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Nimbus Manticore is an Iranian state-sponsored cyber-espionage group linked to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). It is also tracked as UNC1549, Smoke Sandstorm, GalaxyGato, Mirage Kitten, Screening Serpens, and Subtle Snail, and is assessed to be connected to the Tortoiseshell ecosystem. The actor has targeted aerospace, aviation, defense, telecommunications, satellite, software, IT-service-provider, government, financial, and energy organizations, with activity spanning the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, the United States, Australia, and Europe. Nimbus Manticore is known for recruitment-themed social engineering, often impersonating recruiters, employers, career portals, and software-download sites to deliver malware to professionals and software engineers. Its intrusion chains have used credential-harvesting portals, trojanized development challenges and installers, DLL sideloading, .NET AppDomain hijacking, scheduled-task and operating-system-specific persistence, and cloud-hosted command-and-control infrastructure. The group has also used SEO poisoning to distribute weaponized software installers. Its malware ecosystem includes NodeRabbit, PollCat, NightLedger, MiniJunk, MiniFast, MiniBrowse, TWOSTROKE, MINIBIKE, BridgeHead, ArcBridge, LIGHTRAIL, and POLLBLEND. These tools provide remote command execution, host and process discovery, file and directory operations, screenshot capture, payload and DLL loading, file transfer, browser credential theft, data exfiltration, and covert network tunneling. Recent tooling includes cross-platform Node.js and JavaScript remote-access trojans for Windows, Linux, and macOS, as well as Windows implants that use HTTPS or WebSocket communications and resilient cloud-backed infrastructure. MiniFast has been assessed as likely AI-assisted in development based on its coding characteristics.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
39 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
28 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
23 additional families tracked in Mallory.
94 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Iranian cyber-espionage group expanding from Windows-focused tooling into Node.js/JavaScript cross-platform remote-access trojans targeting Windows, Linux, and macOS developer systems. It uses recruitment-themed social engineering, notably LinkedIn and job-assessment lures, to deliver trojanized coding challenges and establish persistent remote access.
Iranian cyber-espionage actor expanding its operational infrastructure and toolset to maintain access to targeted organizations. It has conducted Dream Job-style social-engineering campaigns using fraudulent job offers to deliver malware and has been associated with persistent-access tooling targeting organizations in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and Europe.
Iranian state-sponsored espionage actor linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. It has expanded infrastructure across Europe and the Middle East, used SSH and WebSocket tunneling utilities for persistent access, and deployed backdoors against entities in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia.
Iranian cyber-espionage actor associated with newly identified infrastructure and malware. It has conducted a version of the Dream Job campaign, using job opportunity-themed social engineering to deliver malware.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.