Icefog, also known as Fucobha, is a cyberespionage threat actor active since at least 2011, primarily targeting South Korea and Japan, with additional documented targeting in Taiwan. Its targets include government institutions, military contractors, maritime and shipbuilding organizations, telecommunications and satellite operators, industrial and technology companies, software developers, research organizations, and mass media. Japanese parliamentary institutions were among its early targets. Its national origin and state sponsorship have not been conclusively established. Icefog is distinct from TA428; shared infrastructure or tooling does not establish that the two are the same actor. Icefog is characterized by focused, operator-driven, hit-and-run intrusions. Operators inspect compromised systems and network configurations, identify specific documents and credentials, deploy additional tools as needed, archive and exfiltrate selected information, and then abandon victims. Initial access methods include spear-phishing attachments and malicious links, exploitation of patched Microsoft Office and Oracle Java vulnerabilities, and abuse of Windows Help macros. Document exploits have included CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-2012-1856, while Java exploits have included CVE-2013-0422 and CVE-2012-1723. The actor's tooling includes multiple Windows Icefog backdoor variants, the custom TCP-based Icefog-NG variant, and the macOS backdoor Macfog. These implants support system reconnaissance, remote command execution, file transfer, and deployment of additional malware. Operators have used password and hash dumpers, browser and email credential-recovery utilities, and tools supporting lateral movement. Windows variants employ DLL search-order hijacking and persistence mechanisms, while Macfog uses launch-agent persistence and was distributed through trojanized applications on Chinese-language forums. Operators also screen apparent virtual machines and fake victims before interacting with them.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
3 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
9 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
4 additional families tracked in Mallory.
4 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 4 of them exploited in the wild.
CVE-2012-0158 (the MSCOMCTL.OCX remote code execution vulnerability fixed with Microsoft’s MS12-027 security bulletin). The first two vulnerabilities are exploited through Microsoft Office documents (Word and Excel) that drop and execute the backdoor and show a fake “lure” document to the victim.
During our investigation, we identified several types of exploits being used through spear-phishing e-mails against the targets: ... Web links to Oracle Java exploits (CVE-2013-0422 and CVE-2012-1723).
CVE-2012-1856 (the “Tran Duy Linh” exploit fixed in Microsoft’s MS12-060 security bulletin). The attachment is a standard “Tran Duy Linh” exploit for CVE-2012-1856.
During our investigation, we identified several types of exploits being used through spear-phishing e-mails against the targets: ... Web links to Oracle Java exploits (CVE-2013-0422 and CVE-2012-1723).
154 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Referenced as one of several threat actors known to use ShadowPad.
Referenced as having used Quarian in a 2019 resurgence; the 2020 Quarian activity is discussed separately and attributed to CloudComputating, not explicitly to Icefog.
Mentioned only to clarify that it is distinct from TA428 and that shared builder artifacts caused confusion.
Referenced as a known threat group with network-range overlap to PlugX *Http and Starter groups.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.