UAC-0082, widely known as Sandworm, is a Russian state-linked threat actor associated with the GRU and tracked in Ukrainian reporting for destructive cyber operations against Ukraine. The cluster has been linked with multiple wiper families, including HermeticWiper, IsaacWiper, and CaddyWiper, and has conducted attacks intended to disrupt the integrity and availability of victim systems rather than pursue conventional cybercrime objectives. The actor has targeted Ukrainian critical information infrastructure and government-related entities. In a 2023 destructive intrusion against Ukraine’s national news agency Ukrinform, the operation involved multi-platform wiping components for Windows, Linux, and FreeBSD environments, including CaddyWiper as well as additional destructive tooling. The attackers conducted reconnaissance well in advance of the final attack stage, obtained unauthorized remote access, and attempted centralized malware deployment through Active Directory Group Policy Objects that created scheduled tasks across the environment. Observed behavior also included administrative command execution and actions consistent with environment discovery and attack preparation. Sandworm’s activity in this context reflects a mature disruptive capability focused on reconnaissance, initial access, persistence within enterprise environments, centralized execution, and destructive post-compromise actions. Ukrainian authorities have also linked the same broader wave of hostile activity to attacks extending beyond Ukraine into European organizations supporting Ukrainian refugees. The actor is best characterized as a state-sponsored destructive and espionage-capable operator serving Russian strategic objectives.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
14 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
8 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
3 additional families tracked in Mallory.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Conducting destructive cyber attacks against Ukrainian critical information infrastructure during March 15-22, 2022.
Destructive intrusion against Ukraine’s national news agency Ukrinform, attempting to disrupt integrity/availability via wiper/destructor tooling (CaddyWiper, ZeroWipe; plus SDelete) distributed centrally through Active Directory Group Policy Objects (GPO) and scheduled tasks; partial impact on some storage systems. Recon activity assessed no later than 2022-12-07; final stage initiated 2023-01-17.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.