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APT-Q-27, also known as GoldenEyeDog, GoldEye Dog, and Dragon Breath, is a Chinese-nexus threat group active since at least 2022 that targets gambling businesses and cryptocurrency-related organizations, including Web3 customer support teams. Jinzhigou was merged into this actor's tracking after matching decryption code was identified in its tooling and an APT-Q-27 Telegram watering-hole operation. APT-Q-27's operations have used watering holes, trojanized software, and customer-support social engineering to deliver Windows backdoors. A state sponsorship relationship has not been established. The group's malware employs multistage delivery, encrypted payloads, in-memory execution, packing or custom virtualization, and extensive anti-debugging and anti-sandbox checks. Its tooling includes remote-command execution, keylogging, and clipboard manipulation. Digitally signed malicious files and legitimate signed applications help conceal execution, while DLL sideloading loads malicious components. Persistence mechanisms include Windows services and registry startup entries; some implants also modify User Account Control settings. Delivery and configuration retrieval can abuse cloud storage and public content-hosting services, with encrypted controller lists or remotely retrieved configuration supporting infrastructure rotation.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
56 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
13 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
8 additional families tracked in Mallory.
292 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Mentioned only in related content as a Web3-targeting threat group using fake screenshot links to install a persistent backdoor.
Linked to the long-running sims-4-updater malware distribution campaign, using a custom PE64 backdoor, EV code-signing abuse, live C2 infrastructure, and dead-drop resolvers via rentry.co/rentry.org/GitHub gist. The group is also described as historically targeting gambling operators and Chinese-speaking gambling players in Southeast Asia, and was tied to a January 2026 corporate intrusion in Vietnam.
Conducting social-engineering-based intrusions against Web3 customer support teams by posing as customers in support chats and delivering a multi-stage backdoor via fake screenshot links. The group has been active since at least 2022 and has a history of targeting the gambling and cryptocurrency sectors.
A sophisticated multi-stage intrusion linked by infrastructure and tradecraft similarities to prior APT-Q-27 activity. The campaign used a phishing-delivered .pif dropper, digitally signed malware, DLL sideloading, persistence via registry and Windows services, in-memory payload execution, and a modular plugin-based backdoor architecture.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.