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ForceMemo is a software supply chain intrusion campaign active in March 2026 that compromised more than 150, and in other reporting more than 240, GitHub Python repositories through account takeover followed by force-push of malicious code. The campaign is associated with credentials stolen via the GlassWorm malicious VS Code extension operation, indicating a workflow in which developer credential theft enabled unauthorized modification of upstream source repositories. Reporting also links ForceMemo to infrastructure overlap with activity attributed with high confidence to Lazarus Group's TraderTraitor cluster, also tracked as UNC4899, Jade Sleet, and Slow Pisces, including shared use of a Solana-based dead-drop mechanism and the same wallet infrastructure observed in related developer-targeting malware operations. ForceMemo therefore appears to sit within a broader developer-focused supply chain threat ecosystem centered on compromising code repositories and poisoning trusted software distribution paths. The campaign's directly supported capabilities include initial access through stolen credentials, credential theft as an enabling precursor, and post-compromise modification of repositories for downstream malicious code distribution. High-confidence victimology in the available facts is limited to GitHub-hosted Python projects and developers in the software ecosystem.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
1 distinct technique observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A separate supply chain campaign using credentials stolen via malicious VS Code extensions to force-push malicious code into GitHub Python repositories.
A separate supply chain campaign using credentials stolen via malicious VS Code extensions to force-push malicious code into GitHub Python repositories.
A campaign compromising GitHub Python repositories via account takeover and force-push, injecting code that reads C2 instructions from the same Solana wallet dead-drop infrastructure.
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Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
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