

Privilege Escalation

6 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

The DLL carries full RAT capabilities, including startup registration, scheduled task creation, system information collection, user activity monitoring, and encrypted communication back to the attacker.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK FRAMEWORK ... Persistence T1053.005 Scheduled Task Scheduled-task persistence functionality

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Process injection sits at the top of the MITRE ATT&CK heap for the second year running. Picus Labs’ Red Report 2025 found T1055 in roughly 31% of the million-plus malware samples they examined.

T1055.004Asynchronous Procedure CallEvidence1

Hence APC injection was formed as a technique, they’d find a process with a thread in an alertable wait and get a handle to it, call VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory to plant shellcode and then call QueueUserAPC pointed at the shellcode, the thread would eventually wake up and execute the shellcode.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

The DLL carries full RAT capabilities, including startup registration, scheduled task creation, system information collection, user activity monitoring, and encrypted communication back to the attacker.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Functions such as AddToStartupAdmin, AddToStartupNonAdmin, and SetAutoRun indicate startup persistence mechanisms

Stealth

12 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence4

Confense documented a Python-based loader deploying XWorm RAT using APC injection from obfuscated Python code.

T1027.001Binary PaddingEvidence1

HeartCrypt was originally discovered through underground forums... it has been used to pack over 2,000 malicious payloads... The packed payload was consistently added as a resource to a legitimate binary... Each resource embedded in the binary contains PIC disguised as a bitmap (BMP) image file. This begins with a standard BMP header followed by a repeating hexadecimal pattern for padding.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

MITRE ATT&CK FRAMEWORK ... Stealth T1036 Masquerading Deceptive filenames/metadata impersonating tax docs

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

The binary uses misleading identification details, such as “Runtime Service Host” and “Microsoft Corporation,” to blend with trusted Windows components, potentially reducing suspicion and increasing the chance of bypassing security detections.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Process injection sits at the top of the MITRE ATT&CK heap for the second year running. Picus Labs’ Red Report 2025 found T1055 in roughly 31% of the million-plus malware samples they examined.

T1055.004Asynchronous Procedure CallEvidence1

Hence APC injection was formed as a technique, they’d find a process with a thread in an alertable wait and get a handle to it, call VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory to plant shellcode and then call QueueUserAPC pointed at the shellcode, the thread would eventually wake up and execute the shellcode.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

the “malware” is Python bytecode that decrypts its payload at runtime, making static analysis and YARA signatures far less effective.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK FRAMEWORK ... Execution T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution Mounted disk image (Tax_Assessment.img) stages execution

T1218.005MshtaEvidence1

The trick relies on a Base64-encoded PowerShell or mshta command being injected silently into the user's clipboard... This script then fetched the ClickFix lure and executed mshta via check.foquh[.]icu.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK FRAMEWORK ... Discovery T1497.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Anti-analysis checks before execution

T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence1

After deobfuscation, Tax_Assessment.exe was observed hiding its console window and modifying user registry settings.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

Tax_Assessment.exe was observed loading libsvcs.dll through Assembly.LoadFrom(). After successfully loading the assembly, the executable uses reflection to resolve the client.DllEntry class and invoke the Run method.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

After deobfuscation, Tax_Assessment.exe was observed hiding its console window and modifying user registry settings.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

The DLL carries full RAT capabilities, including startup registration, scheduled task creation, system information collection, user activity monitoring, and encrypted communication back to the attacker.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK FRAMEWORK ... Discovery T1033 System Owner/User Discovery User info collection during reconnaissance

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

Functions such as ... GetWindowsVersion ... support host reconnaissance.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK FRAMEWORK ... Discovery T1497.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Anti-analysis checks before execution

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence1

Functions such as ... GetSecurityInfo ... support host reconnaissance.

Collection

2 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

The DLL carries full RAT capabilities, including startup registration, scheduled task creation, system information collection, user activity monitoring, and encrypted communication back to the attacker.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

At the center sits a button labeled “Download Assessment Order & Workings,” which initiates the download of a malicious ZIP file disguised as official documentation.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The malware communicates with a hardcoded command-and-control server at 103.231.12.27 over port 4444.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK FRAMEWORK ... Command & Control T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols C2 via application-layer web communications

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK FRAMEWORK ... Command & Control T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer Dynamic payload loading/execution

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK FRAMEWORK ... Command & Control T1219 Remote Access Software RAT functionality for remote access/command execution

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence2

Additionally, the binary contains an embedded 32-byte constant likely used as a cryptographic key for socket communication, indicating the use of encrypted command-and-control (C2) traffic.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

318 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
175 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
124 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
19 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 days ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 days ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 days ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 days ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching318

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution12

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities4

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping35

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.