Storm-2992 is a financially motivated cybercrime actor responsible for developing, selling, updating, and supporting EvilTokens, a phishing-as-a-service platform first observed in February 2026. Its two identified primary operators resided in the United Kingdom. The actor marketed the platform through Telegram, charging an initial $1,500 fee and a $500 monthly subscription, with additional paid tools. EvilTokens-enabled campaigns compromised more than 12,000 Microsoft email inboxes across over 10,000 organizations worldwide, facilitating business email compromise and payment fraud. Affected sectors included financial services, construction, wholesale distribution, healthcare, higher education, and real estate. EvilTokens abuses Microsoft's legitimate OAuth device-authorization flow. Attackers initiate an authorization request and persuade victims to enter an attacker-generated device code through Microsoft's genuine authentication portal. Victims thereby authorize attacker-controlled sessions, potentially completing MFA, without directly disclosing their passwords to the attacker. The platform generates live device codes, automates authorization polling, and manages acquired access and refresh tokens. Its phishing templates impersonate Microsoft services, document-signing platforms, cloud services, and business workflows. Delivery and evasion techniques include malicious links, PDF and HTML attachments, image-based links, multistage redirects, fake verification pages, and abuse of legitimate serverless hosting services. The platform supports mailbox access, email exfiltration, Microsoft Graph reconnaissance, and AI-assisted analysis of organizational relationships, payment authority, invoices, and executive correspondence. These capabilities help customers identify valuable targets and craft contextual impersonation messages to redirect payments. Attackers using EvilTokens maintain access through token refresh and device registration, including acquisition of Primary Refresh Tokens, and use malicious inbox rules to conceal communications and security alerts. In September 2026, Microsoft and partners disrupted its infrastructure by seizing 50 websites and disabling more than 150 supporting domains. UK police arrested two suspected operators, who were released on bail pending investigation.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
24 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
1 malware family attributed to this actor across reporting.
3 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Associated with the EvilTokens device-code phishing operation. The content reports compromise of more than 12,000 mailboxes across more than 10,000 organizations before Microsoft's September 2026 takedown.
Creates and maintains EvilTokens, a phishing-as-a-service platform launched in February 2026 that facilitates Microsoft 365 account compromise through OAuth device-code phishing. The platform supports automated token acquisition and AI-assisted mailbox analysis to enable business email compromise and financial fraud. The content attributes more than 12,000 compromised email accounts across over 10,000 businesses worldwide to use of the platform, rather than exclusively to Storm-2992's direct operations. Microsoft announced a coordinated infrastructure disruption on September 22, 2026.
Developed and supported EvilTokens, an AI-enabled phishing-as-a-service platform used to compromise email accounts and conduct follow-on financial fraud. The service abused Microsoft device-code authentication to obtain session tokens and retain cloud-mailbox access.
Operated the EvilTokens phishing-as-a-service platform, which used AI-assisted device-code phishing to compromise inboxes, harvest authentication tokens, conduct Microsoft Graph reconnaissance, persist through device registration and hidden inbox rules, and impersonate parties in payment threads to divert funds.
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Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.