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Lamashtu is a financially motivated extortion group that emerged in April 2026 and operates a dedicated Tor-hosted leak site under the Lamashtu brand. Available evidence indicates that the group primarily conducts data-theft extortion rather than conventional file-encrypting ransomware operations. Public reporting has not identified a confirmed encryptor, ransom note, malware family, file-extension artifact, or cryptocurrency wallet associated with the group. Its operations center on stealing victim data and coercing payment through threatened public release. The group uses a leak-site model with victim listings, countdown timers, breach impact reports, proof-of-life file previews, and a public API to manage or expose victim posts. This tradecraft is consistent with data-theft extortion and public shaming pressure rather than disruptive encryption-led campaigns. Exfiltration is the only behavior directly confirmed at high confidence from observed operations. Lamashtu’s victimology appears opportunistic and broad rather than ideologically driven or narrowly strategic. Reported victims span multiple countries and sectors, including food production, manufacturing, metals, and industrial-related businesses. Confirmed victim geographies include Egypt, Thailand, India, Germany, and Malaysia. Open reporting does not establish any nation-state affiliation, hacktivist alignment, or destructive objective. Likely initial access vectors have been assessed to include stolen credentials and phishing, with exploitation of public-facing applications considered possible, but these access methods are not directly confirmed from primary operational evidence. The group’s dominant objective is financial gain through extortion based on stolen data exposure.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
7 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
3 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Mentioned as a new entrant in quarterly rankings.
Conducting a ransomware attack against Great Foods, an Egyptian food manufacturing and distribution company.
Conducting a ransomware attack resulting in a data breach against PatayaFood, a Thai food manufacturer and supplier.
Conducting a ransomware attack resulting in a data breach against Shanpoornam Metals.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.