CipherForce is a ransomware and data-extortion brand linked to the broader TeamPCP ecosystem. It emerged in early 2026 as a proprietary ransomware operation associated with actors also using the TeamPCP and ShellForce names, and was later described as part of TeamPCP’s shift from large-scale credential theft and software supply-chain compromise into ransomware-as-a-service and extortion monetization. Public statements attributed to the operators indicated that CipherForce was a newer project intended to recruit affiliates and begin publishing victim organizations, while later reporting tied it to partnerships with other extortion actors including Vect. CipherForce has been associated with Tor-based leak infrastructure and victim shaming operations, indicating use of leak-site-driven extortion. Reporting also links the brand to data theft and extortion activity rather than only standalone encryption events, and describes TeamPCP as using credentials harvested from CI/CD and downstream software supply-chain compromises to feed broader monetization chains that included CipherForce. Before TeamPCP’s later rebranding of its leak infrastructure, CipherForce reportedly listed a small number of victims and then went quiet, with its leak sites subsequently becoming unavailable for an extended period. The actor’s broader ecosystem has been tied to credential theft, exfiltration, initial access brokering, and downstream ransomware deployment. CipherForce itself is best understood as the ransomware/extortion arm or brand within that ecosystem rather than a fully separate cluster. Known associated names in the surrounding activity include TeamPCP and ShellForce. Reporting also notes operational overlap or partnership activity with Vect, and some assessments indicate TeamPCP may have sold or shared harvested credentials with ransomware affiliates including CipherForce.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
48 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
1 malware family attributed to this actor across reporting.
1 indicator attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
16 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Ransomware/extortion brand previously operated by TeamPCP before rebranding to a TeamPCP leak site.
Referenced as another TeamPCP-affiliated ransomware operator that had been inactive for roughly 70 days.
Named extortion/leak infrastructure referenced as part of the broader TeamPCP-affiliated monetization ecosystem. The content emphasizes that its infrastructure remained offline and no expected public dump occurred.
Named extortion/leak infrastructure associated in the reporting with TeamPCP's monetization ecosystem, noted here as offline and inactive during the period.
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Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
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Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.