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Storm-237 is a Russian threat cluster associated with device code phishing operations targeting Microsoft accounts. The actor has been observed abusing the OAuth 2.0 device authorization flow to trick victims into authorizing attacker-controlled devices, enabling theft of access and refresh tokens and resulting in immediate and persistent access to victim email, files, Teams data, and other Microsoft single-sign-on-enabled services. This tradecraft aligns with business email compromise-style objectives and token-based account hijacking rather than malware-heavy intrusion chains. Storm-237 has been publicly tracked alongside other Russian groups observed using the same technique, including UTA032, UTA0355, UNK_AcademicFlare, and TA2723. High-confidence reporting supports Russian attribution and the actor’s use of phishing for initial access, session hijacking through token abuse, credential-adjacent account compromise via authorization theft, persistence through refresh-token access, and post-exploitation access to cloud-hosted communications and data.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
1 distinct technique observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
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Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
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Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.