Pink is a financially motivated data-extortion brand tracked as CL-CRI-1147 and linked by multiple researchers to the broader UNC6671 / BlackFile / Redact / Helix / Falcon ecosystem. It is also assessed by several vendors as likely affiliated with The Com cybercriminal milieu. Pink emerged in 2026 as a cloud-focused extortion operation that relies on social engineering rather than malware deployment or encryption-based ransomware. Pink commonly gains initial access through voice phishing and fake IT help-desk calls. Operators impersonate internal support staff and direct employees to tailored phishing portals themed around Microsoft Entra ID, passkey enrollment, SSO, or Okta. The phishing infrastructure is designed to capture credentials, MFA factors, and authenticated sessions in real time, including through adversary-in-the-middle workflows and passkey-enrollment lures. Reported kit features include dynamic victim branding, MFA-adaptive flows, anti-analysis checks, backend-controlled gating, and mechanisms intended to keep victims occupied while the attackers log into the real account and enroll attacker-controlled authentication methods. After compromise, Pink targets enterprise identity and SaaS environments, especially Microsoft 365, SharePoint, OneDrive, and in some reporting Okta. The group has been observed stealing data rapidly from cloud repositories, using legitimate account access and built-in automation or scripted collection rather than conventional malware. Post-compromise activity includes sending extortion demands from compromised email accounts and internal collaboration platforms, threatening publication of stolen data on a dedicated leak site. Pink is therefore best characterized as a data-theft extortion actor rather than a traditional ransomware encryptor. Pink has been linked through shared infrastructure, phishing templates, victimology, and operational overlap to BlackFile and Redact, with some assessments describing it as a successor or rebrand after BlackFile’s 2026 shutdown. Google has associated Pink with the UNC6671 cluster and assessed that multiple extortion brands may be used to compartmentalize operations, obscure total victim volume, and isolate negotiations. Reported targeting spans enterprise organizations across healthcare, technology, financial services, transportation, hospitality, manufacturing, real estate, insurance, and other high-value sectors, with a notable emphasis in 2026 on organizations holding sensitive corporate, client, or transaction-related data.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
33 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
8 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
18 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Named extortion brand sharing infrastructure with UNC6671-linked operations.
Extortion brand sharing infrastructure with Helix within the broader UNC6671-linked activity cluster.
One of four successor brands/groups that UNC6671/BlackFile reportedly split into, continuing the same vishing and extortion tradecraft.
Extortion brand associated with UNC6671; described as conducting Big Game Hunting with tailored Okta and Microsoft Entra ID phishing kits and gated phishing infrastructure.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.