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Mallory

icarus

Also known asicarus

Icarus is a newly emerged cybercrime extortion group active since at least April 2026. In the provided reporting, Icarus claimed responsibility for the June 2026 supply-chain attack involving Klue, a market intelligence platform, and the downstream compromise of multiple customers’ Salesforce environments. Public reporting and victim statements describe Icarus as a ransomware or extortion group operating a Tor-based leak site and threatening to publish stolen data unless ransom demands were met. According to the content, Icarus gained access to Klue using a compromised legacy credential tied to an integration service or limited 2022 pilot, then harvested or generated OAuth tokens used by Klue integrations. The group used those tokens to access connected third-party platforms, especially Salesforce, and exfiltrated data in bulk. Reporting also states the attackers implanted or pushed malicious code in Klue’s environment, enumerated victim Salesforce environments through the REST API, and used automated scripts, including Python scripts, to map CRM structures and steal targeted data over sustained periods. The group’s activity in this incident was focused on data theft and extortion rather than disruptive encryption. Stolen data was consistently described as business contact information, CRM records, support case data, sales-related information, pricing quotes, account data, and related business records. Multiple organizations were publicly identified as affected through the Klue compromise, including Huntress, LastPass, BeyondTrust, HackerOne, Jamf, OneTrust, Recorded Future, Snyk, Tanium, Insurity, Sprout Social, Gong, 8x8, Pendo, and others. Icarus added Klue and several customers to its leak site and directly threatened release of the stolen information. The content does not provide high-confidence attribution of Icarus to any nation state. Huntress is cited as attributing the Klue intrusion to Icarus with high confidence, while other reporting noted disputed attribution involving ShinyHunters; therefore only the direct reporting that Icarus claimed responsibility and was independently linked by Huntress to the incident is high confidence here. No aliases or sub-groups beyond the name Icarus are directly supported in the content.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Software & Services
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

23 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

12 of 15 tactics33 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0001
Initial Access
3 techniques
T1078×16
Valid Accounts
T1078.004×7
Cloud Accounts
T1195×9
Supply Chain Compromise
T1195.001
Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools
T1566
Phishing
TA0002
Execution
1 technique
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.009
Cloud API
TA0003
Persistence
2 techniques
T1078×16
Valid Accounts
T1078.004×7
Cloud Accounts
T1556×2
Modify Authentication Process
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
T1055
Process Injection
T1078×16
Valid Accounts
T1078.004×7
Cloud Accounts
TA0005
Stealth
2 techniques
T1055
Process Injection
T1078×16
Valid Accounts
T1078.004×7
Cloud Accounts
TA0112
Defense Impairment
1 technique
T1556×2
Modify Authentication Process
TA0006
Credential Access
4 techniques
T1212
Exploitation for Credential Access
T1528×11
Steal Application Access Token
T1556×2
Modify Authentication Process
T1649×6
Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
TA0007
Discovery
1 technique
T1526
Cloud Service Discovery
TA0008
Lateral Movement
1 technique
T1550
Use Alternate Authentication Material
TA0009
Collection
3 techniques
T1074
Data Staged
T1119×2
Automated Collection
T1213×16
Data from Information Repositories
TA0010
Exfiltration
4 techniques
T1041×3
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1048×2
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
T1537×6
Transfer Data to Cloud Account
T1567×4
Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1567.002
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
TA0040
Impact
2 techniques
T1486×4
Data Encrypted for Impact
T1657×3
Financial Theft
IOCS

Observables

10 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping23

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables10

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.